1 Why the CCP’s crackdown on the ‘bike revolution’ in Henan could backfire
‘Night Riding Army’ trend
In June 2024, four women college students from Zhengzhou University embarked on an impromptu night trip to Kaifeng in Henan Province by shared bikes to try the city’s famous soup dumplings. The students chronicled their ride on social media and the activity quickly gained popularity among college students in Kaifeng.
Each weekend, students would travel more than 60 kilometers (about 37 miles) on a straight road linking Zhengzhou with Kaifeng by shared bike at night or in the early morning. After enjoying dumplings or spicy soup in Kaifeng, the students would return to Zhengzhou by bus or high-speed train. Participants of the trend, which was dubbed by some as the “Night Ride Army” (夜騎熱) would share on social media and even print on banners slogans like “Youth is priceless, night riders conquer Kaifeng” and “Night ride to Kaifeng; youth is priceless, enjoy it in time.”
Eventually, students from other regions and other members of the public would join in the “Night Ride” craze in different parts of China. For example, college students near Beijing would ride to Tiananmen Square; tens of thousands of students from Nanjing would cycle to Chaohu in Anhui Province; students from Chengdu would ride to Dujiangyan; students from Wuhan would cycle to Lingbo Gate at East Lake; and Xi’an students would bike to Xianyang. Data from shared bike platform Meituan Bike showed that the cities with the highest volume of night time bike rentals include Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenzhen, and Wuhan.
In the evening of Nov. 8, more than 200,000 people rode shared bikes to the center of Kaifeng. Videos circulating on Chinese social media showed streets clogged with cyclists, with some waving the PRC flag and singing the national anthem while onlookers cheered them from the roadside. From the videos, the participants appeared to be students, young people from various professions, and even some military veterans. At least one rider was filmed waving a flag with the homonym for “Freedom, here I come!” The police on scene merely guided traffic and took no action.
Authorities react to the ‘Night Ride’ trend
The CCP authorities initially welcomed the “Night Ride Army” trend. The Kaifeng Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio, Television, and Tourism announced that several attractions, including the Iron Pagoda of Kaifeng, the Qingming Riverside Landscape Garden, and the Wansui Mountain Martial Arts City would be open free to college students at night. Mainland media, including Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, reported positively on the “Night Ride” trend in early November, with an official commentary praising the night rides as college students showing that “life needs passion.”
The “Night Ride Army” also brought significant attraction to Kaifeng. According to mainland media, the Kaifeng WeChat Index (a keyword popularity tool by WeChat) exceeded 500 million keywords on Nov. 3 and was more than 350 million keywords on Nov. 4, while trending topics related to Kaifeng on Weibo during the same period reached nearly 10 million. The activity boosted local businesses and led many vendors to set up mobile shops selling goods and snacks along the road linking Zhengzhou and Kaifeng. The local bus company provided free shuttle services for “night riders” who could not continue on bike or experienced issues with their ride. Meanwhile, the Kaifeng traffic police increased patrols and deployed more officers along the route to monitor vendors and ensure public compliance with traffic regulations.
The CCP authorities appeared to suddenly change their attitude towards the “Night Ride Army” after the big Nov. 8 event. On Nov. 9, universities in Henan Province announced campus lockdowns with control measures that were akin to those of the “zero-COVID” lockdowns. On the same day, three of the largest bike-sharing platforms (Hellobike, DiDi Bike, and Mobile) announced that their vehicles would lock down if ridden out of a designated zone. Meanwhile, mainland media issued commentaries critical of the students. One news outlet wrote, “youthful freedom does not mean following the trend and indulging oneself,” while another ran the headline, “Kaifeng is Worth Arriving at Slowly and Savoring Carefully.”
The actions by the CCP authorities and universities to clamp down on the “Night Riding Army” sparked widespread dissatisfaction among vendors and students. Search terms like “the pause button was pushed on night rights to Kaifeng” trended on Weibo. In the evening of Nov. 9, street vendors in Anyang City pushed down the back gate and fence of Anyang University to protest the campus lockdown, which prevented them from selling food to students. Videos on social media showed some young people walking to Kaifeng as a form of protest to express their discontent with the clampdown by the authorities.
Rumors circulating on Chinese social media suggested that the CCP authorities were alarmed by the massive crowds on Nov. 8. Even though the “Night Ride Army” was not anti-government and had no political message, the Henan provincial department of education and public security bureau held an emergency meeting where they classified the activity as a “political movement” and ordered universities in the province to lock down campuses and prohibit students from going out.
Some Chinese netizens have begun likening the “Night Ride Army” to the “Blank Paper Movement” that broke out near the end of 2022 in response to the CCP’s “zero-COVID” lockdown policy and the sufferings that it caused.
Our take
1. The “Night Ride Army” phenomenon appears to be part of a trend of young people traveling on the cheap “like special forces” that started in 2023 after the end of the “zero-COVID” lockdowns. Beyond inexpensive travel and consumption (which reflect the poor economic situation in China), the “Night Ride Army” craze was an effort by Chinese youth at self-entertainment and releasing pent-up stress amid a tough economic environment (e.g. university graduates facing a tough job market, advanced degree holders having to take up low-skill jobs, etc.) and increasingly stricter social controls (e.g. tighter speech restrictions, endless political indoctrination by the CCP, psychological strain from the pandemic years, etc.). The slogans associated with the craze reflect the youths’ appreciation of the remaining pockets of freedom in Communist China, as well as the thrill and satisfaction of “conquering” an objective (enjoying soup dumplings) after putting in the work on a long trip.
The “Night Ride Army” trend could also indirectly represent the Chinese people’s inner longing for freedom and participation in public affairs under an oppressive regime. The over 200,000-strong night ride to Kaifeng on Nov. 8 where people (including military veterans) sang the national anthem, waved the PRC flag, and chanted slogans was essentially an unapproved demonstration of sorts, and showed that China’s youths have a flair for spontaneous organization.
2. The CCP authorities were supportive of the “Night Ride” trend early on because they likely viewed it as a tourism publicity and revenue-boosting venture. For instance, many college students flocked to Zibo City in Shandong Province to eat cheap barbecue during the May Day holiday period and beyond, and the tourism boom stimulated local consumption. University students also boosted the popularity of Harbin’s Ice and Snow World and spicy hotpot in Gansu. In the first half of 2024, college students from Beijing cycled over 100 kilometers to the “Tianjin Eye” Ferris Wheel in Tianjin City while students from Tianjin cycled in the opposite direction to visit Tiananmen.
However, the CCP authorities likely panicked after the large-scale “Night Ride Army” activity on Nov. 8 after considering what the continuation of the trend could potentially bring. Student movements in the PRC have a tendency of triggering social instability, such as the “great nationwide networking” (全國大串連) in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution and the June Fourth Movement in 1989 that led to the Tiananmen Square Massacre. After witnessing the “strong” organizational capacity of the biking students and some of the calls for “freedom” amongst the participants, the CCP authorities would naturally worry that even a non-political activity could blossom into an anti-government movement if left unchecked, and proceeded to order campus lockdowns in Henan. The rapid crackdown on a relatively harmless entertainment activity reflects the CCP regime’s growing sense of vulnerability and insecurity.
The local authorities could also be considering their respective career advancements and the current climate of political correctness when deciding to suppress the “Night Riding Army.” The Xi Jinping leadership’s focus and sensitivity to national security issues, especially after the 20th Party Congress, incentivizes local officials to “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) and get stricter on social controls to be safe than sorry. For instance, the Shanghai police turned out in force in October 2024 during Halloween to prevent a repeat of 2023 when some people wore costumes mocking sensitive issues such as “zero-COVID” curbs, the stock market, youth unemployment, and criticism of Xi and the CCP. Likewise, the Henan authorities appear to be nipping a potential problem in the bud with campus lockdowns and official media suddenly admonishing the “Night Ride” trend. Local officials do not want to be held accountable for the emergence of another “Blank Paper Movement” where calls for Xi and the CCP to step down were openly voiced.
3. The CCP authorities’ effort to curb the “Night Ride Army” and other avenues that the Chinese youth are using to express their freedom and find outlets of relief from China’s “pressure cooker” environment is more likely than not to eventually backfire.
For one, college students are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Xi Jinping and the CCP as things worsen in China. China has a large university student population (291 million students at the end of 2023) and Zhengzhou alone has 1.465 million college students (second-highest in the nation). Students who have experienced the pandemic lockdowns are likely to be very resentful of the campus lockdowns and the repeated snatching away of their freedoms and “priceless youth.” Further, youth unemployment is becoming endemic (the School of Economics at Renmin University of China issued a report in June 2023 warning that youth unemployment is not just a cyclical issue but a “systemic, long-term trend”) and college students are becoming increasingly pessimistic about their future.
Should student and youth disillusionment reach a critical point, they could potentially defy the CCP authorities’ attempt to control them and turn their restless energies into outright anti-government protests and a color revolution. Xi Jinping’s lingering factional rivals in the CCP elite could exploit growing social instability to incite “anti-Xi” events and create opportunities to move against him.
2 Analyzing rumors that Miao Hua is being probed
Miao Hua in trouble?
In the week of Nov. 11, rumors started circulating in overseas Chinese-speaking circles that Admiral Miao Hua, director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department and a CMC member, was being investigated by the CMC discipline inspection commission.
Miao’s last official public appearance per the PRC defense ministry website was on Oct. 7, 2024 when he attended the 70th anniversary event of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and read a congratulatory letter as deputy head of a central government delegation.
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Some overseas Chinese commentators believe that if Miao Hua was purged as the rumors indicate, then there is escalating and increasingly public infighting within the CMC. Those commentators believe that there is a division between the “Shaanxi faction” led by CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia and the “Fujian faction” headed by CMC vice chairman He Weidong. The commentators add that while neither He and Miao are from Fujian Province, both previously served in the 31st Group Army (now the 73rd Group Army) based in Fujian and are members of Xi Jinping’s “Fujian faction.”
Chinese commentators also note that earlier rumors suggested that Miao Hua was the “most corrupt official in the military” (軍中第一腐) and allegedly had loyalists planted throughout the People’s Liberation Army, with all political commissars serving as his agents and informants. The rumors also allege that Miao had to approve all military promotions before they were submitted to Xi. The commentators add that the investigation of Miao would affect many senior officials who owed their promotion to him, including defense minister Dong Jun.
Some Chinese commentators believe that if Miao Hua is indeed in trouble, then Xi has essentially lost control over the PLA.
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Miao Hua, 69 years old, served in the 31st Group Army of the Nanjing Military Region early in his career and had close working relations with Xi Jinping while the latter was in the Fujian officialdom. In December 2014, Miao was transferred from the PLA ground forces (political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region) to the navy (political commissar of the navy). In August 2017, Miao was appointed director of the CMC Political Work Department and became a CMC member in charge of military personnel affairs in October 2017.
Big picture
After the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, there were plenty of rumors and speculation in overseas Chinese-speaking circles about how Xi Jinping is allegedly “losing power” (“分權,” or having one’s power divided up) and how CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia is “overshadowing” Xi (see here, here, and here).
Our take
1. In reviewing currently available official information, we could not detect any tangible signs that Miao Hua has been investigated as the rumors allege.
Assuming Xi Jinping’s grip on power is secure as we presently assess, there is a very low probability that he would purge Miao unless he suspects that the latter had committed particularly egregious offenses such as threatening Xi’s personal political security or badly undermining Xi’s political agenda. Some potential offenses include Miao forming cliques and factions in the military (especially in the field of political work) that interfere with Xi’s control over the PLA, or Miao not fully implementing Xi’s instructions and directives on political indoctrination of the military (thereby impacting the effectiveness of Xi’s policies and his control over the PLA, as well as worsening corruption in the military). However, we have yet to observe signs that indicate that Miao Hua is guilty of the aforementioned offenses.
Xi is unlikely to initiate an investigation into another high-ranking military official over relatively trivial cases of corruption (Beijing undoubtedly recognizes that corruption is ubiquitous in the officialdom) and other relatively minor offenses. This is especially so given that Xi had already suffered a blow to his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) by removing defense minister and CMC member Li Shangfu and foreign minister Qin Gang in 2023. If Xi were to move against another CMC member, and particularly the head of political work in the military, it would merely call attention to his personal ineptitude (i.e. allowing severely problematic individuals to rise to the top despite his personally vetting their appointment), the farcical nature of his “self-revolution” campaign, and the futility of political indoctrination.
There is also a very low chance that senior officials apart from Xi himself would be able to order an investigation into Miao as long as Xi is firmly in charge and has no pressing reason to purge him. For one, Xi would have to give consent to the Politburo and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to probe a CMC member, and CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia does not possess sufficient authority to order the investigation even if he wanted to. Even if Xi was “losing power” to a military run by Zhang as some have speculated, the latter would not find it easy to mobilize the CMC’s discipline inspection commission against Miao given the way the anti-corruption authorities are set up. Zhang Shengmin, the secretary of the CMC discipline inspection commission, is only a deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and operates under the leadership of CCDI secretary and Xi ally Li Xi. Unless Li had abandoned Xi politically, it is entirely not in his interest to approve Zhang and the CMC discipline inspection commission to probe Miao Hua.
2. The analysis by some overseas Chinese commentators that Miao Hua approved all military promotions before they were submitted to Xi Jinping, and therefore has complete control over military personnel matters, does not seem implausible in considering the precedent and current arrangement. During the Jiang Zemin faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012), then CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou would rubber stamp virtually all military promotions after receiving bribes. With the current “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” the task of vetting senior military promotions would likely go to the political work department head (Miao Hua) before the CMC chairman (Xi Jinping) gave the final approval.
However, the analysis also contradicts rumors and speculation from back in May 2024 that Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan had a role in selecting military personnel. Assuming that the rumors and speculation are accurate, then Miao himself would have been scrutinized by Peng and he would not have complete control over military personnel matters. We believe that the earlier analysis about Peng and the analysis about Miao’s influence in the military are deeply flawed and do not conform to CCP operations under the Xi leadership.
In the event that Miao is indeed being investigated for corruption, it would imply that Xi is presently very paranoid and does not trust even those who are his allies or loyalists. The more a suspicious Xi lashes out, the more isolated he will become and the more distorted his information channels will be. Eventually, Xi would become prone to being deceived by his subordinates and local officials, and is headed for self-implosion.
3. It is possible that the rumors about Miao Hua being investigated could have stemmed from discussions in Zhongnanhai about who should succeed him. After all, Miao is way past retirement age at 69 and the Xi leadership could be planning for his exit and replacement before the 21st Party Congress in 2029. Party insiders who learn of such plans could either misinterpret them as a sign that Xi had moved against Miao or would be inclined to give the information an “anti-Xi” spin so that Miao’s retirement would appear more ominous than it seems.
Unless there is significant change in the political situation in Zhongnanhai, we would not consider Miao stepping down in his current term to be definitive evidence that he is being probed by the Xi leadership.
