1 What the post-Fourth Plenum military personnel reshuffles entail
Post-plenum military personnel movement
Oct. 25
The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission updated the leadership section of its official website after the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Commission. The update saw General Wang Renhua, secretary of the Central Military Commission’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission, no longer listed among the members of the CPLAC.
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Wang Renhua has not made public appearances for some time. On May 8, 2025, the CCP held a special seminar for political and legal affairs leading cadres. State broadcaster CCTV footage of the seminar showed that Wang Renhua and People’s Armed Police commander Wang Chunning were absent from the proceedings. Both men were still listed as members of the CPLAC in early October, but Wang Chunning was removed from the list on Oct. 17 when he was officially purged.
Wang Renhua was not seen in CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo broadcast of the Fourth Plenum.
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Wang Renhua began his career in the military at the PLA General Armaments Department. Following the PLA’s organization in Xi Jinping’s first term, Wang was appointed:
- January 2016: Deputy director of the PLA Ground Force Political Work Department.
- January 2017: Secretary of the discipline inspection commission of the PLA Navy East Sea Fleet.
- 2018: Deputy secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
- December 2019: Secretary of the CMC PLAC and promoted to the vice admiral rank.
- March 28, 2024: Promoted to full admiral (the previous two CMC PLAC secretaries were not promoted to full admiral).
Oct. 26
The PRC embassy in North Korea released a statement about a reception that it held on Oct. 25 to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ participation in the Korean War. The event was attended by a PRC military delegation led by Lieutenant General Xia Zhihe, along with representatives of various PRC organizations in North Korea.
The PRC embassy statement listed Xia Zhihe’s appointment as “political commissar of the National Defense University.” This indicates that Xia had replaced Zhong Shaojun in that office.
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Publicly available information shows that Xia Zhiheng previously served as:
- Deputy director of the organization division of the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT).
- Political commissar of NUDT’s school of humanities and social sciences.
- Political commissar of NUDT’s school of computer science (deputy corps rank).
- Secretary of the discipline inspection commission and director of the supervisory commission of the PLAN’s Eastern Theater Command.
- Political Commissar of the Naval Command College.
Zhong Shaojun was seen in CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo broadcast of the Fourth Plenum. Prior to the plenum, there were persistent rumors that Zhong was under investigation.
Backdrop
The Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee had one of the lowest participation rates since at least the late 1970s, with just 168 full members and 147 alternates in attendance. In particular, several alternates who were military representatives were skipped over for promotion to full member to fill up vacant Central Committee seats.
CCTV footage of the Fourth Plenum suggested that more than half of the military representatives were absent from the session. However, two generals who were rumored to be under investigation attended the Fourth Plenum:
- General Wang Qiang, commander of the Central Theater Command.
- By convention, Wang Qiang should have served as parade commander for the 2025 Beijing military parade per his appointment. Instead, Central Theater Command air force commander Han Shengyan was appointed parade commander. At the time, some observers suspected that Wang Qiang was under investigation.
- Lieutenant General Wang Kai, commander of the Tibet Military District.
- Wang Kai was notably absent when Xi Jinping attended the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region in August and met with officers above the rank of colonel from the Tibet Military District. Some observers believed at the time that Wang Kai was being probed.
Our take
The post-plenum military personnel adjustments appear to be part of the Xi Jinping leadership’s effort to “rectify” the PLA, including through purges and restructuring the military leadership. Broadly speaking, military leading cadres who attended the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (as verified by CCTV’s coverage of the session) are likely politically secure, while those who were absent are likely under investigation.
As for the individual cases listed above:
i) Wang Renhua, secretary of the CMC PLAC, did not attend the Fourth Plenum and saw his name struck off the CPLAC leadership list. This suggests that Wang has likely been purged.
ii) Zhong Shaojun is no longer political commissar of the National Defense University, but did attend the Fourth Plenum. This suggests that contrary to popular speculation, the Xi leadership is preparing to appoint Zhong to a higher office rather than preparing to purge him. We previously assessed (see here and here) that Zhong could fill the vacant post of CMC Political Work Department director, which previously belonged to Miao Hua.
In hindsight, the Xi leadership could have already been paving the way to move against Miao Hua and position Zhong Shaojun to eventually replace him as early as April 2025 when Zhong was transferred to the National Defense University to serve as political commissar (this move also sets up Zhong for future promotion to full general).
iii) Both Wang Qiang (head of the Central Theater Command) and Wang Kai (Tibet Military District commander) attended the Fourth Plenum, indicating that they could be in line for promotion instead of investigation as observers have speculated. Wang Qiang could be appointed to a senior position in the CMC or a service branch, while Wang Kai could become a leading military officer of a theater command.
The potential post-plenum reshuffling of Wang Qiang, Wang Kai, and other military officials was likely planned before the Politburo announced the decision to convene the Fourth Plenum. Typically, most anti-corruption investigations last around six months, with the most critical stage in the first two months. Given that Miao Hua was probed around October 2024 and He Weidong was investigated in March 2025, Beijing would have likely wrapped up their cases by June, and, based on their confessions, extended the probe to others. Therefore, when Xi Jinping visited Tibet in August and presided over the Beijing military parade in September, both of the Wangs were not where they were supposed to be (either to meet Xi or lead the parade) because they were likely at their new posts or preparing to take on their new posts.
Many more senior military officers are likely to be implicated as the Xi leadership’s “rectification” of the military continues and deepens. One of the outcomes of this probe is that the officers who will eventually replace those who are in trouble are likely to be neither full nor alternate members of the Central Committee. This means that the PLA could see a large number of senior officer promotions in the future, and these promotions are likely to fall outside normal procedures (i.e. “rocket” promotions).
2 CCP ushers in ‘Fengqiao Experience 3.0’ with revisions to grassroots laws
CCP revises grassroots ‘organic’ laws
Oct. 28
1. The 18th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress passed revisions to the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees (村民委員會組織法) and the Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees (城市居民委員會組織法). Both revised laws will take effect on Jan. 1, 2026.
Main amendments in the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees (46 articles, 7 chapters) include:
- Elevate the concepts of “Four Discussions and Two Publics” (四議兩公開) and “One Person Holding Two Posts” (一肩挑) into law.
- Four Discussions (四議): Discussion, deliberation, resolution, and voting.
- Two Publics (兩公開): Public disclosure of the decision-making process and of the results.
- One Person Holding Two Posts (一肩挑): The same person serving as both village or community Party secretary and committee director.
- Establish a village affairs supervisory committee and economic responsibility auditing.
- Create villager subgroups in each village to exercise collective economic functions.
- Mandate government funding, compensation, and infrastructure support for village committees.
Main amendments in the Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees (50 articles, 7 chapters) include:
- Community Party organizations must pre-approve all major matters.
- The responsibilities of the residents’ committee are further specified, including assisting in maintaining public security, handling petitions, community correction and rehabilitation, and responding to emergencies.
- Establish a permanent residents’ representative assembly (to be held at least once every six months).
- Require one residents’ representative for every 20 to 50 households to form an ultra-dense grassroots governance network.
- The urban affairs supervisory committee may report directly to supervisory authorities.
- Audits of departing directors must be disclosed before the next election.
- Local governments at all levels that require the assistance of residents’ committees in their work must provide the necessary funding and resources.
- The “one-network integrated management” (一網統管) information system will be coordinated by county-level governments.
- Residents’ committees are granted legal person status, with the director serving as the legal representative. Residents’ committees are allowed to engage in necessary civil activities, but they are prohibited from acting as guarantors.
2. Officials from the Central Social Work Department, the NPC Social Development Committee, and the Legislative Affairs Commission jointly answered reporters’ questions on the revisions to the two organic laws.
A “relevant person in charge” said that the revision of the two laws is a symbolic achievement in implementing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important directives on grassroots governance. The revisions “summarize practical experience at the local level, improve the system of ‘whole-process people’s democracy,’ aim to reduce burdens on grassroots governance, and advance the modernization of governance systems and capacity.”
The officials summed up the basic principles and main content of the revised laws:
- Strengthening the Party’s leadership over grassroots self-governance.
- Ensuring Party leadership runs through every aspect and stage of grassroots organizational work.
- Improving the functions and election systems of grassroots organizations.
- Adding specific provisions on consultation mechanisms.
- Enhancing the systems of grassroots meetings and residents’ representative assemblies.
- Improving mechanisms for management and supervision of grassroots organizations.
- Strengthening institutional guarantees for grassroots organizational work.
Background on grassroots governance in the PRC
The CCP began implementing its so-called grassroots “self-governance” system in the early years of the “reform and opening up” period to grant the Chinese people a degree of autonomy in running their affairs. This autonomy, however, was gradually eroded under Xi Jinping as he sought to strengthen the Party’s control over all sectors of society.
A brief history of grassroots “self-governance” follows:
- In 1987, the CCP issued a trial version of the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees. This law introduced the concept of “villagers’ self-governance,” with the aim of establishing mass organizations in rural areas characterized by the three “selfs” of “self-management, self-education, and self-service.”
- In 1989, the CCP extended the “three-selfs” principle to urban neighborhoods with the Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees.
- In 1998, the CCP formally promulgated the Villagers’ Committees Law. The law established the framework of the “Four Democracies” — democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic supervision — which became the cornerstone of rural governance.
- Revisions to the two organic laws in 2010 and 2018 saw the gradual incorporation of Party-building leadership and property management (物業管理). Villagers and grassroots urban residents, however, retained a degree of “grayzone autonomy.”
- In 2023, the Xi leadership established the Central Social Work Department, a new “super ministry” second only to the Central Organization Department in controlling personnel. The Central Social Work Department directly connects to 700,000 village committees and 500,000 residents’ committees, marking a shift in grassroots governance from fragmented pilot programs to centralized vertical management by Party Central.
Our take
The CCP’s revisions to the two grassroots “organic” laws is not about granting greater autonomy to the Chinese people through so-called “whole-process people’s democracy.” Rather, the revisions are about nationalizing, urbanizing, and digitizing the “Fengqiao Experience” (i.e. having the masses partake in maintaining social stability) to construct a “stability maintenance” system where “the Party controls everything and the grid monitors every household” (黨管一切、網控萬戶).
Put another way, the revisions to the grassroots “organic” laws mark the full entry of urban and rural grassroots governance in the PRC into an Orwellian era of technological totalitarianism characterized by Party control, grid patrols, and algorithmic surveillance.
1. The revisions to the two grassroots “organic” laws essentially transform the looser “grassroots autonomy” of the “reform and opening up” period into “Party-state grid governance” (黨國網格治理). Under the guise of improving “whole-process people’s democracy” (residents’ meetings plus standing residents’ representative meetings plus consultative discussions), the CCP is moving to eliminate all spaces without a Party organization and deepen the scope of its control. For instance, any area without a property management committee, homeowners’ committee, or populated by migrant residents now falls into a five-tier surveillance grid (resident group, resident representative, neighborhood committee, subdistrict office, and Party committee) following the revisions to the “organic” laws.
The CCP asserts that the revisions promote “modernized governance.” But in truth, they legalize technological authoritarianism with the “one-network integrated management” system. Particularly chilling is Article 44 of both revised laws, which calls for “informatization construction” in villages and communities and requires all meetings, finances, and petitions to be uploaded to central databases in real time. In a sense, the CCP is extending its mass-line work to the lowest levels of society and transforming Chinese residents from autonomous participants of society into objects of Party-state control.
The CCP’s effort to perpetuate its techno-totalitarian system could yet encounter roadblocks over funding. While the central government claims that the revisions seek to “reduce burdens on grassroots governance,” it still requires local governments to support the social stability grid out of their own pockets. For instance, Article 43 of the revisions requires that local governments “provide necessary funds and conditions” to support grassroots organizations in assisting with administrative work, a move that essentially pushes financial and administrative burdens from the central and provincial levels down to the county level and below.
2. The revised grassroots “organic” laws extend Party leadership downwards and penetrate the grassroots “capillaries” through five organizational layers. At the top of the power chain is the CCP Central Committee, which manages grassroots governance nationwide through the Central Social Work Department. Party Central’s orders are transmitted to subdistrict Party working committees, then to community Party organizations that control local affairs. At the grassroots, neighborhood committee directors (who concurrently serve as Party secretary) are the central executives, directly commanding resident representatives (one selected for every 20 to 50 households) and stretching the central government’s grip into every household (with real-name data uploads, etc.)
Taking the revised Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees as an example:
- Party infiltration through organization: Article 8 allows community directors to serve as Party secretaries. This means that the Party’s will is directly equivalent to legal decisions.
- Party gatekeeping through procedure: Article 30 requires all major issues to first be studied and discussed by the community Party organization. This grants the CCP preemptive veto power on grassroots affairs and transforms residents’ meetings into mere rubber-stamp assemblies.
- Party control over elections: Article 18 notes that community Party organizations can directly nominate candidates for grassroots elections. This means that the CCP controls the entry point of elections and an earlier requirement where prospective candidates need to have 10 joint nominators is now meaningless.
- Party-directed supervision: Article 36 notes that community affairs supervisory committees must report violations to disciplinary organs. This transforms those committees into the Party’s second pair of eyes to monitor residents rather than the Party itself.
- Party digital surveillance: Article 44 calls on governments at the county level and above to coordinate “informatization construction.” This requires all data to be uploaded to central systems for real-time monitoring and expands the CCP’s techno-totalitarian reach.
The corresponding clauses in the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees follow essentially the same logic as in the “organic” law for urban residents, just differing slightly in wording.
The revised “organic” laws affirm our earlier analysis of how the Central Social Work Department is likely to function and what it entails. We wrote in March 2023 after the CCP rolled out sweeping institutional reforms that the Central Social Work Department “will operate more like a hybrid of the Organization Department and the United Work Front Department. That is, the Department appears to be a non-violent stability maintenance organization that strengthens Party Central’s grip over society through the control of CCP and social organizations.”
We also wrote, “By having a say in whether the people in various economic and social organizations survive and thrive, the CCP is essentially ‘guiding’ the Chinese people to not challenge the regime and safeguard their interests. On paper, such ‘soft’ stability maintenance tactics could be more effective, cheaper, and invite less pushback than hard suppression measures involving domestic security forces.”
3. The revised grassroots “organic” laws can be said to be “version 3.0” of the “Fengqiao Experience.”
The first version of the “Fengqiao Experience” began in the early 1960s under Mao Zedong as the CCP sought to “pit the masses against the masses” (群眾鬥群眾) through work units and communities to better control the rural grassroots. The second version of the “Fengqiao Experience” was launched in 2018 when the Xi leadership piloted the “grid management + comprehensive governance centers” system in cities. Now the third version of the “Fengqiao Experience” expands the city control project nationwide and down to the grassroots.
“Fengqiao Experience 3.0” follows the “local conflict resolution + data-based early warning + legal enforcement” model. For example, in the revised Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees:
- Article 32 requires residents’ committees to organize discussion meetings, hearings, and consultation sessions, effectively stripping citizens of the right to petition higher authorities. The article also sees that grassroots conflicts are not escalated to the subdistrict level where possible and are instead forcibly resolved “on the spot.”
- Article 13 mandates the election of one resident representative for every 20 to 50 households to serve a five-year term. This essentially transforms grassroots residents into the Party grid monitors to create a modern-day, mandatory, and perverse version of the “baojia” civil control system that was introduced in the Northern Song period.
- Article 10 (5) calls for “assistance with community correction,” “education for released prisoners,” and “emergency response.” This effectively places individuals with criminal records, petitioners, unemployed youth, and those in the “four withouts and five losses” group (i.e. those without a spouse, children, job/income, or property; and those who have suffered investment failure, personal loss, relationship breakdown, psychological imbalance, or mental instability) under permanent grid-based monitoring.
