1 West keeps pressure on China amid diplomatic engagements
Raimondo’s China trip
U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited China from Aug. 27 to Aug. 30. During her trip, she met with senior PRC officials like her counterpart Wang Wentao, premier Li Qiang, vice premier He Lifeng, and Shanghai Party boss Chen Jining. Raimondo also met with U.S. business leaders in China.
Notable actions and remarks by Raimondo during her China trip include:
- Aug. 28: Raimondo and Wang Wentao reached an agreement to set up new channels of communication for economic and commercial issues. Raimondo also discussed concerns about restrictions on American businesses like Intel and Micron, as well as the PRC’s curbs on gallium and germanium exports.
- Aug. 28: Raimondo told representatives of U.S. businesses during a reception at the U.S. ambassador’s residence, “I want to be clear that we are not compromising or negotiating in matters of national security. Period. But this is meant to be a dialogue, where we increase transparency, and when we are clear about what we are doing.” She also said that “the world is counting on the U.S. and China to responsibly manage and maintain our commercial relationship,” and the U.S. is “trying to make the case that the most of our trade has nothing to do with national security.”
- Aug. 29: Raimondo said she rejected an appeal by the PRC to reduce U.S. export controls on technology with possible military uses. “Of course, I said no. We don’t negotiate on matters of national security,” she said. Raimondo also said that both sides have agreed to have experts meet to “start to resolve trade secrets issues.”
- Aug. 29: Speaking to reporters aboard a high-speed train en route from Beijing to Shanghai, Raimondo said, “Increasingly I hear from American business that China is uninvestible because it’s become too risky.” She also said that while the U.S. does not want to decouple from China, “we can’t have all our eggs in our basket.”
- Aug. 30: At a press conference in Shanghai, Raimondo said she does not expect any breakthroughs on issues affecting U.S. firms in China, but added that “there is appetite among U.S. business to continue to do business (in China). The market is enormous.” She also noted that “U.S. businesses want to do business here but they need to have a predictable regulatory environment,” and “for U.S. business in many cases patience is running thin and it’s time for action.” Raimondo again insisted that the U.S. does not want to decouple from China, adding, “I’m leaving with some optimism … We can’t drift to a place of greater of conflict. It’s not good for the U.S., it’s not good for China, it’s not good for the world.”
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Washington took several actions aimed at China in the leadup to Secretary Raimondo’s trip, including:
- Aug. 18: The U.S., Japan, and South Korea agreed to strengthen security cooperation and criticized the PRC’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior” in the South China Sea at the Camp David Summit.
- Aug. 18: The U.S. finalized a decision to impose tariffs on solar panel makers who finished their products in Southeast Asian nations to sidestep import duties on Chinese-made goods.
- Aug. 18: The Biden administration tightened controls on the export of materials and components for nuclear power plants to China.
- Aug. 22: The State Department announced that it would impose visa restrictions on PRC officials involved in the forcible assimilation of over one million Tibetan children in government-run boarding schools.
Cleverly visits Beijing
On Aug. 30, UK foreign minister James Cleverly traveled to Beijing and met with senior PRC officials like vice president Han Zheng and foreign minister Wang Yi.
According to PRC state broadcaster CCTV, Han told Cleverly that “economic and trade cooperation is the foundation for the healthy and stable development of China-UK relations. The two governments should create a good business environment for enterprises and actively explore new growth points for practical cooperation.”
Meanwhile, Wang told Cleverly that “dialogue and cooperation are the keywords and the main tone of China’s policy towards the UK,” and Cleverly said that there would be opportunities for both sides if their relationship could be kept “positive.”
Speaking to international media, Cleverly said that the UK is “clear-eyed about the areas where we have fundamental disagreements with China and we raise those issues when we meet. But I think it’s important to also recognise that we have to have a pragmatic, sensible working relationship with China because of the issues that affect us all around the globe.”
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On Aug. 30, the UK parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published a report stating, “Taiwan is already an independent country, under the name Republic of China (ROC). Taiwan, including a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states – it is only lacking greater international recognition.”
The report also called for a more assertive UK policy towards China, noting that the “activities of the Chinese Communist Party as a threat to the UK and its interests.” The report added that the UK government has a “muddled” China strategy, as seen from the “half-hearted sanctions announced in March 2021” over Xinjiang, when “nobody of real seniority was held accountable.”
Our take
The CCP authorities would welcome opportunities to engage with the West and buy as much time as possible to defuse its internal and external crises and prepare the regime for potential conflict in the future. Beijing is thus hoping to use diplomacy to strengthen economic cooperation between China and the West, with the idea that deeper integration would give the West pause in countering the PRC and escalating tensions over Taiwan and other regime “red lines.”
However, the lack of tangible breakthroughs between the U.S. and the PRC and the UK and the PRC suggests that Beijing’s diplomatic efforts are currently limited to having more face-to-face dialogue without any significant lowering of tensions. The U.S. in particular is continuously rolling out measures with an eye on countering the PRC; this is in line with our earlier assessment that Sino-U.S. “deténte” is “at best illusory and very fragile as neither the Biden administration nor the Xi leadership has shifted in actuality from their respective positions towards each other despite the Biden administration’s ‘intense diplomacy.’”
We have also warned that Sino-U.S. tensions “could suddenly take a turn for the worse as both sides probe each others’ weaknesses and look to take advantage of various developments (changes in the Russia-Ukraine war; political, economic, and social problems in the U.S. and China; etc.) to secure their respective interests.”
2 Xi’s political indoctrination effort reaches grassroots, set for further entrenchment
Aug. 20 to Aug. 24
The CCP Central Organization Department, Central Social Work Department, and the Central Party School (National Academy of Governance) jointly held a nationwide video training course for community Party organization secretaries and neighborhood committee directors, according to state media.
The theme of the training course was studying and implementing “Xi Jinping Thought” and the spirit of the 20th Party Congress. The course also urged the attendees to implement the “important deployments” of Party Central on Party building and grassroots governance in urban communities.
During the course, 15 so-called “excellent” Party organization secretaries from eastern, central, and western China gave case studies to “educate and guide” the other course attendees to “unremittingly” use “Xi Jinping Thought” to “concentrate their hearts and cast their souls” (凝心鑄魂), firmly support the “Two Establishes,” and resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards.”
Aug. 31
The CCP Politburo held a meeting and reviewed regulations on educating and training cadres (幹部教育培訓工作條例) and a five-year national plan on the same subject (全國干部教育培訓規劃 [2023－2027年]).
The meeting noted that the education and training of cadres must fully incorporate “Xi Jinping Thought” and “conscientiously implement” the political concepts of Xi and the Party (i.e. “Two Establishes,” “four consciousnesses,” “four self-confidences,” “Two Safeguards,” etc.).
The meeting also emphasized the necessity of studying and implementing “Xi Jinping Thought” as the main theme so as to improve cadres’ political judgment, political comprehension, and political execution.
Background
1. In April 2023, the CCP authorities launched a “thematic education” campaign on “learning and implementing” Xi Jinping’s political theory. The political indoctrination effort has thus far been rolled out to people in state-owned and private enterprises, schools and institutes of higher learning, government at various levels, and the financial sector.
2. The Organization Department and the Central Party School previously conducted comprehensive governance and political training for village Party organization secretaries and committee directors across the country in April.
Our take
1. We previously explained why Xi Jinping is mandating political indoctrination for officials and cadres (see here and here). The training of community Party organization and neighborhood-level cadres, as well as the Xi leadership’s regulations and plan for cadre “education and training,” will further entrench Xi’s political indoctrination campaign in the CCP regime.
Xi has a greater need to lock in his political indoctrination campaign as the regime’s internal and external crises have become more obvious since the campaign was launched in April. As Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is built mostly on propaganda, he has to constantly rely on indoctrination and the creation of a high-pressure political environment to keep officials in line, address the “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” problem, curb challenges to his rule, and maintain his paramount position (定於一尊) in the regime.
However, Xi’s political indoctrination campaign will very likely see diminishing returns as the economic situation worsens in China and the CCP authorities fall further into the Tacitus Trap. The high-pressure political environment could also backfire and see officials default even more to “inaction” (不作爲), adopt various forms of passive resistance, and “prefer left rather than right” for the sake of being “politically correct.” Particularly disgruntled officials, including cadres in the Party elite, could also be tempted to eliminate Xi one way or another; as we wrote in the Aug. 31, 2023 edition of this newsletter, Xi is “greatly concerned about the possibility of assassination attempts against him, and has placed heightened importance on ensuring his personal safety.”
2. The Central Social Work Department’s role in holding the video training course for community Party organization secretaries and neighborhood committee directors affirms our March 20, 2023 analysis that the new Party institution will “operate more like a hybrid of the Organization Department and the United Work Front Department.”
We also wrote that the Central Social Work Department “appears to be a non-violent stability maintenance organization that strengthens Party Central’s grip over society through the control of CCP and social organizations. By having a say in whether the people in various economic and social organizations survive and thrive, the CCP is essentially ‘guiding’ the Chinese people to not challenge the regime and safeguard their interests.”
