1 CCP united front tactics in Taiwan appear to bear early fruit
Taiwanese opposition parties team up to hinder DPP
Parliamentary reform bills controversy
The new session of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan began on Feb. 20, 2024 after a general election was held in January. In March, opposition parties Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party, known collectively as the “blue-white coalition,” proposed a series of parliamentary reform bills that would give greater powers to lawmakers to investigate, sanction, and demand information from the executive branch, businesses, and the military. The proposed legislation could have government officials fined or jailed under the vaguely worded new criminal offense of “contempt of parliament” if they were found to have made false statements to the legislature. Government officials could also be punished for refusing to answer questions and provide documents, or withholding information during hearings. Further, the ROC president is required to deliver an annual address to the Legislative Yuan on key policy issues.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which is the minority party in the legislature, described the reform bills as a “parliamentary expansion of power.” Opponents of the proposed legislation argued that it would undermine Taiwan’s national security if lawmakers forced government officials to disclose sensitive information to parliament or face criminal penalties.
Controversy over the parliamentary reform bills deepened in the week of May 13 when the “blue-white coalition” refused to discuss each provision in the legislative committee with the DPP and preserved all provisions for the next stage of political party consultations. On May 16, Legislative Yuan Speaker Han Kuo-yu convened cross-party negotiations, but the KMT and DPP parted ways unhappily after a six-hour meeting without discussing the provisions of those bills.
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May 17
The “blue-white coalition” put forward a consolidated version of the parliamentary reform bills for a second reading during a legislative session. Some DPP lawmakers occupied the speaker’s podium to prevent the session from proceeding, and there was physical confrontation between lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties. Taiwanese media reported that six legislators were injured and sent to the hospital after the scuffles, including five from the DPP and one from the KMT.
That evening, nearly 2,000 people gathered outside the Legislative Yuan to protest the “blue-white coalition” for attempting to ram through the parliamentary reform law. The protesters also demanded a halt to the passage of those bills and a substantial review of its provisions.
May 21
The Legislative Yuan completed the second reading of a batch of parliamentary reform bills, including one that introduced penalties for “contempt of legislature” and another that granted the legislature greater powers when approving government personnel. The “blue-white coalition” used their majority to force through the second reading of those bills.
On the same day, nearly 30,000 people gathered outside the Legislative Yuan to protest the bills. The demonstrators, many of whom are young Taiwanese, protested the “blue-white coalition’s” acceleration of the bills’ passage, and chanted slogans like “fake reform, real expansion of power” (假改革、真擴權) and “no discussion means no democracy” (沒有討論、沒有民主). The protesters also expressed concern that the “blue-white coalition” is working with the CCP to kill democracy in Taiwan.
May 24
The Legislative Yuan completed the second reading of another batch of parliamentary reform bills, including one that would give the legislature power to investigate and hold hearings. The remaining bills are scheduled to be reviewed on May 28.
In the afternoon of the same day, around 15,000 people gathered outside the Legislative Yuan in protest. The number of demonstrators swelled to about 100,000 in the evening as people joined in from after work and came in from Taipei’s surrounding regions. Supporters of the “blue-white coalition” also showed up, but they were few in number.
PLA holds military drills around Taiwan
May 23 to May 24
On May 23, the People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command announced a “Joint Sword-2024A” military exercise around the Taiwan Straits. The announcement came after drills had already commenced, unlike in 2022 when military exercises followed the announcement.
PLA naval colonel Li Xi, a spokesman for the PLA Eastern Theater Command, said that the military exercise focuses on joint sea-air combat-readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets. Li added that the drills involving maneuvers in areas around Taiwan and integrated operations inside and outside the island chain are meant to test the real joint combat capabilities of the Eastern Theater Command’s forces. Li also said that the exercise is a “a strong punishment for the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces and a serious warning against interference and provocation by external forces.”
A map released by the PLA shows that the exercise will encircle Taiwan’s main island, and cover some of Taiwan’s islands close to mainland China for the first time.
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On May 23, China’s A-shares indices collectively declined, with 4,578 stocks dropping. In particular, the Shanghai Composite Index fell 1.5 percent during the day and closed down 1.33 percent at 3,116.39 points.
On the same day, Taiwan’s stock market continued from its previous day’s high (21,551.83 points) to close at 21,607.43 points.
Recent CCP propaganda on Taiwan
The PRC authorities accused ROC President William Lai Ching-te of promoting “Taiwan independence” in the days after he delivered his inaugural speech:
May 20
Chen Binhua, director and spokesperson of the Information Bureau of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that the “current situation in the Taiwan Strait is complex and severe. The root cause is the DPP’s stubborn adherence to a ‘Taiwan independence’ stance, refusal to acknowledge the ‘1992 Consensus’ embodying the one-China principle, and collusion with external forces in continuous provocations for independence.”
May 23
1. In responding to a question by Reuters on the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s military exercise around Taiwan, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Wang Wenbin said that the exercise was a “necessary and legitimate move to crack down on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their separatist activities and send a warning to external interference and provocations” and was “fully consistent with international law and common practices.”
2. PRC state mouthpiece Xinhua published a commentary titled, “Resolutely Punish Provocative Actions for ‘Independence’ and Firmly Defend National Interests” (堅決懲戒謀“獨”挑釁 堅定捍衛國家利益).
The commentary claimed that the PLA’s military exercise around Taiwan from May 23 to May 24 was a “decisive punishment” for the “dangerous signals of independence provocation” sent by the new Taiwan leader in his “May 20 speech” and a “severe warning to external forces supporting ‘Taiwan independence’ and interfering in China’s internal affairs.”
The commentary accused William Lai of “groveling and fawning” before foreign forces in his inaugural speech and attempting to “sell out Taiwan” in exchange for the support of external forces in his independence agenda. The CCP authorities must therefore “show their stance through strong punishment and draw a clear red line.”
Xi’s rumored instructions on Taiwan
Yuan Hongbing, an Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist with channels to sources inside the CCP, told Kanzhongguo in an interview published on Feb. 6, 2024 that he learned from Party sources that Xi Jinping had issued two directives to Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chairman Wang Huning and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office director Song Tao shortly after William Lai was elected Taiwan president this year.
Xi’s two directives were:
- Seize the opportunity of Han Kuo-yu and Fu Kun-chi’s (both of the KMT) appointments in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan to effectively launch a strategic united front offensive against Taiwan, with the goal of taking the high ground in the legislature. Make a breakthrough in Taiwan’s political structure and quickly expand the results of that breakthrough to create crucial favorable conditions for achieving the ultimate goal of reunification.
- The PRC does not recognize the legitimacy of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan since the CCP declared the ROC defunct in 1949 and cannot establish relations between the PRC’s National People’s Congress and the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, the strategic united front offensive against the Legislative Yuan will be coordinated by CPPCC head Wang Huning and Taiwan Affairs Office director Song Tao.
Yuan’s CCP sources added that the Taiwan Affairs Office acted swiftly on Xi’s directives and submitted a document titled, “Key Points of the United Front Strategy to Occupy the High Ground in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan” (佔領台灣立法院制高點的統戰戰略要點) to Xi Jinping and Wang Huning. The document was distributed to the United Front Work Departments, CPPCC, and heads of Taiwan Affairs Offices in the localities.
The documents reportedly include four measures aimed at dividing and weakening Taiwan through the united front strategy:
- Using various effective channels, urge Han Kuo-yu and Fu Kun-chi to investigate issues related to Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program under the guise of probing corruption and anti-corruption cases. The goal is to undermine ROC efforts at building up stronger defense and weaken Taiwan’s resolve to resist reunification through arms.
- Engage in multi-level interactions with Han Kuo-yu and the KMT to shape the “1992 Consensus” as part of the dominant ideological trend in Taiwanese society.
- Urge Han Kuo-yu and others to propose bills under the pretext of parliamentary reform, including those that involve the legislature’s investigative powers, the president’s inquiry rights, and anti-Taiwan independence. Even if those bills are difficult to pass, the process of passing those bills alone should create chaos or force a shutdown of the Legislative Yuan. This would effectively undermine the administrative efficiency of the DPP and reduce William Lai’s governing effectiveness.
- Take advantage of Han Kuo-yu’s position (chairman) in the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy to invite pro-reunification Chinese and overseas Chinese from around the world to visit Taiwan. This would create a global surge in anti-independence and pro-reunification sentiment.
Backdrop
Jan. 13
Taiwan’s general election saw the KMT win 52 seats, the DPP win 51 seats, and the TPP win eight seats. The DPP’s inability to secure a majority in the legislature opened the door to the “blue-white coalition” to dictate what bills could be passed over the next four years.
April 26 to April 28
Kuomintang legislative caucus leader Fu Kun-chi led 16 other KMT lawmakers to Beijing in a mainland trip. Fu and the others met with Wang Huning and other senior PRC officials.
May 20
William Lai and his running mate Hsiao Bi-khim were officially sworn in. Lai made the following key points in his inaugural speech:
- Democracy, peace, and prosperity form Taiwan’s national roadmap and are its links to the world.
- Democratic Taiwan is already a “global beacon.”
- Taiwan is a “frontline guardian of world peace” and a “pilot for peace.”
- The Taiwan government will uphold the “Four Commitments” from the Tsai Ing-wen administration (i.e. the commitment to a free and democratic constitutional system, the commitment that the ROC and the PRC should not be subordinate to each other, the commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon Taiwan’s sovereignty, and the commitment that the future of the ROC must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwan people).
- Taiwan needs the world, and the world needs Taiwan.
- Lai cited two articles in the ROC constitution (“The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens,” and “Persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China”) and added that the ROC and PRC are not subordinate to each other.
Lai’s speech did not call for respecting the historical reality of the “1992 Consensus” as Tsai Ing-wen previously acknowledged, nor did it refer to the rhetoric used by Chen Shui-bian during his inauguration such as how the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are “descendants of the Yan and Huang emperors.”
Our take
1. The CCP’s stern criticism of Taiwan president William Lai’s inaugural speech was very likely motivated by a perception that Lai and the DPP had signaled an unwillingness to abandon “Taiwan independence.” In his speech, Lai did not mention the “1992 Consensus” favored by the CCP, stressed that the ROC and PRC are not subordinate to each other, and quoted the ROC constitution that ROC nationals are citizens of the ROC. The CCP would naturally interpret what Lai said and did not say to mean that he and the DPP are covertly pushing for a “two state solution” and rejecting the “one-China principle” that it claims the KMT had agreed with via the “1992 Consensus.”
Lai also repeatedly stressed the importance of a democratic Taiwan to world peace and international political stability in his speech. In particular, Lai echoed language in the European parliament’s resolutions on annual reports on the implementation of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other, as well as how only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage (Lai cited two articles in the ROC constitution that hint at this). The CCP would view Lai’s remarks as evidence that his government plans to “collude with external forces in continuous provocations for independence.
Facing increasing geopolitical pressure, the CCP could even interpret William Lai’s remarks about how Taiwan is a “frontline guardian of world peace” and a “pilot for peace” as signs that he and the DPP are planning to have democratic Taiwan cooperate with the U.S. and its allies in containing the PRC (especially given Taiwan’s strategic role in the “first island chain”) and challenging the legitimacy of the CCP regime. This could partly explain why the CCP believes that it needs to suddenly hold a military exercise around Taiwan to “decisively punish” the Lai administration for sending “dangerous signals of independence provocation,” warn “external forces” against backing “Taiwan independence” and “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” and “draw a clear red line.”
2. The “blue-white coalition’s” attempt to ram through the parliamentary reform bills appears to be an outcome of the CCP’s effort to influence Taiwan’s opposition parties and subvert the ROC political system to pave the way for “reunification.” In analyzing Fu Kun-chi and other KMT lawmakers’ visit to mainland China in early May, we wrote that the CCP was “deploying united front tactics” to “ensure that the DPP is hindered in potential efforts to advance ‘Taiwan independence’ in the short term and to advance its ‘peaceful reunification’ agenda in the long term.” What the “blue-white coalition” has achieved by forcing through the parliamentary reform bills also happens to be aligned with what the Xi leadership is looking to accomplish through united front tactics as disclosed by Yuan Hongbing’s Party sources.
The PLA’s two-day military exercise around Taiwan corresponds to our earlier analysis. We wrote that the PLA could “ramp up military activities around Taiwan during the ROC presidential inauguration period (May 20) and after as it wields both the carrot and stick to ‘persuade’ Taiwan to choose its ‘reunification’ plan.”
The reduced intensity of the PLA’s military maneuvers around Taiwan after William Lai’s inauguration compared to those after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 reflects the Xi leadership’s present plan for Taiwan and the CCP’s broader concerns. While the PRC has always been preparing its military to be capable of achieving “reunification” by force if required, the Xi leadership appears to be currently “delaying and waiting for change” and pursuing “peaceful reunification” solutions in view of China’s economic troubles and fears that a war over Taiwan would greatly worsen crises that threaten the regime’s existence. Xi and the CCP likely fear that the PRC will lose its global standing like Russia and lose its ability to use chip-making equipment in mainland China in the event of an invasion, as well as face catastrophic military losses if the United States uses limited nuclear options in the Taiwan Strait to deal with the invading PLA.
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that the parliamentary reform bills will stay even if Taiwan’s opposition parties manage to pass them because William Lai and the DPP have several options to respond.
First, Lai could ask Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the law. However, Lai cannot ask the court to step in until he signs the bill and the legislation becomes law. The Constitutional Court also has a history of moving slowly, which leaves the Lai government vulnerable to probes in the legislature until a ruling is made.
Second, Lai could delay signing the bill. The bill will be sent to the cabinet once it passes the legislature, and the cabinet has the option of sending it back to lawmakers for reassessment. While the process could take several weeks, the cabinet will eventually have to pass the bill to Lai, who does not have a veto, to sign into law. The Constitutional Court will likely be asked to make a ruling should Lai continue to refuse to sign the bill.
Third, Lai could seek to dissolve parliament to block the bill’s passage. Under Taiwan law, DPP legislators could file a no-confidence motion against their own premier, and the outgoing premier can in turn ask the president to dismiss the legislature. However, this option is double-edged, with unpredictable political costs for both the DPP and the opposition parties.
4. We assess that the Lai administration will face significant obstacles in the next four years as it is hamstrung by opposition parties. The DPP could also lose public support if opposition parties launch credible anti-corruption investigations against its lawmakers. A Lai government bogged down by domestic scandals and focused on social issues (to boost public support, etc.) would have less bandwidth for focusing on external matters or advance agendas that the CCP would view as seeking “Taiwan independence.”
2 What Xi’s Shandong inspection tour reveals about the direction in which he is taking the regime
May 22 to May 24
Xi Jinping carried out an inspection tour of Rizhao, Jinan, and some other areas in Shandong Province with Shandong Party secretary Lin Wu and governor Zhou Naixiang. Xi was also accompanied by CCP General Office director Cai Qi, Organization Department head Li Ganjie, PRC vice premier He Lifeng, and other officials from relevant departments of Party central and the state apparatus.
During the inspection, Xi met with high-ranking military officials at the colonel rank and above who were stationed in Jinan City in the morning of May 23. In the afternoon, Xi presided over a symposium with enterprises and experts in Jinan. Wang Huning, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, also attended the symposium.
Xi delivered a speech at the symposium after listening to statements by nine enterprise and expert representatives. Xi also urged the relevant parties to carefully study and absorb the opinions and suggestions being put forward to “further comprehensively deepen reforms.”
Noteworthy points in Xi’s speech include:
- Reform is the driving force for development.
- Resolutely eliminate ideological concepts and institutional shortcomings that hinder the advancement of Chinese-style modernization. Focus on overcoming deep-seated institutional barriers and structural contradictions.
- To further comprehensively deepen reforms, it is necessary to uphold and develop China’s basic economic system and build a high-level socialist market economy system.
- Reform involves both dismantling and establishing.
- The fundamental principles of adhering to the Party’s overall leadership, Marxism, the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the people’s democratic dictatorship must never be shaken.
- Reform requires courage to innovate.
- Reform must focus on systematic integration to prevent and overcome the phenomenon of working in isolation and mutual obstruction.
- Reform requires careful planning, and more importantly, implementation.
Backdrop
Xi’s Shandong inspection tour follows the Biden administration’s imposition of steep tariffs on Chinese exports in strategic sectors and efforts by the U.S. to spotlight PRC overcapacity and unite the G7 against China’s “unfair” industrial policies.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping has conducted inspection tours and held symposiums in Hunan (south-central China), Chongqing (western China), and Shandong (eastern China) over the past three months. The inspections and symposiums appear to be aimed at addressing the deteriorating economic situation in China, with Xi emphasizing the need for “further comprehensively deepening reform and opening up” wherever he goes.
However, Xi’s version of “reform and opening up” involves strengthening his authoritarian control and the Party’s leadership over economic and financial affairs more so than a genuine effort at economic and financial liberalization. For instance, Xi call to “eliminate ideological concepts and institutional shortcoming” that impede the “advancement of Chinese-style modernization” and “overcome deep-seated institutional barriers and structural contradictions” read like an effort to dismantle the mechanisms and systems left by his predecessors that obstruct his authoritarian rule and control over the CCP regime instead of signaling greater liberalization.
As we analyzed on numerous occasions, Xi might believe that his predecessors are directly responsible for the current problems plaguing the PRC. Xi might also believe that the only way that his leadership can make progress on resolving the CCP’s existential problems is to tighten his control over the regime and break up the control of Party elites and business magnates over the “commanding heights” of China’s economy. However, Xi’s insistence on adhering to Marxism and socialism in devising and implementing policies (“The fundamental principles of adhering to the Party’s overall leadership, Marxism, the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the people’s democratic dictatorship must never be shaken”) means that his agenda is destined for failure. For one, Marxism and socialism cannot accommodate a market economy but favor deep government intervention, state planning, and a monopoly of state-owned enterprises in a command economy. The CCP previously tried and failed to make the command economy work under Mao Zedong, and only saw improvements when Deng Xiaoping allowed for a degree of economic liberalization.
Xi’s demand that officials “adhere to the Party’s overall leadership” and still have the “courage to innovate” is contradictory when it comes to economic development. Officials who fully obey Party Central with Xi at the core will be naturally disinclined to innovate for fear of making mistakes and being perceived as being disloyal. That being said, Xi could be intending to make use of his call to have “courage to innovate” to break certain internal Party rules that are holding his leadership back from taking apart the systems and mechanisms that he inherited from his predecessors and are hindering his agenda.
2. Xi’s speech at the Shandong symposium also spotlights some of the deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian system. For example, Xi’s call for reform to “focus on systematic integration to prevent and overcome the phenomenon of working in isolation and mutual obstruction” obliquely points to the longstanding problem of officials at various levels formulating and implementing policies that serve local interests first and sometimes create risks that the central government must later step in to defuse.
Meanwhile, Xi’s call for reform to follow “careful planning” and “implementation” indirectly highlights the problem of officials showing “inactivity” (不積極), “inaction” (不作為), “lying flat” (躺平), and “chaotic behavior” (亂作為). Xi’s concern about personnel performance could explain why Organization Department head Li Ganjie accompanied Xi on his inspection tour. Also, He Lifeng could have followed Xi to gain a better understanding of bad practices by officials and the risks in finance, fiscal, real estate, and other fields in the localities to better formulate solutions for the Xi leadership.
Finally, Wang Huning’s attendance at the Shandong symposium instead of premier Li Qiang (who is responsible for economic policy) suggests that Xi is more concerned about keeping the support of private entrepreneurs to the regime through united front work rather than actually “further comprehensively deepening reform” to resolve economic issues.
