Analyzing recent speculation about Xi’s political status; Xi signals expansion of anti-corruption efforts

  1   Analyzing recent speculation about Xi’s political status

Shortly after the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee last year, some overseas Chinese observers became fixated on spotting “signs” that Xi Jinping has “lost power” (失勢) or has “lost control of authority” (大权旁落). We analyzed and debunked several of the more prominent observations in several newsletters (for e.g., see here, here, and here).

The speculation about Xi’s grip on power has not died down. Below are some notable developments that some overseas Chinese observers have been focused on.

  Propaganda outlet ‘infighting’?

PLA Daily
In December 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published four articles in its commentary section on page eight on the topic of “consciously setting an example in adhering to democratic centralism.”

The four articles are:

• Dec. 4: “Taking the Lead in Upholding Party Principles” (authored by the Shanxi Armed Police Corps).
• Dec. 9: “Taking the Lead in Upholding Collective Leadership” (authored by the Luohe Military Subdistrict in Henan Province).
• Dec. 11: “Taking the Lead in Promoting Intra-Party Democracy” (authored by the Office for Reform and Organizational Structure of the Central Military Commission).
• Dec. 16: “Taking the Lead in Maintaining Team Unity” (authored by a unit of the PLA Aerospace Force).

Qiushi
Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published on Dec. 16 in its 24th issue of the year a portion of Xi Jinping’s speech delivered at the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on Jan. 8, 2024 under the title, “Deepening the Party’s Self-Revolution.”

***
Some commentators in overseas Chinese-speaking circles described the discussion of the “collective leadership” and “intra-Party democracy” in the PLA Daily articles as “unusual.” They singled out parts of the articles that “clearly” appear to challenge Xi’s “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” including:

• “The relationship between the secretary, deputy secretary, and members [of Party Committees or groups] is one of equality, with equal rights to speak and vote when discussing and deciding on issues.”
• The secretary is “first among equals,” but must not view themselves as “head of the household” and transform their relationship with members into one of “administrative subordination.”

The commentators also believe that the “Deepening the Party’s Self-Revolution” article in Qiushi is a direct counter to the PLA Daily commentaries and Xi is using strong-armed measures to suppress internal dissent.

Other commentators, however, disagree with the views above.

  PLA personnel adjustments

Dec. 23
Xi Jinping promoted Chen Hui, the political commissar of the PLA Ground Force, to the rank of general.

Chen, age 61, spent the bulk of his military career in the PLA Air Force doing political work. After Xi implemented military reforms in 2016, Chen was transferred to the anti-corruption department at the PLAAF. In August 2021, Chen was appointed political commissar of the space systems department at the PLA Strategic Support Force. In April 2024, Chen became the first political commissar of the PLA Aerospace Force, and was transferred eight months later to the PLA Ground Force.

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Some overseas Chinese media outlets and commentators speculated that the “absence” of several senior military officers from the promotion ceremony suggests that they are headed for a downfall. The individuals in question are former PLA Ground Force political commissar Qin Shutong, PLA Ground Force commander Li Qiaoming, PLA Navy political commissar Yuan Huazhi, and People’s Armed Police commander Wang Chunning.

Dec. 25
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced the removal of eight deputies from the 14th NPC, including army representative Lieutenant General You Haitao and navy representative Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng.

You Haitao, 66, was the former deputy commander of the army and the son of former Chengdu and Guangzhou military regions commander You Taizhong. The PLA Ground Forces revoked You Haitao’s deputy position at a representative assembly convened on Nov. 29, 2024.

Li Pengcheng, 61, was the former naval commander of the PLA Southern Theater Command. The PLAN revoked Li’s deputy position at a representative assembly convened on Nov. 25, 2024.

***
Some overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets believe that You Haitao and Li Pengcheng were removed due to a power struggle between Xi Jinping and CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia.

  Differing views on Politburo democratic life meeting

Dec. 26 to Dec. 27
The CCP Politburo convened a democratic life meeting on the theme of thoroughly studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, according to state media reports. Xi presided over the meeting and delivered a speech.

Key items reviewed at the meeting include Party discipline compliance, the implementation of disciplinary regulations, and adherence to the Central Committee’s “eight-point decision” on improving work style. The meeting also incorporated “criticism and self-criticism based on practical work and ideological reflection.”

During the meeting, the Politburo members each spoke in turn on matters pertaining to the meeting’s theme. The speeches focused on five key priorities:

• Strengthen the resolve to uphold the “quan wei” and centralized leadership of Party Central.
• Reinforce the commitment to serving and benefiting the people.
• Deepen the resolve to implement Party Central’s decisions and deployments.
• Take the lead in studying, understanding, and adhering to Party discipline.
• Strengthen the political responsibility of strictly governing the Party.

Xi Jinping provided detailed feedback on each Politburo member’s statements, outlined specific requirements, and concluded the meeting with a summary.

According to state media, the Politburo members “unanimously agreed” that the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core is the “fundamental guarantee for all work” and ensures the “steady and long-term progress of China’s modernization.” Also, the Party must deeply grasp the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” enhance the “four consciousnesses,” strengthen the “four self-confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards” to implement the policies and directives of Party Central steadfastly. Further, work in 2025 will continue to be guided by Xi Jinping Thought, and the CCP authorities will fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee.

***
Some overseas Chinese commentators argued that the Politburo democratic life meeting offered further “signs” that Xi has “lost power.” They say that the number of priorities that the Politburo members focused on was down from six in the previous year, and notably absent was the first priority in 2023 of “becoming more self-aware and resolute in studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought.” The commentators argue that the “omission” of “Xi Jinping Thought” meant that Xi’s ideology was being downplayed and his “core” status has weakened compared to before.

However, other commentators argue that Xi remains firmly above the other Politburo members and he remains just as dominant.

  PRC expands detention regime for corruption suspects

Dec. 28
CNN reported that the PRC has built or expanded at least 218 specialized detention facilities across China to interrogate suspects of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

CNN said that the expanded detention regime called “liuzhi” (“retention in custody”) comes with facilities with padded surfaces and round-the-clock guards in every cell. Detainees can be held for up to six months without having access to a lawyer or seeing family members.

  Our take

We believe that recent observations and claims that Xi Jinping has “lost power” or has “lost control of authority” do not hold water. Most of these observations reflect selective reading or interpretation of developments to fit the argument that Xi is in serious political trouble.

1. The articles in the PLA Daily and Qiushi that some overseas Chinese observers believe to be “unusual” and evidence of infighting between Xi Jinping and elements in the military actually fall well within standard CCP propaganda and regulations.

Implicit in the argument of some overseas Chinese observers is that “anti-Xi” elements in the military are discussing “democratic centralism” as a foil and challenge to Xi’s one-man dictatorship. However, “democratic centralism” is not democracy or a check on authoritarianism, but a Leninist organizational system and a tool that the CCP uses to prevent corruption among cadres and officials.

After serious corruption in the PLA was disclosed in 2023, the Xi leadership began requiring Party Committees at all levels in the military to “adhere to democratic centralism” as a check on leading military cadres to prevent them from fostering an environment where corruption runs rampant. On June 27, 2024, or before some overseas Chinese observers began speculating about Xi Jinping’s health and his “loss of power,” the PLA Daily reported that the CMC Political Work Department had compiled and distributed a handbook on “democratic centralism” to the entire military. Given the Xi leadership’s ongoing efforts to promote “democratic centralism,” the four commentary articles on “adhering to democratic centralism” published in PLA Daily in December 2024 represent compliance, and not a challenge, by the military to Xi Jinping. In particular, the commentary section on page eight of the PLA Daily is designated for grassroots military units, and the military units that submitted the articles are merely reporting on the insights gained from the political education of “adhering to democratic centralism.”

Meanwhile, the piece in Qiushi on “Deepening the Party’s Self-Revolution” is complementary to the CMC’s directive for military Party organizations to “adhere to democratic centralism,” as well as to Party Central’s strengthening of anti-corruption efforts in the military and elsewhere.

2. The recent military personnel changes and anti-corruption efforts do not reveal anything out of the ordinary and are insufficient as evidence that Xi Jinping has “lost power” and control over the PLA.

The argument by some overseas Chinese observers that the “absence” of certain senior military officers at Chen Hui’s promotion ceremony means that they are being probed is tenuous, but not entirely incorrect. The promotion ceremony did not require the attendance of all active generals, and many senior officers other than the four who were supposedly being investigated were also absent from proceedings. State media footage of the promotion ceremony showed that the five CMC members were in attendance, along with 42 other major generals, lieutenant generals, and full generals. This meant that just 18 out of 67 active generals were at Chen Hui’s promotion ceremony. By the logic of the overseas Chinese observers, all of those “absent” generals are potentially being investigated for corruption, which is highly unlikely. While the “absence” of Qin Shutong, Li Qiaoming, Yuan Huazhi, and Wang Chunning from the promotion ceremony does not necessarily mean that they are being investigated, it also cannot be ruled out that they are currently subjected to a probe.

On a separate note, state media footage of Chen Hui’s promotion ceremony shows new PLA Rocket Force commander Wang Houbin and defense minister Dong Jun in attendance. Their public appearance suggests that it is less likely that they will be affected by the Miao Hua corruption case. Meanwhile, Chen’s transfer from the air force to the ground force is somewhat reminiscent of Miao’s move from the ground force to the navy. This is likely part of Xi Jinping’s strategy of having senior officers move to different branches of the military from where they spent the bulk of their careers to take them away from established networks to facilitate anti-corruption efforts and allow Party Central to have greater control over the PLA. For instance, senior officers who are “parachuted” in from other branches will not be familiar with the troops, which makes it harder for the senior officers to form corruption networks and factions in the short term while making them more inclined to comply with or pursue anti-corruption activities to earn merit with Beijing.

The removal of You Haitao and Li Pengcheng from the National People’s Congress suggests that they are being investigated. The scrutiny of retired generals (some of whom are princelings) highlights the intensification of Xi’s anti-corruption efforts in the military.

Finally, the unchanged propaganda concerning Xi Jinping and lack of noticeable shifts in how the CCP treats Xi politically undermines the argument by some Chinese observers that Xi and CMC vice chair Zhang Youxia are engaged in power struggle. As long as the CCP continues to emphasize the “core” status of Xi and promotes his political theories and line, it is unlikely that Xi has “lost power” and control over the military.

3. The Politburo democratic life meeting in December shows that Xi Jinping retains elevated political status over the other Politburo members and he has not “lost power.”

Some quick takeaways:

• While speeches by Politburo members did not call for “becoming more self-aware and resolute in studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought,” the theme of the meeting was “thoroughly studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought.” This indicates that Xi’s primacy in the Party has not changed and remains a core component of the criticism and self-criticism process.
• State media footage of the meeting shows no change in the seating order of the Politburo members, which indicates that there is no change in the balance of power in the CCP. For instance, if Zhang Youxia had indeed taken control over the CMC, then he would not be seated in his usual position (the outermost row of tables [round table in the center with Xi and Politburo Standing Committee members, followed by two rows of tables], in the corner of the meeting room) among Politburo members.
• Xi Jinping continues his usual practice of commenting on and providing instructions to each of the Politburo members after their speech. This emphasizes the hierarchical difference between the General Secretary and the other Politburo members rather than the General Secretary being merely “first among equals.”
• Official reporting on the democratic life meeting maintains the same level of praise and reinforcement of Xi’s “quan wei” as before, with no noticeable changes.

4. CNN’s report that the PRC has built or expanded over 200 specialized detention facilities to interrogate suspects of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign offers indirect evidence that he has not “lost power” as some overseas Chinese commentators are claiming. If Xi had truly lost power and some form of “collective leadership” was restored, then Xi’s anti-corruption campaign would be halted instead of deepened as the “anti-Xi” elements move to protect their political interests.

The construction of specialized detention facilities for corrupt officials aligns with earlier reporting in overseas Chinese press. This development indicates that corruption in the CCP remains rampant and severe despite over a decade of anti-corruption activity, and Beijing is forced to allocate scarce resources to constructing dedicated facilities to confine the sheer number of detained officials.

Finally, the construction of the specialized detention facilities signals an expansion of Xi’s “self-revolution” effort. The anti-corruption campaign remains Xi’s most significant political accomplishment since he came to power, and served him well as a tool to purge factional rivals, dismantle the “collective leadership,” and consolidate personal authority. Under Xi’s leadership, the number of senior military officers brought down by the anti-corruption campaign to date (171, including 24 generals, 42 lieutenant generals, and 105 major generals) has far surpassed the number of senior officers lost (estimated at between 60 to 80) between 1927 and 1949 (when the CCP was more actively engaging in internal uprisings and war of some sort). Even after including the 20 to 30 senior military officers who died during the Cultural Revolution due to various reasons (including political persecution and natural causes), the number of senior military officers lost in earlier periods is still smaller than the number removed under Xi.

  2   Why Beijing raised civil servant salaries amid fiscal shortages

  Civil servants in China received salary increase?

Dec. 31, 2024
Bloomberg News reported that the PRC gave a range of civil servants their first significant pay increase in years, citing people familiar with the matter. The people said that the basic salaries of many government employees went up by at least 500 yuan per month and the wage hike was backdated to July 2024.

One of the people said that the percentage increases varied depending on the base salary, but it amounted to about 5 percent. The people said that the pay rise extends to teachers, policemen, and bureaucrats.

Bloomberg reported that a police officer in southwestern China saw a 3,500 yuan lump sum in his December payslip labeled “back payment,” but he was not owed any money. His colleague said it was a pay raise going back to July. Meanwhile, a teacher in eastern China said that while her pay increased in December with a lump sum dated back to the summer, her wages had not actually risen after accounting for deep bonus cuts in recent years. Another civil servant said that the pay rise was much less than the several rounds of pay cuts he endured.

Bloomberg said that China last hiked civil servants’ salaries in 2015, with about 40 million government employees receiving about 300 yuan per month more on average. Some social media users suggested that salaries had also increased in 2018 and 2021, but the CCP authorities never confirmed the hikes and the percentage increases are unclear.

Chinese social media users have recently been discussing the topic of civil servants receiving a 500 yuan salary increase retroactively dated to July 2024. They claim that local governments have received “central government directives” regarding the matter and financial departments are currently processing the payments. Social media users also claim that over 20 provinces and cities have announced basic salary increases for civil servants, with most disbursements expected around the Chinese New Year.

Some civil servants shared screenshots of their salary increases on social media, which show that the basic salary of civil servants increased from between 300 yuan to 1,000 yuan depending on their rank and seniority. For instance, a senior teacher in Anhui showed that she received 4,374 yuan at mid-afternoon on Dec. 30, 2024.

The PRC Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security increased basic pensions for retirees by an average of 3 percent in 2024. Additionally, several provinces and cities have raised their minimum wage standards by about 200 yuan on average.

***

Reuters reported on Dec. 29 that some civil servants are considering resigning due to widespread bonus reductions and pay cuts of up to 30 percent in 2024, citing interviews with 10 public sector employees. Also, local government austerity cuts have led to occasional staff cuts.

Reuters said some civil servants have not been paid for months, while others survive on as little as 4,000 yuan per month while making loan payments and supporting families.

  Backdrop

1. China’s official fiscal data for the first 11 months of 2024:

• The national general public budget revenue decreased by 0.6 percent year-on-year to 19.9 trillion yuan.
• The national general public budget expenditure increased by 2.8 percent year-on-year to 24.5 trillion yuan.
• The fiscal deficit increased by 20.12 percent year-on-year to 4.6 trillion yuan.
• Revenue from the transfer of state-owned land use rights declined by 22.4 percent year-on-year to 3.26 trillion yuan.

2. Reports of civil servant salary reductions and delays in wage payment in various regions of China have been frequent in recent years. Some notable cases include:

• The Nanjing local government set the civil servant salary payment goal for 2023 at “guarantee (payment for) six months, aim for eight months.” In 2024, the goal was revised downward to “guarantee (payment for three months, aim for six months.”
• In August 2024, grid managers in Hanjiang District of Putian City in Fujian Province posted on social media that the local government had delayed payment of six months worth of wages for 800 grid managers in the district.

3. In November 2024, the National People’s Congress approved a 6 trillion yuan debt swap quota for the next three years to replace the outstanding hidden debt of local governments and reduce the fiscal pressure on them.

4. Incidents of “revenge against society” by individuals have spiked in recent years. Because of this, the CCP authorities have called for closely monitoring individuals or groups who belong to the “four withouts and five losses” (四无五失), or people “without” a spouse, children, a job or stable income, and property or other assets, and who have suffered “losses” in the form of investment failure, setbacks in life, broken relationships, psychological imbalance, and mental disorders.

  Our take

Bloomberg noted in its report that the CCP authorities were raising civil servant salaries to “boost morale and spur spending.” We believe that those are just some of the reasons behind Beijing’s move.

1. The CCP authorities have been grappling with insufficient consumer spending for a while. By increasing the wages of civil servants, Beijing is hoping to stimulate consumption and break the deflationary cycle.

The economic rationale behind Beijing’s move is clear. Civil servants represent a segment of the population with relatively strong purchasing power in a country where about 964 million people have a monthly income of below 2,000 yuan. Providing this group with additional income before the Chinese New Year period could boost spending, enhance China’s consumption data, create the impression that the Chinese economy is off to a strong start in 2025, and counter fears of persistent deflation.

Beijing could theoretically produce improved consumption figures if civil servants spend all the money that they received. According to the PRC National Housing Provident Fund 2023 Annual Report, there were 48.359 million employees in state agencies and public institutions making housing provident fund contributions that year. Meanwhile, National Bureau of Statistics data shows that the average annual salary of employees in urban non-private institutions in 2023 was 121,000 yuan. Extrapolating from the above data, the total wage expenditure for China’s civil servants in 2023 was about 5.85 trillion yuan.

A 5 percent salary increase and six months of retroactive pay would see China’s civil servants receive an additional 146.3 billion yuan in 2024. This amounts to 1.8 percent of the total retail sales of consumer goods for the January-February period in 2024 (8.13 trillion yuan). If civil servants spend the entirety of the 146.3 billion yuan, then China’s consumer price index for January-February 2025 would appear to significantly improve. This in turn could improve consumer sentiment and business optimism, as well as give something positive for the CCP authorities to use as propaganda.

2. The CCP authorities are looking to ingratiate themselves with the segment of the Chinese population that is most loyal to them (at least on paper). By “rewarding” civil servants with pay increases and back pay, Beijing likely wants to keep their faith in the CCP regime and incentivize them to help with “stability maintenance” as public discontent rises.

Despite the CCP authorities’ talk of “common prosperity,” it appears that they are still making economic calculations in choosing which groups to benefit with a wage increase. For instance, distributing the 146.3 billion yuan that went to civil servants to the 964 million people earning less than 2,000 yuan per month would amount to handing out just 152 yuan per person on average. For impoverished citizens at the grassroots, the 7.6 percent increase in their monthly income is just a drop in the bucket to resolving their needs. Those citizens are also more likely to spend their increased wages on essential goods rather than on big-ticket consumer items like cars, home appliances, and real estate, or areas of consumption that the CCP authorities are seeking to stimulate. This could in turn lead to higher prices for necessities and increased public resentment.

3. Beijing’s decision to raise civil servant salaries will not be without negative consequences.

As alluded to in the point above, Beijing’s salary move somewhat goes against its “common prosperity” drive. Already, civil servant wages, benefits, and pensions, which are funded by the general public, far exceed those of ordinary citizens. Amid worsening economic conditions and high unemployment, prioritizing civil servant pay over addressing public welfare would widen the income gap between government workers and the general population. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that the average annual salary of employees in urban non-private work units (120,698 yuan) in 2023 was 177 percent that of the average annual salary of employees in private work units (68,340 yuan). The disparity in pensions is even more pronounced; Nomura Securities chief China economist Lu Ting noted at an economic forum on Jan. 8, 2024 that the pensions for 170 million Chinese farmers was just 100 to 300 yuan while retired section-level cadres from the civil service receive pensions 70 to 100 times that of the farmers.

The widening wealth disparity that Beijing’s civil servant wage increase is likely to bring could fuel public resentment against the CCP. This could potentially lead frustrated citizens to take extreme actions as they lose hope and envy the treatment of civil servants. It is possible that by channeling benefits to civil servants to sustain the regime, the CCP authorities are ultimately exacerbating social instability rather than alleviating it.

Boosting civil servant salaries would also sharply raise government spending. We estimate that the CCP authorities will have to pay out an additional 146.3 billion yuan in 2024 and about 292.6 billion yuan in 2025 to cover the government worker wage increase. To fund the increased expenditure amid poor economic conditions and fiscal shortages, the CCP authorities will likely create more problems for the regime.

First, Beijing would likely turn to the central bank to openly or covertly purchase more government bonds to create more liquidity. Already, the People’s Bank of China made net bond purchases of 300 billion yuan in December 2024, and 1 trillion yuan of net bond purchases from August to December. Concurrently, the PBoC injected 1.4 trillion yuan into its banking system through outright reverse repo operations on Dec. 31, 2024. Unlike pledged repos that the central bank usually uses in regulator reverse repo operations, the title of the collateral in an outright repo transaction is sold to the buyer. This allows the PBoC to indirectly hold more government bonds and inject liquidity into the banking system to purchase bonds, and is a sort of covert printing of more money (相變無錨印鈔) by the CCP authorities. Excessive central bank holding of government bonds, however, will further depress government bond yields, contribute to greater currency depreciation, and spur capital outflows.

Second, the central bank’s purchase of government bonds will drop bond yields and widen the China-U.S. bond yield spread. Yields on China’s benchmark 10-year government bonds have fallen sharply from December 2024, dropping to as low as 1.5966 percent on Jan. 6. Likewise, the 30-year government bond yield fell below the psychological threshold of 1.9 percent on Jan. 2 and hit a historic low of 1.8327 percent on Jan. 6. Meanwhile, the China-U.S. 10-year government bond yield spread hit 300 basis points on Jan. 3 and widened to 308 basis points on Jan. 7, marking a 24-year high.

Finally, running the money printing press hot has caused the renminbi to depreciate. On Dec. 31, 2024, the offshore RMB exchange rate fell to 7.3688, while the onshore rate hit a new low of 7.3325 on Jan. 6.

  3   Xi signals expansion of anti-corruption efforts at CCDI plenum

  CCDI plenum

On Jan. 6, Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Per state media reports, Xi said that the efforts and intensity in advancing comprehensive and strict governance of the CCP and the anti-corruption struggle have been “unprecedented” in the new era, with tangible results. He urged unwavering determination in maintaining the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, sustaining strategic resolve and high-pressure momentum, and advancing the integration of measures to ensure that officials “dare not, cannot, and do not” want to engage in corruption. Xi further called for resolute efforts to win the “critical, prolonged, and overarching battle” against corruption.

Other key points in Xi’s speech include:

• In 2024, Party Central continued to lead societal change through “self-revolution,” consistently advanced the comprehensive and strict governance of the CCP, and achieved new progress and results.
• Corruption remains the “biggest threat” facing the Party and anti-corruption efforts constitute the most profound form of “self-revolution.”
• The current anti-corruption situation remains “severe and complex.” The “stockpile of corruption” has not yet been cleared, new corruption cases continue to emerge, and the task of eliminating the breeding grounds and conditions for corruption remain arduous and demanding.
• Political oversight must be more “specific, precise, and routine.”
• Investigations into both corruption and misconduct must be deepened. A high-pressure stance should be maintained against corruption at all times, with the focus on key issues, areas, and individuals. Efforts should be made to investigate bribery and acceptance of bribes simultaneously. Systemic corruption risks and hidden dangers should be eliminated.
• The comprehensive and strict governance of the Party should be continually extended to the grassroots.

CCDI chief Li Xi lauded Xi’s speech as being “visionary, deeply insightful, candid in addressing issues, and profoundly impactful.” He added that the speech provides critical guidance for advancing the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and the anti-corruption struggle. Li called on anti-corruption agencies to thoroughly study and implement the spirit of Xi’s speech and to unwaveringly advance the anti-corruption campaign in greater depth.

The fourth plenum of the 20th CCDI was held as a teleconference, with sub-venues in the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and relevant military units. Those in attendance at the main venue in Beijing include:

• Members of the Politburo.
• Members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
• Relevant leaders of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
• State Councilors.
• The president of the Supreme People’s Court.
• The procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
• Relevant leaders of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
• Members of the Central Military Commission.
• Members of the CCDI.
• Leading officials from departments under the Central Committee and State Council, various mass organizations, and relevant military units.

  Propaganda mobilization

CCP propaganda outlets released content around the 20th CCDI fourth plenum period to drive home Xi Jinping’s message about anti-corruption.

Documentaries
State broadcaster CCTV aired a four-episode television documentary series titled, “Fighting Corruption for the People” (反腐為了人民) starting on the evening of Jan. 5.

The documentary series was jointly produced by the propaganda department of the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission along with China Media Group. The titles of the four episodes are:

• “Punishing Petty Corruption and Misconduct at the Grassroots” (懲治蠅貪蟻腐)
• “Jointly Addressing Corruption and Misconduct” (風腐同查同治)
• “Unveiling the Cloak of Corruption” (揭開腐敗隱身衣)
• “Promoting Reform and Governance Through Case Studies” (以案促改促治)

Xinhua commentaries

Jan. 5
State mouthpiece Xinhua published a 9,000-character article titled, “‘Truly Becoming the World’s Most Powerful Political Party’ — Written on the Occasion of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CCDI” (“真正成為世界上最強大的政黨”— 寫在二十屆中央紀委四次全會召開之際).

The article repeatedly emphasized that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts are a key pathway for the CCP to “escape the historical cycle of rise and fall” and achieve long-term governance. The article then underscores the legitimacy and necessity of the Party’s “self-revolution” through five aspects:

1. “Self-revolution” is “always on the road” (i.e. anti-corruption efforts are a journey without an end) because the “unique challenges faced by the big Party is inherently a long-term and arduous process.” The article said that 58 senior officials under central management were purged in 2024 alone, which reinforces Xi’s declaration from more than a decade ago that “no matter who they are, no matter how high their position, anyone who violates Party discipline or state law will be seriously pursued and punished.”

Party Central continues to view the corruption situation in the regime as “still severe and complex.” The article added that Xi stressed the need for exceptional clarity and firm resolve in the fight against corruption at the Politburo democratic life meeting in December 2024, and warned against complacency or leniency.

2. Xi’s call for “comprehensive and strict Party governance” is both “political safeguard and political leadership,” and provides support and protection for China’s “high-quality development.”

3. “Comprehensive and strict Party governance” aims to “bind the hands of those who act recklessly while freeing the hands of the majority of Party members and cadres to take responsibility, act decisively, and pursue initiatives.” Also, “comprehensive and strict Party governance” encourages accountability among officials.

4. “Self-revolution” is deeply connected to the people. The article quotes Xi as saying that “a political party and a government’s future and destiny are ultimately determined by the hearts and minds of the people,” and “it is worth offending thousands if it serves 1.4 billion people.”

5. Xi’s anti-corruption experience offers “inspiration” for political party-building worldwide. The article claims that an “increasingly strong international consensus” recognizes that the governance capabilities and political character demonstrated by the CCP provide a “Chinese model” for the development of political parties around the world. Amid unprecedented global changes, the CCP is a “pillar of stability, injecting certainty and positive energy into a chaotic world.”

The article concludes by asserting that “a political party possessing the spirit and capacity for ‘self-revolution,’ which is essential to achieving goals, will be invincible.”

Jan. 6
Xinhua published a commentary titled, “First Observation — General Secretary’s Speech at the CCDI Meeting is Profoundly Impactful” (第一觀察丨中央紀委全會，總書記講話振聾發聵). The commentary summarizes the key points from Xi Jinping’s speech at the 20th CCDI’s fourth plenum:

• Xi’s call for anti-corruption efforts to “not pause and retreat” reflects Beijing’s unwavering stance on the issue. The commentary noted that over the past decade, the “unprecedented anti-corruption campaign has demonstrated that no matter how high the position, how great the contributions, or who the individual is, corruption will not be tolerated. There are no ‘red book and iron coupons,’ no ‘iron-cap princes,’ and no so-called ‘safety boxes.’”
• Xi described the anti-corruption campaign as a “comprehensive battle,” “targeted offensive,” and a “prolonged struggle,” and explicitly called for resolute efforts to win the “critical, enduring, and overarching battle” against corruption.
• Xi underscored the need to govern the Party with the “spirit of reform and strict standards” to achieve “even greater results.” He added that the goal of the anti-corruption campaign is to ensure that the Party maintains a strong leadership core to undertake the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Therefore,
  • Political oversight should be more specific, precise, and routine.
  • The integrated investigation and resolution of corruption and misconduct should be deepened.
  • The primary responsibility of comprehensive and strict Party governance and supervisory responsibility should be strengthened.
  • Comprehensive and strict Party governance should be continuously extended to the grassroots.

  Our take

Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth plenary session of the 20th CCDI and the accompanying propaganda in state media indicate that the anti-corruption/“self-revolution” effort remains a primary focus of his leadership after more than a decade since its inception.

There are also hints that Xi’s anti-corruption/“self-revolution” campaign could be elevated to greater significance.

1. Xi’s continued anti-corruption efforts suggest that the corruption situation in the regime remains dire. Notably, Xi described corruption as the “biggest threat” facing the CCP and the anti-corruption situation as still being “severe and complex.” Developments such as a record number of “tigers” purged in 2024, the downfall of senior military officers like Miao Hua, and the construction of over 200 specialized detention facilities across China to hold corruption suspects (see the first entry in this newsletter) suggests that Xi’s remarks are not empty rhetoric or political posturing to sustain a redundant campaign, but a partial reflection of the dismal corruption situation affecting Communist China today.

Given the current state of affairs, Xi is calling for more persistent and thorough anti-corruption efforts. For instance, political oversight must be more “specific, precise, and routine,” investigations into corruption and misconduct must be deepened, and “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party” must be expanded to grassroots government. Xi is likely hoping to improve the CCP’s governing ability through enhancing Party discipline so that his leadership can better tackle the many regime-imperiling crises currently plaguing the PRC. Xi is also likely looking to use the anti-corruption/“self-revolution” drive as a tool to suppress intra-Party discontent and maintain control over the officialdom in the face of economic struggles and increasing governance failures.

Xi’s bleak assessment of the corruption situation and proposed measures to deal with the problem partially contradicts earlier propaganda in his second term about how the Party had achieved “overwhelming victory” (壓倒性勝利) against corruption and as a result discounts his most tangible political “achievement.” However, this is unlikely to impact Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) much or erode his political standing because the propaganda apparatus will not call attention to Xi’s failings and due to his already having consolidated power to a very high degree at the 20th Party Congress.

2. Xinhua’s Jan. 6 commentary on Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth plenary session of the 20th CCDI makes a reference to “iron-cap princes.” This reference is particularly sensitive because it is widely believed to be a coded warning to Zeng Qinghong, the influential Party princeling and de facto head of the Jiang Zemin faction after Jiang’s death in 2022.

Xinhua’s reference to “iron-cap princes” potentially adds another layer of meaning to Xi’s observation that the anti-corruption situation is “severe and complex.” Xi could be hinting that his factional rivals are still at large and challenging his rule. We previously analyzed that Xi could have been compelled to remove key allies like Qin Gang after receiving intelligence that they compromised national security, a stated top priority for the Xi leadership. It is possible that Xi suspects that Zeng and others in the remnant Jiang faction who have some sway over the intelligence apparatus could have fed him tainted information and manipulated him into scoring “own goals” through the removal of his loyalists and allies. If so, a paranoid Xi has greater incentive now to move against “anti-Xi” Party princelings like Zeng and others under such rhetoric as “offending thousands” — “no matter how high the position, how great the contributions, or who the individual is” — to “serve 1.4 billion people,” and resolve the “biggest threat” facing the Party.

3. Xinhua’s framing of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as an “inspiration” and “Chinese model” for the development of political parties around the world suggests that Beijing is thinking about elevating the significance of the campaign to beyond its domestic function. The CCP is currently attempting to court the Global South and other countries who might be disillusioned with the United States and the West with its push of so-called “multipolarism” and “community of shared future for mankind.”

To get ahead in geopolitics and “great power competition,” Beijing could be looking to sell its anti-corruption campaign as one of the “attractive” features of “Chinese development.” However, the CCP has shown with its anti-corruption drive that the campaign is better suited for enhancing authoritarian control and rooting out political enemies rather than being a lasting or effective solution to corruption and its ills. Countries that recognize the actual results of the Party’s anti-corruption campaign are unlikely to find it to be a suitable model for development.