1 What Xi and the CCP look to achieve with Sept. military parade
Beijing announces military parade
June 24
The State Council Information Office announced in a press conference that the CCP authorities will hold a commemorative event on Sept. 3, 2025 marking the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Facist War. The Office added that Xi Jinping would attend the event and its associated activities, deliver an important speech, and review the troops in a military parade.
Major general Wu Zeke, the deputy director of the operations bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission and deputy director of the Parade Leading Group Office, provided details on the military parade. Noteworthy points include:
- The parade will consist of marching formations, armored formations, and aerial echelons. The marching formations will focus on showcasing the new structure and layout of military branches following the reform and restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as the “three-in-one” force composition of field armies, local forces, and militias. The armored formations will highlight the latest achievements in the PLA’s weapons systems development, reflecting China’s capacity for independent innovation in defense technology. The aerial echelons will demonstrate the systematic integration and rapid advancement of PLA Air Force combat capabilities.
- Units that have participated in peacekeeping missions, as well as militia formations, will take part in the parade.
- All weapons and equipment featured during the parade will be domestically produced, active-duty main battle systems. In addition to showcasing a new generation of conventional weapons, the parade will also feature cutting-edge combat capabilities such as unmanned and intelligent systems, underwater warfare platforms, cyber-electronic warfare units, and hypersonic weapons. This reflects the PLA’s growing ability to adapt to technological change, evolve forms of warfare, and win future wars.
- National leaders, former heads of state, and senior officials from various countries, heads of international organizations, as well as foreign diplomats, military attachés, and representatives of international organizations in China will be invited to the event.
- The parade will feature participation from veterans of the communist Chinese forces who fought in the war against Japan, elderly CCP members and militia members, model representatives from local wartime support efforts, relatives of fallen heroes, veterans of the Kuomintang forces who fought against the Japanese, as well as foreign individuals who contributed to China’s victory in the war or their descendants.
Putin to visit China
June 19
Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said after a telephone call between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping that the two leaders will next see each other at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin from Aug. 31 to Sept. 1, and participate in the festivities marking the 80th anniversary of victory over “militarist Japan” and the end of World War II in Beijing on Sept. 3. Also, “full-scale bilateral talks” will be held on Sept. 2.
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When Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko was in Beijing on June 4, Xi also invited him to attend the SCO Summit and the military parade.
Our take
Xi Jinping and the CCP likely intend to achieve multiple objectives with the military parade on Sept. 3:
Reinforce Xi’s ‘quan wei’ and pad the CCP’s legitimacy
Politically significant gestures like reviewing the troops and delivering an important speech at the military parade help boost Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and solidify his paramount position in the CCP.
Meanwhile, the parade’s inclusion of KMT war veterans and foreigners (and their descendants) who helped China repel Imperial Japan is likely intended to refute criticism that the CCP lacks governing legitimacy because the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek did the bulk of the fighting during the Second World War. The CCP’s branding of World War II as the “world anti-fascist war” also plays into typical propaganda tropes (“communist versus the fascists,” etc.) and is designed to glorify the authoritarian regime.
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One of the unintended purposes of Xi’s upcoming military parade is its debunking of the intense rumors and speculation in overseas Chinese language circles that he has “lost power.” First, planning and preliminary work for the military parade has almost certainly been underway for several months, and such work would not have proceeded if Xi were not in charge. Second, the rumors and speculation that Xi no longer controls the PLA or has his influence over the Party’s “gun” severely diminished does not stand if he is reviewing the parade and delivering important remarks in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the military and head of the CCP.
Deter external enemies and boost domestic confidence
The military parade will showcase some of the regime’s advanced weaponry and military technology (e.g. unmanned, intelligent, underwater, cyber, electronic, and hypersonic equipment). The display of such equipment signals to the international community that the PRC is capable of addressing modern warfare challenges and is likely partly intended to serve as a deterrence to the CCP’s adversaries that the regime should not be trifled with and can capably aid its allies if needed. The latter point is becoming more pertinent for Beijing, especially with the recent U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The parade is also likely meant to boost domestic confidence in the regime and stoke “patriotism.” The display of homegrown military hardware demonstrates the PRC’s technological self-sufficiency and capability. The military parade and commemoration of historical glory can rouse nationalist sentiments, which can potentially enhance social cohesion and divert the public’s attention away from China’s many crises (economic slowdown, rising unemployment, real estate problems, etc.) and dissatisfaction with the CCP’s governance.
The CCP’s appeal to “patriotism,” however, could backfire. Too much “patriotism” could provoke anti-Japanese and other anti-foreigner sentiments, which would in turn heighten wariness of the CCP threat among China’s neighbors. This could prompt China’s neighbors to step up military exercises in the region, as well as strengthen military cooperation and alliances among themselves and with the United States. Growing jingoistic nationalism and appeal to militarism in China could also result in further Western sanctions and restrictions on the PRC’s access to advanced technologies.
Strengthen alliances and promote ‘multilateralism’
Beijing’s invitation to Vladimir Putin to attend the parade and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit reinforces the PRC-Russia partnership. Both countries also have an opportunity to mark their “anti-fascist” history and project this legitimacy onto their current proxy conflicts with the West.
Concurrently, inviting national leaders and other foreign dignitaries to the military parade allows Xi and the CCP to showcase the PRC’s global influence, promote its “multipolar world order” (see here and here), and position the PRC as the leader of developing nations (the Global South, etc.) in opposing Western “hegemony.”
