1 Analyzing more ‘signs’ that Xi is ‘losing power’
More signs of Xi ‘losing power’?
Some overseas Chinese commentators and Chinese language media outlets continue to spot “signs” that Xi Jinping is “losing power” (“分權,” or having one’s power divided up).
Xi’s absence from an ‘important’ military meeting
The People’s Liberation Army held its whole-army military theory work conference (全軍軍事理論工作會議) in Beijing from Oct. 14 to Oct. 15. Military leaders from various departments and commissions of the Central Military Commission, CMC-affiliated institutions, the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, military theaters, branches of the armed forces, and People’s Armed Police attended the meeting. With the exception of CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia, the other members of the CMC were not in attendance. Xi Jinping did not attend the meeting in person but issued important instructions.
In his instructions, Xi stressed that in the new era and on the new journey, the world is undergoing rapid changes unseen in a century, the new military revolution is advancing swiftly, and China’s security and development needs are evolving profoundly. Therefore, achieving the goal of a strong military (强軍) has become more urgent and there is a need to comprehensively strengthen military theoretical work. Xi also called for enhancing the practical application of military theory, building a modern military theory system with Chinese characteristics, and providing scientific support and guidance for achieving the goal of building a strong military by the centenary anniversary of the PLA’s founding and accelerating the construction of a world-class military.
Zhang Youxia spoke at the conference. He emphasized the need to thoroughly study and implement Xi’s important instructions and to deeply research the theories of warfare and operations in the new era.
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Some overseas Chinese commentators believe that the significance of the whole-army military theory work conference was no less than that of the CMC political work conference held in Yan’an in June this year, and therefore Xi’s absence from the recent conference was a sign that his grip over the military has diminished.
The commentators made the following arguments for why Xi was losing power:
- Xi and all senior military leaders attended the Yan’an conference, but Xi and several senior military leaders were absent from the Beijing conference.
- In his speech at the Beijing conference, Zhang Youxia only called for studying and implementing Xi’s important instructions without mentioning previously often highlighted concepts like “Xi Thought on the Strong Military” and the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
Xi did not meet with Russia’s defense minister
On Oct. 15, CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia met with Russian defense minister Andrey Belousov in Beijing. This was Belousov’s second trip to Beijing in five months. Xi Jinping previously met with Belousov when he was part of Vladimir Putin’s entourage during the latter’s visit to China in May, but did not meet Belousov personally this time.
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Some overseas Chinese commentators believe that Andrey Belousov ranks higher than former Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu because the former was previously a deputy prime minister. This and the fact that Xi met with Shoigu when he visited China in October 2018 meant that Xi not meeting Belousov in Beijing this time was a sign that actual military power has shifted to Zhang Youxia and his faction and Xi has been largely sidelined from military affairs within the CMC.
Xi did not visit the Eastern Theater Command during local inspections
Xi Jinping visited Fujian and Anhui provinces for inspections in the week of Oct. 14.
On Oct. 15 and Oct. 16, Xi visited Dongshan Island in Fujian. The island faces Taiwan and has long been considered a military “frontline.” A day before Xi’s visit, the PLA Eastern Theater Command held its “Joint Sword-2024B” military exercise around Taiwan. While on Dongshan Island, Xi inspected Aojiao Village in Chencheng Town, the Gu Wenchang Memorial Hall, and the Guandi Cultural Industry Park. PRC state media said Xi visited those places to understand the progress of promoting rural revitalization, inheriting revolutionary traditions, and strengthening cultural heritage protection.
On Oct. 17 and Oct. 18, Xi carried out inspections in Anhui Province. While in Anhui, Xi inspected the PLA Rocket Force’s strategic missile units with Zhang Youxia. During the inspection, Xi urged the strategic missile troops to “adhere to the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, carry out ideological and political work down to the launch pad, and ensure that the troops always and under all circumstances resolutely obey the command of Party Central and the Central Military Commission.”
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Some overseas Chinese commentators noted that Xi Jinping would typically inspect the Eastern Theater Command, hold discussions with the military command’s leaders, and deliver important speeches at the command during his trips to Fujian Province. The commentators added that Xi did not mention any military matters and instead focused on cultural topics during his latest Fujian inspection. Therefore, the commentators argue that the CCP leadership has decided to prevent Xi from further involvement in military affairs.
In explaining Xi’s inspection of PLARF strategic missile units in Anhui, some overseas Chinese commentators argue that this was merely an attempt by Xi to “maintain his presence” (i.e. pretend to stay relevant).
Three senior officials sentenced to death with reprieve
Oct. 10
Fan Yifei, the former deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, was sentenced to death with reprieve for illegally accepting bribes totaling about 386 million yuan.
Oct. 12
Jiang Jie, the former vice chairman of the Tibet Political Consultative Conference, was sentenced to death with reprieve for illegally accepting bribes totaling about 225 million yuan.
Oct. 14
Wang Dawei, former director of the Liaoning Provincial Public Security Bureau, was sentenced to death with reprieve for embezzling 555 million yuan.
PRC regulator vows to strengthen financial supervision
Oct. 18
Wu Qing, the chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, said at the Annual Conference of Financial Street Forum 2024 that the CSRC would rigorously enforce supervision and management of the financial sector, as well as guard against risks, in accordance with the “new nine provisions.”
Wu also stressed the need to decisively address violations such as illegal share reductions, circumventing shareholding limits, financial fraud, fraudulent issuance, and market manipulation.
Our take
The latest “signs” of Xi Jinping “losing power” follow those that we debunked in the Oct. 17 newsletter. We believe that the “signs,” rumors, and speculation about Xi “losing power” are founded on unreliable assumptions about Xi’s health and political instability in the CCP elite, but gained momentum after Beijing introduced a wave of economic support measures that appeared to contradict the Xi leadership’s approach to the economy (we see no fundamental conflict) starting from late September.
Further, the analysis of “signs,” rumors, and speculation that Xi is “losing power” by some overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets do not correspond with how the CCP operates and with current power dynamics in the Party elite.
1. The recent whole-army military theory work conference in Beijing was focused on political indoctrination and not the reaffirmation of the Party’s supremacy over the military as was the CMC political work conference in Yan’an. This means that the Yan’an conference is much more important than the Beijing conference, and both conferences are not on the same level of significance as some overseas Chinese commentators have claimed. Since the Beijing conference was less prominent, it did not matter that Xi and some senior military leaders were absent from it.
It is significant that Zhang Youxia was tasked to lead the Beijing conference, but not in the way that some Chinese commentators have interpreted. As CMC vice chairman, Zhang is responsible for combat-related work rather than political work. However, with the elevation of “political military-building” (i.e. political work) at the Yan’an military conference, Zhang now appears to have been tasked with personally overseeing the indoctrination of the PLA in Xi Jinping’s military theories. Put another way, Zhang is reinforcing Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige), not “dividing up” Xi’s control over the military. This development would not be missed by senior military officials who attended the Beijing conference, and there is virtually no risk of those officials viewing Zhang leading the conference and Xi’s absence as a sign that Xi is “losing power.”
Meanwhile, Zhang Youxia not mentioning “Xi Thought on the Strong Military” and the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” in his speech at the Beijing conference does not mean that those concepts were not raised or emphasized. In fact, those concepts were undoubtedly hammered home during the conference as part of political indoctrination. Among the materials that would have very likely been read at the conference include the “Selection of Xi Jinping’s Important Discourses on Political Military-building in the New Era” (習近平關於新時代政治建軍重要論述選編) that the CMC distributed military-wide on Sept. 11. In its notice about the “Selection,” the CMC urged the PLA to thoroughly implement the spirit of the recent Yan’an conference, to carefully organize the study and use of the “Selection,” and ensure that political military-building is deepened and solidified. The notice further stressed that officers and soldiers are to be guided to fully grasp the decisive significance of Xi’s political theories, including the “Two Establishes,” “four consciousnesses,” “four confidences,” and “Two Safeguards,” as well as uphold the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
In sum, senior military officers are still being required to study Xi Jinping’s political and military theories and a CMC vice chairman is personally the effort at political indoctrination because Xi remains very much in control over the military and has not lost power. If Xi had truly been sidelined as some overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets are claiming, then there would be efforts to de-emphasize the study and implementation of his political and military theories, as well as the promotion of the “CMC Vice Chairman Responsibility System” over the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
2. It is a stretch to view Xi Jinping not meeting Russian defense minister Andrey Belousov in Beijing as a sign that the former is “losing power” in lieu of more plausible diplomatic and geopolitical explanations.
First, it is entirely normal for heads of state to be selective about meeting or not meeting visiting senior officials from other countries. When Xi met with Belousov earlier this year, the latter was part of the entourage of Putin’s state visit to China. With Belousov traveling alone to China on his second trip, it was within protocol for him to meet with PRC defense minister Dong Jun on Oct. 14. Meanwhile, Belousov was likely granted a meeting with CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia the next day in consideration of the strengthening of Sino-Russian ties since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Second, geopolitics likely played a part in why Xi Jinping met with Sergei Shoigu when he was defense minister in 2018, but did not meet Andrey Belousov on his recent China trip. In 2018, the U.S. and the PRC were in the midst of a trade war and Xi had reason to spotlight China’s “closeness” and “friendship” with Russia by personally meeting with the Russian defense minister to sway the Trump administration back to “engagement” and dissuade the U.S. from antagonizing China. But with the U.S. and the international community growing increasingly wary of the PRC after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Xi likely does not want to draw too much attention to the CCP regime’s involvement in Moscow’s war effort and risk courting more penalties by having a personal audience with the Russian defense minister in Beijing.
3. Likewise, there are geopolitical explanations for why Xi Jinping did not visit the Eastern Theater Command this time when inspecting Fujian this time that are more plausible than the speculation that he must be “losing power.”
The international community has become increasingly worried and vigilant about the possibility of a PLA invasion of Taiwan since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and with the PRC not renouncing the use of force in achieving “reunification” with Taiwan. In October, the PRC incurred even more international scrutiny in the wake of its response to Taiwan leader William Lai’s “motherland” and “territorial integrity” remarks and military drills around Taiwan after the Republic of China’s national day. Given the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s greater prioritization on economic rescue, it would make sense for Xi to barely keep up the PRC’s menacing posture towards Taiwan by visiting Dongshan Island but stop short of courting unwanted international pressure by also inspecting the Eastern Theater Command (which could easily be misinterpreted by external observers as Beijing preparing for imminent aggression).
Meanwhile, Xi likely inspected the PLARF strategic missile units in Anhui to showcase his rapport with the troops, boost morale in the military and strengthen his “quan wei,” and mitigate the negative impact of the major corruption scandal involving the PLARF. State media coverage of Xi’s PLARF inspection was also consistent with previous reporting, with Xi clearly placed above Zhang Youxia (who accompanied Xi during the PLARF inspection) in prominence. In short, there is no sign that Xi has lost control over the military and was attempting to “maintain his presence” through the PLARF inspections.
4. The Xi leadership’s recent sentencing of senior officials to death with reprieve and continued anti-corruption efforts in the financial sector are signs that he is very much in control and his power has not been “divided up.” If the Party elders were indeed able to constrain Xi and restore the “collective leadership,” they would certainly be able to prevent the purge of their allies and stop the Xi leadership from undermining their interests in the financial system.
We believe that Xi Jinping maintains a strong grip on power despite the erosion of his “quan wei” through the exposure of numerous governance failures, severe economic challenges, mounting international pressure, and widespread dissatisfaction with his rule. However, Xi is riding the proverbial tiger by clinging to the Party to maintain his rule and searching for solutions to China’s problems from within the CCP system. Xi is very much at risk of being suddenly deposed should the PRC’s polycrisis come to a head and overwhelm the regime.
