1 Passage of controversial reform bills in Taiwan spur anti-CCP sentiment
Taiwan legislature passes another reform bill
May 28
1. Taiwan’s opposition parties passed a bill that adds a “contempt of parliament” offense to the criminal court, requires the president to report to the legislature and answer questions, and enables lawmakers to get the military, companies, and individuals to share information.
2. Large numbers of people gathered outside Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan for the fourth time to protest the parliamentary reform bills, with organizers announcing in the evening that the crowd had surpassed 70,000. The protest movement, which was initially dubbed “Sunflower 2.0,” was later named the “Bluebird Movement” (青鳥行動) as people searched for a way to counter algorithms lowering the visibility of the protest (references to “Blue Island East Road” [青島東路] outside the Legislative Yuan were changed to “Bluebird East” [青鳥東], with the character for “island” swapped with the similar-looking “bird”).
On the same day, so-called “528 Bluebird Movement” protests were launched in 15 counties and cities, including Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung. Nearly 50 civil society groups participated in the demonstrations, according to Taiwanese media.
Taiwanese opposition parties push for abolishing the Control Yuan
May 28
Taiwan’s Control Yuan said in a statement that the Republic of China constitution stipulates the separation of the government’s five branches, and supervisory powers such as investigation and review are exclusively exercised by it. Also, some provisions passed by the Legislative Yuan violated the separation of powers before the passage of constitutional amendments.
Kuomintang legislative caucus leader Fu Kun-chi criticized the Control Yuan for the statement and claimed that it had “only prosecuted the blue camp (KMT) and not the green camp (Democratic People’s Party)” in the past eight years. Fu added that the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party would establish an “Opposition Special Investigation Team” in the future to investigate corruption cases.
TPP caucus whip Huang Kuo-chang also slammed the Control Yuan and said that it spends NT$1 billion yuan (about $31 million) annually of taxpayers’ money to maintain operations but “only dares to swat flies, not tigers” and had completely lost the people’s trust. Huang added that the TPP will push for abolishing the Control Yuan in the next phase of constitutional reform.
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Leading DPP politicians had proposed abolishing the Control Yuan and Examination Yuan when they were the opposition. The DPP also previously wrote on its official Facebook page that “abolishing the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan is the consistent position of the DPP.”
William Lai sees surge in popularity
May 27
Taiwanese newspaper Formosa News published a national governance poll for May 2024 with the following results:
- Taiwan president William Lai Ching-te had a trust rating of 53 percent and a satisfaction rating of 45.2 percent. Lai came to office in January with 40.05 percent of the vote.
- 41.7 percent of the people polled believe that Taiwan’s overall domestic economic situation is good, an increase of 7.6 percent from the previous month. Conversely, 54.6 percent believe that the overall domestic economic situation is bad, a decrease of 7.1 percent from a month ago.
- The DPP’s favorability rating increased by 2.6 percent to 46.1 percent.
- The KMT’s favorability rating decreased by 3 percent to 32.9 percent.
- The TPP’s favorability rating decreased by 4.8 percent to 31.6 percent.
Our take
1. The ongoing developments and disputes over the parliamentary reform bills in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan appear to partially affirm our analysis and other insider information about how the CCP is influencing Taiwan’s opposition parties to undermine democracy in the ROC and advance the PRC’s “reunification” agenda.
The “blue-white coalition’s” effort to ram through the parliamentary reform bills without necessary intra-party consultations has raised concerns about their constitutionality. The resulting social backlash the move has triggered is in line with the two directives and four measures that Xi Jinping allegedly instructed senior officials responsible for united front and Taiwan affairs on that was earlier disclosed by Australia-based Chinese dissident Yuan Hongbing’s CCP sources.
In an interview with the Chinese language edition of Voice of America published on May 29, Yuan said that the “blue-white coalition” has two political objectives in expanding the legislature’s power. First, the opposition parties want to shackle William Lai’s executive power (allegedly in accordance with directives from the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office). Second, the opposition parties want to extend the legislature’s power into the judiciary to counter the DPP’s control and influence over that branch of the government. Yuan believes that the “blue-white coalition’s” next step is abolishing the anti-infiltration act; the act was passed in 2019 to obstruct channels between the CCP and pro-CCP elements in Taiwan.
The effort by Taiwan’s opposition parties to expand the legislature’s power and ignore the democratic process will likely be self-defeating in the long run and will draw more attention within Taiwan to the CCP threat. Already, the recent national governance poll by Formosa News shows that the KMT and TPP are losing favorability in Taiwan. Meanwhile, KMT caucus leader Fu Kun-chi’s call to abolish the Control Yuan appears to contradict the KMT’s campaign pledge in the 2024 general election to “defend the ROC constitution” (捍衛中華民國憲法). Going forward, the “blue-white coalition’s” interactions with the CCP (such as the KMT’s engagement on the mainland at the end of April) will likely come under greater public scrutiny as the Taiwanese people grow more wary of CCP united front and subversion efforts.
2. The initial success of Taiwan’s opposition parties in forcing through the parliamentary reform bills and suspected CCP involvement behind the scenes has sparked a civic movement on the island and will generate greater anti-CCP sentiment going forward.
Beijing’s united front tactics and efforts to drive “peaceful reunification” are likely to become less effective in the long run as Taiwanese society, and especially the younger generation, becomes increasingly aware of and resistant to such measures. For instance, Taiwanese media found that the “Bluebird Movement” has a broad age distribution, with participants ranging from those under 20 to those over 50. The “Bluebird Movement” also lacks any prominent social movement figures.
The CCP’s ability to sway Taiwanese society is further reduced by Taiwan’s reduced dependence on the mainland. For instance, Taiwan’s total exports in the first four months of 2024 increased by 10.6 percent from a year ago to $147.8 billion, but exports to mainland China (including Hong Kong) decreased by 3.7 percent year-on-year to $45.3 billion (30.7 percent of total exports). This meant that Taiwan’s exports to China were at the lowest proportion for the January-April period since 2002. Moreover, tourism from mainland China to Taiwan plummeted during the pandemic years and has not bounced back to pre-pandemic levels. Fewer than 13,000 Chinese tourists visited Taiwan during the first 11 months of 2023 compared with about 1.9 million Chinese tourists in all of 2019 according to data compiled by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, and the bulk of tourists to Taiwan now come from Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Singapore.
Finally, support for the DPP among centrist voters and young people could also go up as a result of the “blue-white coalition” pushing through the parliamentary reform bills. The DPP did not do well in the 2024 presidential and legislative elections as the Taiwanese people grew dissatisfied with the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s governance over the previous four years:
- 2024 Taiwan presidential election results:
- William Lai Ching-te (Democratic Progressive Party) — 40.05 percent.
- Hou Yu-ih (Kuomintang) — 33.49 percent.
- Ko Wen-je (Taiwan People’s Party) — 26.46 percent.
- 2024 Taiwan legislative election results:
- DPP
- Regional vote — 44.73 percent
- Proportional vote — 36.16 percent
- KMT
- Regional vote — 40.44 percent
- Proportional vote — 34.58 percent
- TPP
- Regional vote — 2.96 percent
- Proportional vote — 22.07 percent
- DPP
With the legislature being controlled by the “blue-white coalition,” the DPP will likely be only able to reach a consensus with the opposition on bills that concern matters of people’s livelihood. This development would indirectly benefit the DPP if the livelihood measures end up benefiting the Taiwanese while the opposition parties’ constitutional moves lower their support, and weaken the CCP’s ability to influence Taiwan through united front work and other methods.
2 US warns the PRC over ‘destabilizing’ Europe in supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine
Key recent Russia-Ukraine war developments
May 21
Russia’s defense ministry announced that it had begun tactical nuclear weapons exercises near Ukraine. The nuclear tests seek to “ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials,” the Russian defense ministry concluded.
May 30
1. President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to conduct limited strikes inside Russia with American-made weapons, according to administration officials.
“The president recently directed his team to ensure that Ukraine is able to use U.S.-supplied weapons for counter-fire purposes in the Kharkiv region so Ukraine can hit back against Russian forces that are attacking them or preparing to attack them. Our policy with respect to prohibiting the use of ATACMS or long-range strikes inside of Russia has not changed,” a U.S. official said in a statement issued by the administration.
2. Reuters reported that France could announce a decision to send military trainers to Ukraine, citing three diplomatic sources.
Two of the diplomats said that France would first send a limited number of personnel to “assess the modalities of a mission” before sending several hundred trainers. Training would revolve around “demining, keeping equipment operational, and technical expertise for warplanes to be provided by the West.” France would also finance, arm, and train a Ukrainian motorized brigade.
“The arrangements are very advanced and we could expect something next week,” one of the sources said.
The Wall Street Journal reported that France president Emmanuel Macron could announce the decision to dispatch military trainers during the D-Day celebrations.
May 31
1. Russian defense minister Andrei Belousov said at a meeting of regional defense ministers in Kazakhstan that Russian forces had captured 880 square kilometers (339 square miles) of area in Ukraine so far in 2024, and Ukrainian troops had retreated by eight to nine kilometers in key areas in the Kharkiv region.
“Advances are taking place in all tactical directions. Russian armed forces are systematically reducing the combat potential of the Ukrainian armed forces,” Belousov said.
2. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said that Russia “regards all long-range weapons used by Ukraine as already being directly controlled by servicemen from NATO countries. This is no military assistance, this is participation in a war against us. And such actions could well become a casus belli.”
Medvedev added that it would be a “fatal mistake” on the part of the West to believe that Russia was not ready to use tactical nuclear weapons against, and spoke of the potential to strike unnamed hostile countries with strategic nuclear weapons. “This is, alas, neither intimidation nor bluffing,” he said.
Medvedev added, “The current military conflict with the West is developing according to the worst possible scenario. There is a constant escalation when it comes to the firepower of NATO weapons being used. Therefore, nobody today can rule out the conflict’s transition to its final stage.”
3. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken left open the possibility that the Biden administration could allow Ukraine to use American-made weapons to hit a broader range of targets inside targets instead of just attacks on launch sites that Russia is using for its assault on the Kharkiv region.
Blinken said at a news conference in Prague in response to a reporter’s question on whether the U.S. would allow Ukraine to strike deeper into Russia with U.S.-made weapons, “Going forward, we’ll continue to do what we’ve been doing, which is: As necessary, adapt and adjust.” Blinken had earlier used the phrase “adapt and adjust” at a news conference in hinting that President Biden was about to allow Ukraine to use U.S.-made weapons to strike inside Russia.
US warns China over supporting Russia
May 29
1. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told reporters in Brussels that there was an urgent need for European and NATO countries to “send a collective message of concert to China about its actions” in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which “we view are destabilizing in the heart of Europe.”
Campbell said he had briefed the North Atlantic Council about U.S. concerns on May 28, and that the PRC was helping Russia reconstitute elements of its military, including artillery and drone capabilities, long-range missiles, and its ability to track battlefield movements.
Campbell added, “What we’ve seen from China to Russia is not a one-off or a couple of rogue firms involved in supporting Russia. This is a sustained, comprehensive effort that is backed by the leadership in China that is designed to give Russia every support behind the scenes.”
Campbell said that the PRC’s actions had created capacities for Russia not just in Ukraine but to be able to “pose a strategic challenge to others in Europe. We see this as a matter of utmost urgency.” Campbell added that the U.S. had already imposed “sanctions in certain cases” in response to the PRC’s actions in Europe and he would expect the U.S. and NATO countries to “take subsequent steps.”
2. U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo told Bloomberg Television that the PRC must stop supplying Russia with components that can be used in weapons to strike Ukraine. Adeyemo said that the U.S. and its allies are “open to sanctioning” any company or individual helping Russia to acquire components that can be used for weapons.
May 31
1. Kurt Campbell told reporters in Virginia at the start of a meeting with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts that the U.S. and other countries could take action against Chinese firms and financial institutions over the PRC’s support of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
“I think where we are primarily focused are on Chinese companies that have been involved in a systematic way in supporting Russia. We’ve also looked closely at financial institutions,” he said.
Campbell also said, “There will be steps that are taken, not just by the United States, but other countries, signaling our profound displeasure about what China is seeking to do in its relationship with Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine.”
2. Wally Adeyemo said in a speech in Berlin that “Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia’s war machinery with dual-use goods. They can’t continue to do both.”
Adeyemo said that every country in the European Union that imposed sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and every country in NATO must communicate to Beijing that it is unacceptable for the PRC to aid Russia’s military-industrial base. “Let’s make clear to Chinese companies that we are all prepared to use our sanctions and export controls to hold them accountable,” he said.
Adeyemo also said, “No other country, despite what China would tell us, has the capacity to supply Russia with the quantity of machine tools, microelectronics, engine parts and other goods the Kremlin needs to build its weapons of choice. Beijing may not be sending tanks and missiles to Russia but the Kremlin cannot produce these weapons at scale or continue its war without assistance from companies and financial institutions in China.”
Our take
1. The Biden administration has signaled that it is serious about having the U.S. and its allies punish the PRC over its continued support of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The U.S. and its allies appear likely to act sooner rather than later in targeting Beijing as the military situation in Ukraine worsens and with Russia preparing an offensive in the summer.
We previously wrote that Washington could do the following to pressure the PRC over supporting Russia:
- Sanction some smaller Chinese banks and other entities.
- Increase tariffs on certain Chinese exports (solar panels, lithium-ion batteries, NEVs, etc.).
- Carry out anti-subsidy probes and impose sanctions.
- Further restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors and other critical technologies.
- Raise awareness and take action to curb the CCP’s interference in U.S. elections and democracy.
- Do more to combat PRC espionage.
We now believe that the U.S. could also potentially:
- Expand secondary sanctions to possibly include some of the PRC’s six state-owned commercial banks and larger financial institutions, as well as some large state-owned enterprises or private companies.
- Cut off some Chinese financial institutions and companies that are involved in backing Russia from the global financial system.
- Eventually sanction some PRC officials, including possibly some senior officials (commerce minister, financial minister, etc.) in the Xi leadership.
EU countries and some of America’s close allies are likely to follow Washington’s lead and enact similar measures in targeting the PRC for backing Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to hold the PRC accountable for supporting Russia are likely to escalate geopolitical tensions and accelerate the exodus of foreign companies and capital from mainland China and Hong Kong. This would in turn negatively impact the Chinese economy and worsen the many crises plaguing the CCP regime.
2. The CCP is not likely to break its support for Russia under increased Western pressure given the strategic importance of the partnership for the PRC and its bid to survive and dominate the “new cold war.” When sanctions and other punishments are eventually imposed, Beijing is likely to express outrage in its usual fashion but continue trying to maintain working diplomatic relations with the U.S. and its allies for as long as possible.
The Xi leadership likely wants to “delay and wait for change” before deciding how it will properly react to heightened pressure from the West. For one, Beijing is currently preoccupied with rescuing China’s economy and resolving domestic problems, and can ill-afford to escalate tensions with the U.S. and hasten the worsening of domestic woes. Beijing is also likely hoping for political change to occur in the U.S. during the 2024 presidential election near the end of the year and to exploit the fracturing of American society over the political situation in the United States. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is likely to continue strengthening his grip over the CCP and take additional steps to prepare the regime for greater self-sufficiency and “semi-closing up.”
