1 Xi doubles down on indoctrination and propaganda as problems mount for the PRC
Promoting Xi’s paramount position in the PLA
Aug. 1
1. The Central Military Commission issued an opinion on “comprehensively strengthening the military’s Party building around the realization of the centenary goal of the military” (關於圍繞實現建軍一百年奮鬥目標全面加強軍隊黨的建設的意見). The opinion essentially rehashed earlier CCP propaganda and the Xi leadership’s political requirements of “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s military” and “implementing the CMC chairman responsibility system.”
2. The CMC issued “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military Study Outline (2023 Edition)” (習近平強軍思想學習綱要 [2023年版]) to the entire military. The Outline is a revised version of a document that was first published in 2019.
The CMC also issued a notice requiring the entire military to seriously organize the study and use of the Outline (2023 Edition). The notice added that military personnel at all levels must take the study and implementation of “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” as their “primary political task and long-term strategic task.”
3. Official CCP media published a five-minute video promoting the PLA titled “The Road to a Strong Military | The Commander’s Concern” (強軍之路丨統帥的牽挂).
The video focused on depicting Xi Jinping’s “in-depth investigations and research at the grassroots” of the military in recent years. For instance, the video highlighted Xi visiting officers and soldiers patrolling the border when temperatures were at minus 30 degrees Celsius (minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit) in 2014 as an example of Xi showing “love for the soldiers” (愛兵情懷).
The video also boasted that Xi had overseen the PLA’s sweeping reforms, which were implemented under the 18th Central Committee and replaced the old system with a new one in a swift and steady manner (expressed through the phrase, “大開大合、大破大立、蹄疾步穩”). Also, “the Commander-in-Chief’s deep concern [for the PLA] will surely become an inexhaustible driving force for the generals and soldiers of the three armed forces to struggle and advance.”
Aug. 2 to Aug. 10
The PLA Daily published nine commentary articles on the topic of “comprehensively and deeply studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on a strong military” (論全面深入學習貫徹習近平強軍思想) on its front page. The nine articles are part of a 13-article series promoting the “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military Study Outline (2023 Edition).”
‘Xi Thought’ consolidation
Aug. 2
The CCP General Office and the State Council General Office issued an opinion on “establishing a checklist system for leading cadres to know and understand the internal regulations of the Party and national laws” (關於建立領導干部應知應會黨內法規和國家法律清單制度的意見).
The opinion required leading cadres (the “key minority”) to “study and implement” Xi Jinping’s political thought and support him.
The three learning focuses proposed in the opinion are:
- Xi Jinping Thought on the rule of law.
- Intra-Party regulations.
- National laws.
The opinion also listed three work measures:
- Formulate a list of internal Party regulations and national laws that leading cadres should know and be familiar with in a hierarchical and classified manner.
- Incorporate the study of Party regulations and national laws that leading cadres should know and understand into the cadre education system.
- Establish and improve a mechanism to encourage leading cadres to learn and use the law.
Aug. 3
State mouthpiece Xinhua published an over 9,000-character commentary article titled, “Continuously Climbing New Ideological Peaks — A Review of the In-depth Study and Comprehensive Implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (不斷攀登新的思想高峰 — 深入學習和全面貫徹習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想述評).
The article rehashed earlier propaganda in discussing the importance of Sinicized Marxism and Xi Jinping Thought to the development of the Party and the country’s cause, as well as for the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The article also re-emphasized the “inevitably” of the “two combinations” (i.e. combining the basic principles of Marxism with China’s “specific reality” and “fine traditional Chinese culture.”)
Backdrop
1. The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region saw record rainfall (the most in 11 years) from the evening of July 29 to August 2. The rainstorms flooded the shallow mountainous regions of the aforementioned area and the adjacent plains on the western edge of the North China Plain.
To protect Beijing and Xiong’an from being flooded, the CCP authorities attempted to channel the waters into so-called “flood storage areas” in low-lying populated land. The move severely affected Zhuozhou City in Hebei Province and other areas, deepening local resentment towards the authorities and resulting in boycotts of donations to the Red Cross Society of China, a government-organized non-governmental organization.
2. On Aug. 6, two shallow earthquakes (magnitude 5.5 and magnitude 3.0) struck Pingyuan County of Dezhou City (about 185 miles south from Beijing) in Shandong Province in quick succession and generated 52 aftershocks. The earthquakes collapsed over 100 buildings and left at least 24 people injured, according to state media reports.
3. From the lack of public appearances by the top Xi leadership officials, the annual Beidaihe work retreat (around the end-July to end-August period) for senior active and retired CCP officials appears to be underway.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is being steadily eroded by “turbulent challenges” coming one after the other, including visible and rapid economic deterioration, various financial and debt crises, personnel problems (Qin Gang and the PLA Rocket Force), nature disasters, and mounting geopolitical pressures.
In what appears to be an effort to forestall political challenges to his rule as crises deepen for the CCP regime, Xi is doubling down on propaganda (on which much of his “quan wei” is established), indoctrination, as well as Party discipline and the regime’s “rule by law” system. In theory, Xi’s moves will create a high-pressure and coercive environment within the CCP, and particularly among leading cadres, to be loyal to his person, reduce the threat of coups against his leadership, and mitigate the problem of “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai.”
Beijing’s indoctrination and propaganda efforts also appear to partly be an effort to “stabilize” society in light of the recent floods and earthquakes in northern China, as well as in the wake of increasing recessionary and deflationary pressures in the regime.
2. The recent propaganda targeting the military is consistent with the Xi leadership’s long-term efforts to ensure that the PLA remains loyal to Xi Jinping, that is, “upholds the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s military” and “implements the CMC chairman responsibility system.”
Xi is also likely looking to consolidate his control over the PLA and ensure that he continues to have a firm grip on the Party’s “gun” in light of the shake ups in the PLARF leadership as well as worsening internal and external crises for the CCP regime.
3. Party Central and the State Council’s “checklist system for leading cadres to know and understand the internal regulations of the Party and national laws” appear to indicate that Xi’s political theories rank above the CCP’s intra-Party regulations in terms of importance and precedent, while intra-Party regulations are weightier than the laws laid out in the PRC constitution. This hierarchical arrangement further entrenches Xi Jinping’s one-man rule over the PRC while sidelining the “collective leadership.”
2 Official response to floods in Hebei deepen resentment towards the CCP regime
On July 28, Typhoon Doksuri made landfall in China’s southern province of Fujian. The typhoon would make its way up north over the next several days, flooding many areas and bringing the heaviest rainfall to Beijing since records began 140 years ago.
One of the worst-hit areas was Zhuozhou, a city to the southwest of Beijing with a population of more than 600,000. Mainland media reports on Aug. 1 cited local officials as saying that the average precipitation in Zhuozhou was 355.1 millimeters that day, and 100,000 people were later evacuated. The record rainfall also led to the overflow of 67 of 83 smaller reservoirs in the prefecture-level city of Baoding to which Zhuozhou belongs, and the local government estimated direct economic losses reaching nearly 17 billion yuan as of Aug. 5.
The CCP authorities’ handling of the situation in Zhuozhou and other aspects of the flood sparked popular anger in China.
A ‘moat’ for Beijing
As the flooding situation worsened in Hebei Province, CCP officials made moves and signaled that the authorities would channel water to low-lying populated areas in order to protect the capital of Beijing and Xiong’an, a state-level new area designated to have millennial significance (千年大計, “millennium plan”) and Xi Jinping’s pet project.
- July 31: Hebei opened seven of its 13 designated flood storage areas, including two in Zhuozhou City. Under the PRC’s flood control laws, water may be temporarily channeled to flood storage areas when basin-wide flooding causes reservoirs to exceed their limit.
- Aug. 1: Li Guoying, the minister of water resources and deputy commander-in-chief of the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, said that flood control measures should prioritize protecting Beijing Daxing airport and the Xiong’an New Area, as well as the people in flood storage areas.
- Aug. 2: Ni Yuefeng, the Hebei provincial Party secretary, said during an inspection of flood control and rescue work in Baoding and Xiong’an New District that it is necessary to “activate flood storage and detention areas in an orderly manner to reduce the pressure on flood control in Beijing” and “resolutely serve as a moat for the capital.” Ni’s comments were published on the Zhuozhou City authorities’ official WeChat channel, but were later deleted and discussions of Ni’s remarks were censored following strong pushback from netizens.
- Aug. 3: Former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin sought to defend Ni Yuefeng’s “moat” remarks by claiming that the description “mostly refers to politics and security, meaning that the social stability around Beijing is conducive to the social governance of the capital.” Hu also urged people to trust in the “good intentions” of CCP officials.
According to overseas Chinese language media reports and information circulating on social media, conflict between local residents and officials broke out in Baoding and other parts of Hebei as officials opted to be “politically correct” in ensuring that Beijing and Xiong’an remained “protected” from the flood waters.
- Videos and other information posted on Chinese social media showed residents in Zhuozhou confronting officials who insisted on breaching local dykes to flood their homes and farmland in order to “protect” Beijing and Xiong’an. The residents eventually clashed with local officials and the police to stop them from digging up the dykes, and a number of them were arrested. Meanwhile, some netizens said that the flood storage areas in Hebei, including Baiyang Lake, were not at capacity, which indicated that the officials’ move to flood villages was still premature.
- Aug. 2: Videos circulating online showed the residents of Ci Village in Zhuozhou confronting a local demolition team in a bid to stop them from digging up their dyke. The residents were ultimately unsuccessful in their effort as they were forcibly taken away by the police after a confrontation. The rest of the residents had to be evacuated overnight after a “breach” in the dyke submerged their village.
- Aug. 3: A “red letterhead” regulatory document from the Gaobeidian City flood control authorities being circulated on the Chinese internet called for the widening of flood diversion from 300 meters to 1,000 meters in the city’s township administrative area of Xincheng’s Dongwu Village to “ensure the absolute safety of the Xiong’an New Area and Baigou East Dyke.”
- Aug. 4: A video circulated online showed villagers in Gaobeidian protecting their local dykes from being demolished by officials. The person shooting the video said that four excavators had been brought in for the job, and skirmishes appeared to have broken out as villagers rushed to the scene.
- Aug. 5: Hundreds of villagers from Bazhou City went to protest their local government for allowing floodwaters from the destruction of local dykes to inundate their village. Black-clad policemen later showed up on scene to beat up the villagers, resulting in fierce clashes.
Similar incidents of officials breaking dykes in China’s northeastern region have also been reported by overseas Chinese media and on social media.
Coverup
There was also popular anger over the CCP authorities’ cover up of flood deaths.
For instance, the Zhuozhou authorities claimed on Aug. 1 that there were “zero” deaths and “zero” people missing out of the 133,913 people who had been affected by the floods. However, a reporter with the local state media broadcaster found many bodies floating in the water in a house that had been flooded after the authorities dug up the dykes, but the authorities still instructed the media to report “zero deaths and zero missing,” according to an account posted to Twitter on Aug. 5 by the reporter’s former classmate. The reporter’s former classmate said that the people of Zhuozhou were “slowly waking up” to the horrors of the CCP authorities after paying a “painful price” during the flood.
Meanwhile, Radio Free Asia reported on Aug. 7 that the Zhuozhou propaganda department had instructed its subordinate units and civil servants not to themselves release information about the disaster and flood season, and to not accept interviews with reporters from other provinces without authorization. The Zhuozhou propaganda department also slammed “some rescuers” for broadcasting “malicious live streams” of the rescue effort that “seriously affected the image of the local community.” Radio Free Asia further cited a rescue volunteer as saying that the Zhuozhou authorities had shot down drones that were filming the disaster area without permission.
The Zhuozhou authorities were not the only ones engaging in coverup. On Aug. 9, state broadcaster CCTV reported that 33 people had died in Beijing due to the heavy rains. However, the Beijing-based independent reporter Gao Yu had posted on social media on Aug. 3 that more than 200 people had died in Beijing’s Mentougou District alone, including a four-year-old child. Gao added that the Mentougou authorities appeared to have cut mobile signals in the area to prevent live broadcasting.
Flood corruption in Zhuozhou
Aside from destroying dykes and flooding homes in the name of “protecting” Beijing and Xiong’an from floodwaters, local officials in Zhuozhou have also been called out for taking advantage of the natural disaster to engage in corruption.
- Aug. 3: According to a screenshot of a Southern Weekly reporter’s group chat, Zhuozhou officials have been blocking residents from helping out in the relief effort and were “warehousing” the aid (food, water, life jackets, etc.) donated by residents for resale instead of getting the material to those in need. The group chat criticized the Zhuozhou officials for acting “worse than beasts” (禽獸不如).
- Aug. 3: Netizens who helped in the rescue effort claimed that resident donations, including food and clothing, were piled up high in the Zhuozhou Zhijiao Center (a technical school in Zhuozhou), but the local officials insisted that there were no supplies to hand out to flood victims and attempted to block the netizens from revealing what they had done with the donations.
- Aug. 4: According to information circulating on Weibo, most of the civilian rescue teams in Zhuozhou had left the area due to inaction on the part of the local government. Also, many vehicles transporting resident donations were not allowed to exit the highways to make deliveries unless they possessed an “invitation letter” issued by the local government. After the military took over the rescue effort, the donations piled up in the Zhuozhou Zhijiao Center could only be delivered to those in need after going through many procedures.
As news of corruption in Zhuozhou made the rounds, Chinese residents began to boycott and mock calls by the Beijing Red Cross Society (Aug. 2) and Zhuozhou municipal government (Aug. 3) to solicit public donations for the flood relief effort. Netizens blasted them for being “shameless” and told them to “scram,” and the censors later scrubbed popular search terms related to the Zhuozhou municipal government and Beijing Red Cross Society’s appeal for donations. Netizens also slammed news that China had donated 10 million yuan worth of humanitarian supplies to Sudan on Aug. 2 after an armed conflict broke out, with some asking, “Where in Zhuozhou is Sudan?” The outpouring of mockery and criticism saw the censors turn off comments under reports of China’s donation of supplies to Sudan.
Meanwhile, official mainland media reported that the finance ministry and emergency management ministry had allocated an additional 350 million yuan to support disaster relief efforts in seven provinces and areas (including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Jilin) on Aug. 6. The central authorities had earlier allocated 170 million yuan to those areas.
Food security concerns
The heavy rains brought by Typhoon Doksuri and Typhoon Khanun have also hit Jilin and Heilongjiang, two important grain-producing areas in China.
- On Aug. 6, the ministry of water resources raised the emergency response for flooding to level 3 (one step below the highest at level 4) for Inner Mongolia, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.
- On Aug. 6, People’s Daily reported that 90,000 hectares of crops were damaged by flood waters in Heilongjiang’s capital of Harbin.
- Xinhua reported that more than 42,575 hectares of crops were destroyed in Heilongjiang’s Shangzhi City by the worst rainstorm faced by the city in over six decades.
Our take
1. Record rainfall and official corruption aside, the local governments in the various flood-hit areas do not appear to be doing a good job in either flood prevention work or organizing disaster relief.
Politics is almost certainly part of the reason for the shortcomings in local governance. Disaster prevention and relief work typically rank near the bottom of priorities for local governments because the work is neither profitable nor glamorous; local officials would rather pursue projects that make big money and are eye-catching to rack up political achievements rather than build more dykes and improve infrastructure to channel floodwaters. Also, local officials are inclined to put in more effort in disaster relief than in prevention; officials stand to score political points for appearing to be “vigorous” in organizing large-scale flood rescue efforts but will not stand out if diligent prevention measures effectively forestall or mitigate flooding.
Another reason why local governments tend not to have adequate resources for disaster relief is a simple lack of funding. Local governments have been stretched thin financially under the Xi leadership due to economic deterioration across China and Xi Jinping having launched one political campaign after the other (including “zero-COVID”) in his efforts to consolidate power.
We previously covered the phenomenon of local governments going public about their financial difficulties and debt risks while beseeching the central government for help. Recently, a notice by the Dalian municipal finance bureau on the delay of wage payment to civil servants dated July 31, 2023 made the rounds on the Chinese internet. The notice said that the processing of payment of salaries and social security to various work units under the Dalian government budget would be delayed until after Aug. 15, with the specific processing time to be announced later. Dalian is one of five cities specifically designated in the state plan (i.e. cities with budget authority on the same level as provinces), and its 2022 GDP of 843.09 billion yuan ranks first in the three northeastern provinces. So if the Dalian municipal authorities are running out of funds to pay civil servants, then the financial situation of most local governments is bound to be similar or worse. Local fiscal shortages, the central government’s lackluster disaster fund allocations, and local corruption (the Zhuozhou authorities’ hoarding of public donations is reminiscent of the charging of toll fees for harvester transports in Henan after heavy rains in May) are combining to negatively impact the ability of local governments to carry out effective flood relief work in the affected areas.
2. Beijing is the PRC’s capital and Xi Jinping has prominently earmarked Xiong’an New Area as part of his political legacy. Thus, local officials in Hebei would naturally do everything in their power, even without Beijing’s prompting, to protect both the municipality of Beijing and Xiong’an from being flooded, and in doing so, protect their respective careers.
Local officials, however, are protecting Xiong’an and Beijing the only way they know how, that is, by sacrificing the interests of the masses to advance the Party’s agenda. While those officials may succeed in their immediate objective and in safeguarding their individual interests, they have done so by sacrificing more of Xi and the CCP’s political legitimacy, and ultimately placing the regime in further jeopardy.
3. The Chinese people have come to view the CCP’s flood relief effort in Hebei Province as helping to create man-made disasters that harm local residents at the cost of preserving the narrow interests (Xiong’an) of Xi Jinping and the regime. Put another way, the destruction of dykes in Zhuozhou and other areas to “resolutely serve as a moat for the capital” is a significant public relations disaster for the CCP that undermines the Xi leadership’s propaganda about how “the country is the people, and the people are the country” and “the people’s hearts are the greatest politics.”
Disaster relief is an important obligation that the taxpaying citizenry has come to expect from their government. The CCP authorities’ poor response to the recent flooding disaster will further undermine its credibility and political legitimacy at a time when both are already threatened by rapidly worsening economic conditions in China and rising social instability.
