1 Beijing’s latest policies ‘paint picture to satisfy hunger’ rather than concretely fixing problems
Beijing recently introduced policies to “improve people’s livelihoods” and expand “reform and opening up” in Shenzhen.
‘Improving people’s ‘livelihoods’
June 9
The General Office of the CCP and the General Office of the State Council issued an Opinion on “further safeguarding and improving people’s livelihoods” with a focus on “addressing urgent and difficult issues facing the public” (關於進一步保障和改善民生 著力解決群眾急難愁盼的意見). According to state media reports, the Opinion was finalized as early as March 2, 2025.
The Opinion aims to “further safeguard and improve people’s livelihoods” by “enhancing the fairness of social security, improving the balance of basic public services, expanding the universality of essential services, and increasing the accessibility of diversified social services.” Also, the Opinion seeks to make the development of people’s well-being “more equitable, balanced, inclusive, and accessible.”
Key points in the Opinion include:
- Fairness: Expanding social security coverage, removing household registration (hukou) restrictions, and strengthening support for low-income groups.
- Balance: Promoting urban-rural integration of basic public services, providing services based on place of residence, and optimizing resource allocation.
- Universality: Increasing the supply of resources in education, healthcare, and services for the elderly and children, while improving their quality and coverage.
- Accessibility: Developing convenient community services, improving the quality of everyday services, and ensuring that children, youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities all share in the benefits of development.
- Implementation guarantees: Enhancing fiscal support, coordinating policies, and using scientific evaluations to ensure effective implementation of livelihood policies.
Higher-level ‘reform and opening up’ in Shenzhen?
June 10
The CCP General Office and State Council General Office issued an Opinion on “deepening reform, innovation, and opening up in the comprehensive reform pilot program in Shenzhen” (關於深入推進深圳綜合改革試點深化改革創新擴大開放的意見). According to state media reports, the Opinion was finalized as early as Aug. 30, 2024.
The Opinion proposes 15 measures across five key areas. Noteworthy points in the document include:
Overall requirements
- Guiding Ideology: Shenzhen officials should be guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee, adhere to the new development philosophy, and balance development and security.
- Goals: Shenzhen should take the lead in areas such as education, science and technology, talent development, industrial chain integration, Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao cooperation, and build a modern, international, and innovative city. The aim is to deepen reform and expand opening up, making Shenzhen a driving force for the Greater Bay Area and the nation, and to create experiences that can be replicated and promoted elsewhere.
Specific measures
- Advance integrated reform across education, tech, and talent systems.
- Promote high-quality development of the real economy through finance, technology, and data.
- Explore market access mechanisms for AI-assisted medical devices.
- Deepen reform in unmanned aerial vehicle management.
- Expand use cases for energy storage.
- Build a higher-level open economic system
- Delegate approval authority for international express delivery agency licenses to regional levels.
- Innovate in digital RMB pilot application scenarios.
- Improve policies on international cultural relic transactions.
- Pilot the practice of Hong Kong tax professionals in Shenzhen.
- Expand the list of recognized overseas professional qualifications.
- Optimize exam mechanisms for overseas futures professionals.
- Enhance scientific, refined, and rule-of-law-based governance
- Deepen reform in drug and medical device review and approval.
- Explore the use of international clinical data for new drugs.
- Promote digital government development.
- Pilot three-dimensional real estate registration.
- Reform the mechanism for handling idle land.
- Establish a “one-stop” mechanism for resolving international commercial disputes.
- Support judicial confirmation of Hong Kong and Macao mediation agreements.
- Strengthen implementation
- The National Development and Reform Commission will coordinate the overall effort (of the comprehensive reform pilot program), the Guangdong provincial government will enhance decentralization efforts, and the Shenzhen municipal government will assume primary responsibility.
- Establish efficient mechanisms for reform advancement and risk prevention.
- Track pilot progress, consolidate effective practices, make timely adjustments, and report major issues promptly.
June 12
The State Council Information Office held a press conference where officials from central government departments, the Guangdong provincial government, and the Shenzhen municipal government answered reporter questions regarding the Opinion.
Key points from the press conference include:
- The Opinion is an upgraded version of the “Implementation Plan for the Comprehensive Reform Pilot Program for Building a Pilot Demonstration Zone of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in Shenzhen (2020–2025)” (深圳建設中國特色社會主義先行示範區綜合改革試點實施方案 [2020-2025年]), originally issued in 2020.
- The Opinion explicitly calls for the establishment of a higher-level open economic system in Shenzhen.
- The overall objective is to leverage Shenzhen’s role as a key engine in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and its national influence to provide a model for Chinese-style modernization.
- The reform effort places a particular focus on artificial intelligence and the low-altitude economy (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles and related industries).
Backdrop
Deflationary pressures are on the rise in China amid an escalated Sino-U.S. trade war.
Our take
1. The Opinions on “improving people’s livelihood” and expanding “reform and opening up” in Shenzhen appear at first glance to be part of a hedging strategy by Beijing to counter the escalation of the Sino-U.S. trade war in April 2025. However, their drafting timeline indicates otherwise — the “people’s livelihood” policy was drafted during the Two Sessions in March 2025, while the Shenzhen “opening up” policy was planned in September 2024. If so, the policies are not immediate responses to the trade conflict, but delayed announcements of measures under an existing policy framework.
Beijing likely did not release the Opinions earlier because there was no opportune moment for them. Both Opinions focus on medium- and long-term reforms, offering little short-term relief for more pressing economic issues like deflation, shrinking exports, or weak consumption. Meanwhile, the market was anticipating Beijing to issue policies with more immediate stimulus, including direct central government subsidies in consumption and livelihood sectors, or large-scale infrastructure investments to boost domestic demand.
That Beijing has introduced the Opinions now suggests that its “toolbox” of stimulus measures may contain fewer implements than was previously implied. The Opinions, with their lack of innovative measures and direct stimulus, are unlikely to restore market and consumer confidence.
2. The two Opinions are heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, vague, and appear to be largely recycled from previous policies. Local governments constrained by local fiscal limitations will likely find it difficult to implement those measures. The end result could be more performative actions from the CCP authorities with little result.
‘Improving people’s livelihood’
i) The Opinion is filled with rhetoric, highly repetitive, vague on details, and lacks a clear implementation roadmap. For instance, the document sets out ambitious goals such as comprehensively expanding social security coverage, achieving equitable public services, and improving the quality of educational and medical resources. However, it lacks clear operational guidelines, funding sources, and timelines for the goals to be achieved. With limited resources, local governments will struggle to break down the requirements and allocate resources for execution.
Also, many of the measures mentioned in the Opinion overlap with existing policies introduced in recent years and lack innovation. These measures — including “visiting enterprises to expand opportunities, “ten thousand enterprises entering campuses” (i.e. promoting employment opportunities for college graduates by facilitating direct engagement between enterprises and university campuses), and “three supports and one assistance” (i.e. support education, agriculture, healthcare, and poverty alleviation program) — have already shown limited effectiveness (particularly in an economic downturn), and are little more than policy stacking at this point.
ii) Local governments will struggle to implement the Opinion even if there was policy clarity given funding issues. The document calls for “optimizing fiscal expenditure structures” and “increasing the proportion of budget investments supporting social programs,” but it fails to specify the cost-sharing ratio between central and local governments. Local governments face declining fiscal revenues (i.e. sharp drops in land transfer fees and tax income) amid a worsening economy and are already struggling to raise funds to repay maturing explicit debts.
Given their fiscal situation — the central government is issuing special treasury bonds to address high-risk local government debt and sustain basic grassroots operations — local governments are unlikely to have surplus funds to undertake new people’s livelihood projects or achieve targets like “80 percent community coverage for inclusive childcare” or “full coverage of standardized compulsory education.”
iii) The Opinion’s measures cannot fundamentally address structural unemployment amidst external challenges and domestic deflationary pressures. In the context of an economic downturn and trade war impacts, private enterprises are cutting hiring, state-owned enterprises have limited absorption capacity, and grassroots positions lack appeal and stability. The employment pressure on college graduates is particularly acute, and policies like “hundred-day sprint” (i.e. promoting employment for college students in the final months before graduation), “visiting enterprises to expand opportunities, and “ten thousand enterprises entering campuses” may not guarantee long term employment. As long as Sino-U.S. trade tensions persist and Chinese enterprises fail to recover orders and revive job demand, structural unemployment in China cannot be fundamentally resolved.
iv) Local governments will likely deploy “countermeasures” in response to the central government’s policies (上有政策, 下有對策), including keeping the policies stuck at the documentation level while rolling out propaganda to “show” Beijing that work is being done. Ultimately, social tensions will accumulate as “people’s livelihood” issues go largely unresolved.
‘Higher-level’ opening of Shenzhen
The CCP authorities claim that the Opinion on expanding Shenzhen’s “openness” builds on a 2020 implementation plan and is formulated with “new circumstances, tasks, and requirements” with the goal of positioning Shenzhen as a model of “Chinese socialist modernization.” However, the Opinion is akin to “painting a picture to satisfy hunger” (畫餅充飢) considering Shenzhen’s current economic situation and the problems posed by the Sino-U.S. trade war.
Several key indicators highlight Shenzhen’s problems:
Exports
Shenzhen has been a critical hub for China’s foreign trade, with its total import and export volume ranking first among Chinese cities in 2024. However, according to the Shenzhen statistics bureau, the city’s exports in April 2025 fell by 7 percent year-on-year, while national exports grew by 9.3 percent. By contrast, Shenzhen’s exports surged 33.9 percent in April 2024, with a full-year export growth of 14.6 percent for the full year. This suggests that Shenzhen’s export enterprises have been severely impacted by the trade war, leading to significant contraction.
Unless there is a shape de-escalation of Sino-U.S. trade tensions, Shenzhen’s export problem will drag on and even worsen. This will affect Beijing’s plans to further “open up” the city and the Shenzhen pilot case as a template for other parts of China.
Employment
Data from the Shenzhen medical security bureau shows that over 14.04 million people were enrolled in employee basic medical insurance as of January 2025, a decrease of 220,000 compared to the same period in 2024. Enterprises that are able to provide medical insurance for workers typically have relatively stable operations or finances. The steep drop in the number of people with employee basic medical insurance is an indirect indicator that Shenzhen’s employment situation has taken a turn for the worse, and could even be quite dire.
Possibly to conceal unemployment problems, the Shenzhen authorities stopped publishing employee basic medical insurance participant numbers starting in February 2025, and has instead released only insurance fund amounts.
Government finances
Shenzhen’s fiscal revenues declined sharply in 2024. The city’s total fiscal revenue dropped by 12 percent, with land transfer income plummeting by 45.8 percent. Despite a 4.9 percent reduction in total expenditure (through civil servant salary cuts, etc.), the fiscal deficit still grew by 20.7 percent. Meanwhile, Shenzhen’s local government debt balance reached 345 billion yuan in 2024, compared to just 14.6 billion yuan in 2018 when the U.S.-China trade war began and Shenzhen’s economy was still thriving. These figures show that economic contraction has reduced fiscal revenues, forcing the city to rely on large-scale borrowing to sustain itself.
Despite fiscal shortages, the Shenzhen local government has had to provide financial support to major real estate developer Vanke (whose largest shareholder is the state-owned Shenzhen Metro Group) to prevent its collapse, which could impact local officials’ performance records. Since the start of 2025, Shenzhen Metro Group has provided Vanke with loans totaling 15 billion yuan to repay debts. Public information indicates that 2025 is a peak year for Vanke’s debt repayments, with total liabilities amounting to 914.065 billion yuan as of March 31, 2025.
Mere slogans?
Against the backdrop of rising global protectionism and Shenzhen’s economic downturn, the Opinion still sets grandiose goals (building a hub for technological and industrial innovation, an internationalized city, and a high-level international trade hub, etc.). But without specific targets or timelines, the goals laid out in the Opinion are likely to remain as empty slogans and the measures stuck at the stage of policy declaration.
Many reforms proposed in the Opinion — such as cross-border data flows, international commercial dispute resolution mechanisms, a project manager system for research, data trading rules, and cross-border helicopter flights — require coordination across multiple departments, legal and regulatory adjustments, reallocation of authority between local and central governments, and international cooperation. These are unlikely to yield results in the short term, offering little relief to current economic downward pressures and even less potential for successful models replicable by other cities.
The Opinion emphasizes the low-altitude economy (drone routes, cross-border helicopter flights, etc.), but the development of this sector remains in its early stages, with limited commercial applications (e.g., low-altitude logistics, tourism) and scale. It is unlikely to become a significant driver of economic growth, at least in the critical short term.
Heavy on propaganda and lacking substantive breakthroughs, the Opinion on expanding Shenzhen’s “openness” is unlikely to mitigate the near-term negative impacts of the U.S.-China trade war. And without specific deadlines and targets, the Opinion will not yield much over the longer term.
2 Xi’s post-‘disappearance’ activities, actions suggest no ‘loss of power’ as rumored
Rumors and speculation that Xi Jinping has “lost power” and has even been “replaced” as CCP leader continue to swirl unabated in overseas Chinese-speaking circles. The speculation intensified further after Xi “vanished” from the public eye for a 14-day stretch between late May and early June (for our breakdown, see here and here). However, we see little evidence from publicly available information and the CCP’s operating principles that Xi’s power has been seriously threatened as speculated. We also earlier laid out possible reasons for the longevity of the rumors and the problems of buying into the surrounding narrative.
Below we look at Xi’s recent activities that challenge the narrative that he has “lost power,” as well as look at whether differences in formulaic language used to refer to Xi could be an indication that he is in trouble.
Xi’s recent activities
Attending funerals of two state leaders
June 8
Xi Jinping and the other six members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee attended the funeral ceremony of former Central Military Commission vice chairman Xu Qiliang at Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.
Footage of the funeral ceremony from state broadcaster CCTV’s prime-time program Xinwen Lianbo showed that former CCP leader Hu Jintao sent a wreath.
June 12
All seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended the funeral ceremony of former National People’s Congress vice chairman Raidi (an ethnic Tibetan) at Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.
Xinwen Lianbo’s footage of the funeral ceremony also showed that Hu Jintao had sent a wreath.
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Some overseas Chinese-language commentators argue that Xinwen Lianbo’s footage showing the wreaths from Hu Jintao and the absence of CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia from Xu Qiliang’s funeral ceremony are signs of Xi Jinping’s supposed waning influence (習 “失勢”).
Rumors from overseas Chinese-speaking circles also allege that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force organized a low-key, private memorial for Xu Qiliang at his former residence at the PLAAF compound, and that Xi Jinping could have either murdered Xu or literally scared him to death (due to the threat or prospect of investigation).
Commemorating Chen Yun
June 13
The CCP held a symposium at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee were in attendance and the symposium was chaired by National People’s Congress Standing Committee chairman Zhao Leji.
During the symposium, Xi Jinping delivered an important speech where he gave high praise to Chen Yun’s revolutionary career. Xi commended Chen for his “noble spiritual character,” his “rich leadership experience,” and the “scientific thinking and work methods” he developed. Xi urged the entire Party to study and apply the lessons learned from Chen Yun to tirelessly advance the great cause of building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.
Speaking as the symposium chair, Zhao Leji praised Xi’s speech as “visionary, incisive, and profound,” with strong political, ideological, and guiding significance. Zhao called on the entire Party to “earnestly study and fully implement” Xi’s message, unite even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee, and push forward national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.
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Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping delivered speeches at the 100th and 110th anniversaries of Chen Yun’s birth in 2005 and 2015 respectively.
No political references to Xi in State Council oath-taking ceremony?
June 11
The PRC State Council held a ceremony for officials to pledge allegiance to the state constitution. Premier Li Qiang served as the supervising official.
Li delivered a speech after the oath-taking ceremony where he stressed that State Council officials must “forge unwavering loyalty, deeply study and comprehend Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the decisions and deployments of Party Central.” He urged officials to be “decisive executors, proactive problem-solvers, and pragmatic achievers” (做雷厲風行的執行者、攻堅克難的行動派、善作善成的實干家).
Li also emphasized the need for officials to “work diligently and forge ahead under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and “contribute to the cause of building a strong nation and realizing national rejuvenation.”
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In previous State Council oath-taking ceremonies since the 20th Party Congress, Li Qiang referenced Xi’s political theories such as the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” in his speeches. Some overseas Chinese commentators argue that Li’s “omission” of those political theories is yet another sign that Xi has “lost power.”
Former 610 deputy head purged before June 10
June 9
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced an investigation into Gao Yichen on its website. The headline of the investigation article and the article text listed Gao’s previous appointment as former deputy director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Preventing and Dealing with Cult Issues.
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The Office of the Central Leading Group on Preventing and Dealing with Cult Issues is better known as the “610 Office,” which was founded on June 10, 1999 on orders by Jiang Zemin to carry out the anti-Falun Gong campaign.
According to publicly available information, Gao Yichen was a former vice minister of the Ministry of State Security (deputy chief police supervisor). When he was deputy director of the 610 Office in 2005, Gao also served as deputy secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and deputy director of the Office of the Central Leading Group for Maintaining Stability. Gao retired from public office no later than March 2017.
Our take
1. A review of funeral protocols for national-level officials shows no anomalies in how the official wake of former CMC vice chairman Xu Qiliang was handled:
- National-level officials of good standing in the CCP who pass away are usually afforded an obituary in central-level media outlets (Xinhua, People’s Daily, etc.) and have their funeral ceremony covered as the second item on CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo.
- Coverage of national-level officials’ funerals on Xinwen Lianbo typically follows the same format. The report contains around 2,800 characters and begins with the anchor narrating the official’s biography followed by footage of the wake and the body covered with the Party flag. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee bow to the body and take turns offering condolences to the family of the deceased. Subsequently, the camera pans across the flower wreaths presented by the Politburo Standing Committee members, followed by a separate shot of wreaths given by retired CCP leaders (currently, only Hu Jintao).
- Xinwen Lianbo’s coverage of funerals of national-level officials does not show individual shots of Politburo members, including vice chairmen of the CMC.
Xinwen Lianbo’s coverage of Xu Qiliang’s funeral ceremony was entirely in line with protocol. And given the protocol, what some overseas Chinese commentators believe were signs (Hu Jintao’s wreath, Zhang Youxia’s “absence,” etc.) of extraordinary changes in the CCP leadership were in fact non-issues and only confirmed that there was nothing unusual with the Xi leadership.
As for rumors that the PLAAF organized a low-key funeral wake for Xu Qiliang, this is entirely possible and not irregular. Xu spent the bulk of his career in the PLAAF and eventually became PLAAF commander from September 2007 to October 2012. Therefore, it is natural and in line with sentimental considerations for Xu’s family and friends to hold a private memorial for him. However, only the official funeral ceremony reflects the formal stance of the CCP authorities.
2. Li Qiang’s “omission” of certain political theories of Xi Jinping’s in his speech at the recent State Council oath-taking ceremony does not indicate any anomaly in Xi’s political status.
After Xi centralized power to a significant degree in 2016, his leadership has rolled out several political theories and slogans centered on promoting Xi as the Party’s “core” and emphasizing his “quan wei” (authority and prestige). These political theories and slogans do not necessarily need to appear together in all official documents or state media reports, for even the referencing of some of them is enough to indicate that Xi’s power is intact. For instance, the Party Constitution revised at the 20th Party Congress did not include the “Two Establishes,” but added political theories associated with Xi such as the “Two Safeguards,” “Four Consciousnesses,” and “Four Confidences.”
After the 20th Party Congress, the Xi leadership started to tweak how it references Xi Jinping’s political theories. Instead of listing the political theories, official documents would call for adherence to Xi’s policies and key meetings where Xi set policy frameworks. For example, the communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee framed Xi’s leadership consolidation and strengthening of Party control as the “further comprehensive deepening of reform and advancement of Chinese-style modernization.” Another recent formulation is the “full implementation of the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee.” Since the person behind those policies is Xi and his policies are based on his political theories, the new formulaic phrases are in fact also a directive to uphold Xi as the Party’s “core” and adhere to his political theories.
We see several reasons why the Xi leadership has tweaked its references to Xi Jinping:
- Improving governance is a central reason behind Xi’s power consolidation. Therefore, it makes sense now for the Xi leadership to emphasize adherence to Xi’s policies and policy frameworks more than allegiance to him, while still making the reference to Xi’s political theories and “quan wei” unmistakable in the formulaic phrasing.
- China has not been doing well in many key areas, in particular the economy, especially after the 20th Party Congress. Therefore, the Xi leadership could be looking to slightly de-emphasize Xi’s “cult of personality” and focus instead on his “solutions” (policies, policy frameworks, key meetings, etc.) for resolving the current crises.
- The Xi leadership could be looking to make its propaganda promoting Xi sound less personal and authoritarian so that the propaganda would be more palatable and effective for indoctrination.
3. Far from subtly hinting at Xi Jinping’s “loss of power,” Li Qiang’s speech at the State Council oath-taking ceremony re-emphasizes Xi’s “quan wei” and dominance in the regime. This is seen from Li urging officials to be “unwaveringly loyal,” “deeply study and comprehend Xi Jinping Thought,” “fully implement the decisions and deployments of Party Central (with Comrade Xi at the core),” and become “decisive executors, proactive problem-solvers, and pragmatic achievers” in implementing Xi’s policies.
Li’s rhetoric is a rehash of his remarks at the eighth plenary meeting of the State Council in March 2025. We analyzed at the time that Li’s remarks show a continuation of the trend where the “collective leadership” model is being eroded and Xi’s personal, centralized model is being elevated.
4. The Xi leadership’s prominent commemoration of Chen Yun is a clear sign that Xi Jinping is firmly in charge, contrary to the speculation that he has “lost power.”
One of the tropes of the “Xi lost power” narrative is that CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia, not Xi, is currently in control of the military. However, there was no change to his seating arrangement at the Chen Yun symposium; Zhang was seated at the far left of the podium, or even more on the margins compared to where the late CMC vice chair Xu Qiliang sat in 2015 during the symposium to mark the 110th birth anniversary of Chen Yun. Because the seating arrangement of Politburo members reflects their political ranking and status, Zhang Youxia almost certainly has not wrestled control over the military from Xi or has gained any power given that he is seated exactly where he is supposed to be.
Meanwhile, the Xi leadership could be looking to take advantage of commemorating Chen Yun in a high-profile manner to bolster the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s political line. Chen was opposed to Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up,” advocating instead a planned economy with a regulated market in the supplementary role, as well as emphasizing economic stability and socialist principles. Chen also opposed rapid marketization, fearing that reforms would lead to a capitalist restoration. Like Chen, Xi wants economic stability and promotes socialist principles over the “savage expansion” of capital. And while Xi might not want a planned economy, he is interested in controlling capital outflows, promoting the “real economy” over the “financial economy,” developing state capital, and keeping private enterprises firmly under the Party’s watchful eye. Therefore by promoting Chen, the Xi leadership is indirectly finding political reasoning for Xi Jinping’s current approach to the economy and lending credence to Xi’s policies.
5. The purge of former 610 Office deputy director Gao Yichen is a curious development given the way it was handled. The CCDI issued the investigation announcement a day before June 10, or the anniversary of the founding of the 610 Office; this would be considered a political faux pas under normal circumstances as the CCP is usually careful about the messaging it sends out around so-called “sensitive dates” (e.g. anniversary of Tiananmen Square Massacre and other dates of significant persecution). Also, the CCDI only listed Gao’s position in the 610 Office instead of his other job titles, as if to highlight that Beijing was dissatisfied with his anti-Falun Gong post.
Xi Jinping has targeted the 610 Office and the anti-Falun Gong campaign in going after the Jiang Zemin faction. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that the Xi leadership is again issuing a veiled warning to the Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi” elements that it is connected with, possibly after discerning fresh attempts by these actors to undermine Xi Jinping. If so, then the factional struggle between the Xi camp and the Jiang faction is still ongoing even though signs of the conflict have become less visible in recent years.
6. There may be little or no basis to the rumors and speculation that Xi Jinping has “lost power,” but that does not mean that he faces no political risks and has no political challenges. Xi’s lingering factional rivals are still at large and could potentially become a factor if crises overwhelm the Xi leadership. Mounting social and economic problems in mainland China could also transform into political problems if the Xi leadership cannot turn around the situation. Finally, the fiercely “anti-Xi” informational environment abroad could play a role in undermining the Xi leadership, albeit a minor one as long as Xi Jinping retains his paramount position and firmly controls informational flow into mainland China.
