1 What the Politburo’s regulations on work of Party Central’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies entails
June Politburo meeting
June 30
1. Xi Jinping presided over a CCP Politburo meeting to review regulations on the work of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies (黨中央決策議事協調機構工作條例; henceforth referred to as the Regulations).
The meeting said that the establishment of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies is an important institutional arrangement to strengthen Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership over major work and to promote the implementation of key tasks.
The meeting added that the formulation and introduction of the Regulations is of great significance in ensuring these bodies effectively fulfill their functions of top-level design, overall coordination, comprehensive advancement, and supervision of the implementation of major undertakings.
The meeting emphasized that the primary role of these bodies is to plan major affairs, deliberate major matters, and handle major issues, providing more effective leadership and coordination over key areas of work.
The meeting further required that these bodies must:
- Coordinate without overstepping, be thorough without overreaching.
- Conduct in-depth investigation and research, and propose practical and effective policy measures.
- Firmly avoid formalism and bureaucratism, and strive for tangible results in their work.
2. The 21st group study session of the CCP Politburo was held in Beijing on the theme of “improving the long-term mechanism for implementing the ‘Eight-Point Regulation’ and correcting the ‘Four Forms of Decadence.’”
Xi Jinping presided over the study session and delivered an important speech. Noteworthy parts of Xi’s speech include:
i) Self-revolution is the “second answer”
- Self-revolution is the CCP’s “second answer” to overcoming the historical cycle of rise and fall in governance.
- Starting with improving Party conduct has been a vital lesson in promoting comprehensive and strict governance of the Party in the new era.
ii) Historical significance of the Eight-Point Regulation
- The Eight-Point Regulation represents a landmark measure by Party Central to establish credibility through action.
- Party Central began its reforms from the 18th Party Congress with the Eight-Point Regulation. Since then, it has curbed many previously uncontrollable bad practices, eradicated longstanding maladies, and addressed issues that drew intense public discontent. As a result, Party and government conduct has seen a clear improvement.
iii) Five key directions for implementing self-revolution
- Leading cadres, and especially senior officials, must lead by example.
- Party members must strengthen their Party nature (黨性).
- Anti-corruption efforts must be coupled with proper regulation of power.
- Discipline must be enforced strictly and violations dealt with resolutely.
- Party governance responsibilities must be fully implemented. Politburo members must set the benchmark and lead the way for the entire Party.
Qiushi calls for unity
July 1
Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published a piece titled, “Unity and Struggle is the Only Path for the Chinese People to Achieve Great Historic Undertakings” (團結奮鬥是中國人民創造歷史偉業的必由之路)
The article is a compilation of key statements made by Xi Jinping in multiple speeches delivered between October 2016 and April 2025. The article attempts to systematically expound on the idea that “unity and struggle” is both the spiritual driving force and practical path for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It also asserts that “unity and struggle” is the only path for the Party to lead the Chinese people toward national strength and rejuvenation in the new era.
The central themes of the article are:
- National rejuvenation must rely on unity and struggle.
- A stronger fighting spirit and greater capacity for action are required in the face of internal and external challenges.
- It is essential to mobilize the people’s strength, reinforce ideals and convictions, and forge ahead with courage in undertaking Chinese-style modernization.
The gist of the article can be summed up in six points:
i) Unity and struggle as a summary of the CCP’s historical experience
- The CCP’s survival and rise to power are attributed to its long-term commitment to unity and struggle.
- Unity and struggle represent the most defining spiritual traits behind all of the Party’s achievements.
- From the spirit of the Long March, the spirit of the War of Resistance, and the spirit of Reform and Opening-Up, to the spirit of poverty alleviation, unity and struggle is at the core of each.
ii) The internal link between unity and struggle
- Happiness is born from struggle. Struggle itself is a form of happiness.
- Unity stems from shared goals, and the most powerful form of struggle is built upon solid unity.
- History is written by those who struggle. Only through sustained effort can long-term goals be achieved.
iii) Emphasis on the spirit of struggle and strategic resolve
- The path to national rejuvenation will not be smooth. The Party and people must “dare to struggle and be good at struggling.”
- In the face of external containment and encirclement, China must maintain strategic clarity and adopt a proactive posture.
- Xi Jinping introduced the concept of a “great struggle in the new era,” asserting that “evasion and retreat lead only to a dead end.”
iv) Unity and struggle in Chinese-style modernization
- Chinese-style modernization is a collective endeavor of all the people, relying on the broadest possible united front.
- The development concept of “joint construction and shared benefit” is highlighted.
- As stormy seas become the norm, only through united strength can China brave the waves.
v) Mobilizing the whole Party and following the mass line
- The entire Party must firmly uphold the fundamental mission of serving the people.
- Emphasis must be placed on the mass line and public oversight, strengthening the bond between the Party and the people.
- Xi calls for unity and struggle to become a shared responsibility across the Party, the nation, and society.
vi) Historical perspective and cultural inheritance
- The Qiushi piece reinforces the legacy of unity and struggle by drawing on historical events like the Red Army’s Long March, the May Fourth Movement, and the 1911 Revolution.
- The article promotes the development logic of “struggle leading to victory,” with the Party’s century-long struggle as a spiritual compass.
Backdrop
Xi Jinping and the CCP’s activities and measures have come under greater scrutiny with the nonstop spreading of rumors and speculation in Chinese-speaking circles about how Xi has supposedly “lost power.”
However, publicly available information and how Xi and the CCP have been operating in recent months do not show any indication that Xi’s power has been seriously threatened as speculated (for more, see here).
Our take
The CCP’s announcement of regulations on the work of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies led some overseas Chinese commentators and others in external China-watching circles to conclude that Xi Jinping is “losing power.”
The speculation does not hold water in considering the CCP’s basic operating principles. If Xi had truly been ousted or lost significant grip on power, the CCP has no need to reform the central government’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination mechanism — a move that only re-emphasizes and strengthens Xi’s authority — when the Politburo Standing Committee can simply restore the “collective leadership” and directly address the various issues that stem from Xi’s flawed decision-making. The Party also has no need to subtly humiliate Xi by having him preside over a meeting where measures were made to undermine himself.
Below, we examine key details about the Politburo meeting in which the Regulations were deliberated and the context that led to its emergence, as well as other recent and prior developments, to more thoroughly debunk the notion that the Regulations are a sign of Xi losing his grip on power and offer more plausible reasons for their introduction.
1. The PRC state media readout of the June Politburo meeting offers clues about the purpose of the Regulations and Xi Jinping’s present political status. The readout notes that the establishment of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies is a vital institutional arrangement to “improve the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central over major work and to promote the implementation of key tasks” — a clear nod to Xi’s paramount position in the regime.
There are currently just a handful of bodies overseeing decision-making, deliberation, and coordination. The State Council’s Development Research Center crafts major economic policies and provides policy recommendations and assessments on economic, social, industrial, and reform issues to State Council leaders. Other key central decision-making bodies include the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and its subordinate Central Policy Research Office, as well as the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. The introduction of the Regulations likely entails the creation of more high-level and targeted bodies responsible for decision-making and coordination. This institutional arrangement is in line with Party Central’s post-20th Party Congress call for CCP members to implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress, its plenary sessions, and other central directives, as well as the findings in the National Audit Office’s 2024 audit regarding the failure of localities in implementing central policies.
The readout also states that the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies must “ensure coordination without substitution and thorough implementation without overstepping boundaries” (統籌不代替、到位不越位), as well as see to it that “formalism and bureaucratism must be resolutely avoided and efforts must focus on achieving tangible results.” Put another way, the Regulations are an attempt by the Xi leadership to get central and local governments to properly implement Xi Jinping’s decisions, deployments, and policies to improve governance and better extricate the CCP regime from its many crises, rather than have officials default to “prefer left rather than right” and other seemingly “politically correct” policy implementations that do more harm than good to the regime and the Xi leadership’s agenda.
The Xi leadership had previously identified the problem of officials incorrectly interpreting and implementing Party Central’s directives. As early as 2016, official media brought up the concept of “fallacy of composition” (合成謬誤) in referring to incidents where officials did not implement Beijing’s policies as the Xi leadership intended and caused trouble. With Xi’s policies resulting in more serious failures in recent years, the term “fallacy of composition” has also been used to deflect blame. After the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2021, then executive deputy director of the office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission Han Wenxiu urged officials to “prevent the ‘fallacy of composition’ (合成謬誤), avoid negative effects from the layering of locally rational policies, and also prevent the ‘decomposition fallacy’ where simplistic division of overall tasks or excessive layering overwhelms grassroots government.”
A recent and prominent example of officials engaging in “fallacy of composition” is the overzealous enforcement of the Xi leadership’s Party discipline and austerity campaign. Shortly after the Two Sessions in March, Beijing launched a political campaign to call attention to the Eight-Point Regulations and dispatched central inspection teams to ensure compliance. On May 19, the Central Committee and the State Council issued revised regulations on “frugality and opposition to waste in Party and government organs” that imposed a “no smoking and no drinking” rule for official banquets. To underscore the necessity of the measure, the anti-corruption authorities and various provincial Party Committees repeatedly publicized cases of drinking-related mishaps or casualties.
In response to the “no drinking” rule and re-emphasis on maintaining strict Party discipline, some local governments expanded the rules meant to target irregular dining and the drinking culture among officials into a blanket ban on alcohol and dining out. This led to a sharp decline in Chinese liquor stock prices, and impacted the restaurant and catering industry.
The overzealousness of local governments in upholding the Xi leadership’s latest austerity and Party discipline drive led state and Party media to issue several commentaries addressing the issue. People’s Daily noted in a June 17 commentary that “some localities have ‘layered on restrictions’ – equating ‘prohibiting illegal dining and drinking’ simply with ‘banning all eating and drinking.’” This behavior is “a form of lazy governance and a variant of formalism, causing businesses to lose customers and dimming the vibrancy of people’s everyday lives,” the People’s Daily wrote, adding that “the cost of these excessive measures ultimately falls on the shoulders of the workers.” The article further noted that the true purpose of the austerity campaign was preventing corruption and ensuring the wise use of public funds, not to stifle normal social interaction and economic activity, and that the focus should be on tackling “formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagance.” The People’s Daily also criticized local officials for adopting a “one-size-fits-all approach” to policy implementation.
Therefore, the introduction of the Regulations on the work of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies must be considered in the context of the recent austerity campaign implementation troubles and other instances of officials displaying a “fallacy of composition” in governance.
Another plausible reason for the Regulations is that Xi Jinping needs a mechanism to both reduce the emergence of and deflect responsibility for future governance failures. Since taking office, Xi has overseen numerous flawed or unsuccessful policies, including “zero-COVID,” Beijing’s handling of Sino-U.S. trade tensions, and various economic policies. With enhanced oversight over policy implementation, the Xi leadership can now shift some of the accountability of governance failures to local governments and central departments, while ensuring that its image remains “great, glorious, and correct” (i.e. it is not Xi’s policies that are wrong, but the incorrect implementation of them by lower ranking officials).
2. CCP propaganda and political meetings around the period of the June Politburo meeting where the Regulations were introduced indicate that Xi Jinping remains firmly in charge.
i) Footage from CCTV’s prime-time program Xinwen Lianbo of the Politburo’s 21st group study session shows Xi Jinping seated in a prime spot that emphasizes his paramount position in the Politburo Standing Committee and the CCP regime.
Meanwhile, Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia, whom some overseas Chinese commentators are speculating to be currently holding “actual military authority,” was seen diligently taking notes alongside other officials at the tables on the side rows. While Zhang was shifted from his corner seat in the third row to a middle seat in the second row, this appeared to have been due to a noticeable increase in the number of attendees (possibly leading cadres from some departments and organs) at the study session.
ii) The 21st group study session of the Politburo stressed that Xi’s “self-revolution” (i.e. anti-corruption campaign) is the “second answer” to the CCP’s effort to overcome the historical cycle of rise and fall in governance. This, and the promotion of Xi’s “Eight-Point Regulations,” underscore Xi’s contributions to the regime (while hinting at the intractable problems that his predecessors left to him) and his paramount position.
The emphasis on Xi’s “self-revolution” campaign also foreshadows continued purges in the officialdom.
iii) The Qiushi article on “unity and struggle” demonstrates that the regime’s ideological and political direction set by Xi Jinping remains unchanged. This contradicts the rumors and speculation that Xi has already been replaced by a senior cadres who adhere to Deng Xiaoping’s thinking; the Party should revert to the Deng line of “hiding strength, biding time” and not be promoting “struggling” in external affairs if Xi was indeed ousted.
Separately, Xi’s call for “unity and struggle” within the Party hints at internal disunity (i.e. lingering factional struggle and disloyal elements) and passivity among cadres (“lying flat,” “inaction,” etc.). This would partly explain why Xi introduced the regulations on the work of the Central Committee’s decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies at the June Politburo meeting, and urged the bodies to “propose practical and effective policy measures.”
2 Analyzing the Xinjiang Party boss swap
Xinjiang leadership reshuffle
July 1
State mouthpiece Xinhua announced that Chen Xiaojiang, an official with a background in water resources and ethics affairs, would replace Ma Xingrui as Party secretary of Xinjiang Province. Xinhua added that Ma would be “appointed to another position.”
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Chen Xiaojiang (63 years old) began his career in the water conservancy and power system. In March 2011, he rose to the position of director and Party Group secretary of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission under the Ministry of Water Resources. After Xi Jinping came to power, Chen was relatively quickly elevated up the ranks, becoming head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s propaganda department in August 2015. Subsequently, Chen held various roles in the supervisory and united front systems, including secretary of the Liaoning provincial discipline inspection commission, vice minister of the Ministry of Supervision, deputy director of the National Supervisory Commission, and vice minister of the United Front Work Department.
Ma Xingrui (65 years old) spent much of his career at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and can be considered a “technocrat.” After Xi took office, Ma moved from the PRC’s military-industrial state-owned enterprise sector into politics in March 2013. Ma would serve briefly as vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and director of the China National Space Administration before being appointed deputy Party secretary of Guangdong Province in November 2013. Later, Ma served as Shenzhen Party secretary and Guangdong governor before succeeding Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang Party secretary in December 2021. In October 2022, Ma Xingrui joined the Politburo at the 20th Party Congress.
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Some overseas Chinese commentators argued that the personnel reshuffle in Xinjiang is another sign of Xi Jinping “losing power.” They made the following arguments:
- Ma Xingrui is a native of Yuncheng City in Shandong Province, which means he shares the same hometown as Xi Jinping’s wife Peng Liyuan. Therefore, the removal of Ma, who is supposedly a “close confidant” of Peng, hints at Xi’s “loss of power.”
- The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation which Ma previously helmed has been a focal point of investigations following the exposure of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and logistics department’s involvement in major corruption in 2023. The removal of Ma as Xinjiang Party boss therefore suggests that he could be implicated in military corruption; investigations have led to the downfall of dozens of generals and executives from military-industrial enterprises.
Our take
As we previously analyzed, the Xi Jinping “losing power” narrative is built on fundamentally flawed understandings of CCP elite politics and dubious sourcing. Therefore, we believe that it is unlikely that the recent Xinjiang leadership reshuffle is a sign that Xi is losing his grip on power. It is also unlikely that Ma Xingrui was involved in the recent military corruption scandal as he exited the PRC’s military-industrial industry more than a decade ago and has been focused on politics since late 2013.
We see three plausible and overlapping reasons for the Xinjiang personnel adjustment.
First, the Xi leadership could have high regard for Chen Xiaojiang’s work and decided that he is ready to be Xinjiang Party secretary. Chen’s previous appointments give him a leg up in governing Xinjiang. While he was in the united front work system, Chen served as director of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission and would have gained experience in managing ethnic relations. And as executive vice minister of the United Front Work Department, Chen would have been a key participant in the central government’s decision-making regarding Xinjiang.
Second, the Xi leadership could be looking to groom and position Chen Xiaojiang for higher office. Chen will be 65 in 2027 when the 21st Party Congress is held, and would be eligible to join the Politburo if required. Meanwhile, Ma Xingrui would be 68 and be due to step down from the Politburo per personnel norms.
Third, the Xi leadership could be looking to elevate Ma Xingrui to a more important post. Ma being removed early as Xinjiang boss does not necessarily indicate that he is in trouble given that his predecessors Chen Quanguo and Zhang Chunxian were also swapped out between Party Congresses. Ma’s next job could potentially be a deputy position in a central leadership group or a coordination body related to Xinjiang affairs. Ma could also be appointed to a deputy national level post in the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at the 21st Party Congress, when he is due to “retreat to the second line.”
Alternatively, Ma could take on a more significant leadership role like serving in newly established Central Committee decision-making, deliberation, and coordination bodies, including those that deal with advanced technologies, military technologies, and so-called “new productive forces.” As a Politburo member, Ma would have sufficient political clout to sway officials into getting serious about properly complying with and implementing the central government’s policies and directions.
