1 Problems with new rural ‘stability maintenance’ agency emerge
On April 15, the PRC Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs published a Q&A between a “relevant person in charge” at the ministry’s department of laws and regulations and reporters regarding the Comprehensive Agricultural Law Enforcement Team (農業綜合執法隊伍; henceforth referred to as the CALET) that comes under its oversight.
In answering a reporter’s question about why CALET was established, the “relevant person in charge” said that it was set up per requirements made at the Third Plenum of the 19th Central Committee (i.e. as a part of Party and state institutional reforms rolled out in March 2018) to integrate and form five administrative law enforcement teams responsible for the sectors of agriculture and ecological environment protection, transportation, cultural market, and market supervision. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs then integrated previously scattered administrative law enforcement teams in its system to create the CALET. By the end of 2022, CALET agencies had been set up in city and county-level governments as required.
In answering a question about netizens referring to CALET as “nongguan” (農管, or the rural version of “chengguan” [urban administrative and law enforcement personnel]) and accusing CALET personnel of prohibiting people from planting melons in vegetables their front or backyards, the “relevant person in charge” said that it is not CALET’s role to manage all matters in rural areas. The “relevant person in charge” added that CALET’s main mission is cracking down on the use of counterfeit and shoddy seeds, pesticides, veterinary drugs, and other illegal activities that “infringe upon and harm peasants,” and will not “interfere with the normal production and life of peasants.”
Background
During a December 2022 press conference, a Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs official said that CALET was founded in 2018 and there were 2,564 agencies established across China at the time. The official added that those CALET agencies have more than 82,000 law enforcement personnel on payroll and those staffing resources (編製) were not new additions but pre-existing.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ “comprehensive administrative law enforcement measures for agriculture” (農業綜合行政執法管理辦法) would come into effect on Jan. 1, 2023. According to the measures, CALET is mainly responsible for enforcing the law with regard to planting, animal husbandry, fishery, forestry, water conservancy, agricultural machinery, and the quality and safety of agricultural products. CALET is also allowed to carry out inspections, investigations, evidence collection, punishment, and law enforcement.
On March 31, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs noted in a document on “rule of law governance construction” in 2022 (農業農村部2022年度法治政府建設情況) published on its website that CALET had dispatched law enforcement personnel a total of 4.5526 million times to investigate and handle 113,600 illegal cases last year.
Despite the PRC authorities’ claim and official documents showing CALET’s limited law enforcement scope, Chinese netizens have disclosed on social media that the agency’s law enforcement personnel are in fact “managing all matters” in rural areas. For instance, peasants have been told not to plant crops whose leaves turn yellow in the autumn near fish ponds because they “don’t look good”; some “nongguan” seized free-range poultry from peasants for themselves; and peasants have been barred from stringing ropes in their yards to dry blankets, etc.
Our take
1. The fact that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs allowed and responded to a question about wayward “agricultural managers” (“nongguan”) during an official Q&A session indicates that the complaints from netizens about the over-intrusiveness of those enforcers, their misbehavior, and their clashes with the peasantry are likely to be mostly true.
Given Communist Party culture’s repressive tendencies and the CCP’s historic mistreatment of the peasantry, it is possible that the agricultural managers could be “outperforming” their urban counterparts (“chengguan”) in abusing and harming the interests of the population that is supposed to benefit from their presence and work.
For example, netizens have complained that agricultural managers in some areas have begun collecting “property fees” from the local peasantry. The fees, which have been reported to be about 18 yuan per person annually, are collected from people with hukou (household registration) in the area regardless of whether or not they are presently staying there. Assuming the “nongguan” across the country press the 491.04 million rural Chinese to each hand over 18 yuan, the CCP authorities could rake in more than 8.8 billion yuan each year.
While the “property fees” do not seem high, they represent an extra expense for the poorer, rural-dwelling folk for whom every penny counts. According to a 2019 study by the Institute of Income Distribution at Beijing Normal University, about 600 million people in China make a monthly income of less than 1,000 yuan. Also, 75.62 percent of those 600 million people come from rural areas, while 5.46 million of the 600 million people are completely without an income.
Worse for the peasantry, the agricultural managers could increasingly collect higher “property fees” from them. When the CCP authorities rolled out the “new rural cooperative medical care” insurance plan in 2003, the peasants only had to pay premiums of 10 yuan per person per year. By 2023, however, annual premiums had risen to 350 yuan per person.
In what appeared to be another case of arbitrary fines, the rural authorities in Heilongjiang Province fined peasants 178.2 million yuan for the open-air burning of straw and stubble during the period from Nov. 1 to Dec. 15, 2022, according to a report by local official newspaper Heilongjiang Daily on March 4.
2. The Xi leadership could have established CALET to ensure the proper implementation of central government policies aimed at resolving long-standing problems like agricultural and rural employment, poverty, inefficient food production, and rural land use:
- Agricultural managers would be helpful in “pushing” peasants into the cities to supplement China’s manufacturing labor shortage and promote urbanization.
- Agricultural managers could aid local governments in the task of expropriating land from the peasantry and “promoting” real estate development.
- Agricultural managers could be tasked to get local farmers to surrender their land to facilitate intensive land operations and production to boost food production.
- Agricultural managers help the CCP authorities with its reform of rural allocation of homesteads. A pilot program for the reform of the rural homestead system was launched in 2023, which saw compensated usage fees being levied on homesteads that exceed a specified area (regulations differ from place to place). For instance, Guigang City in Guangxi Province is charging a one-time usage fee of 300 yuan per square meter or 5 yuan per square meter per year for paid use.
- In the event of food shortages and other crises, local rural authorities will need to rely on agricultural managers to “maintain stability” and keep the CCP in power.
Beijing’s establishment of CALET could also be a part of the CCP’s preparations for surviving a trade war with the United States and long-term Sino-U.S. confrontation. Notably, the Sino-U.S. trade war kicked off in mid-July, or some months after the Xi leadership made the requirement to set up agricultural managers to “improve” agricultural production and affairs. In theory, the CCP’s reform of the rural supply cooperative system and establishment of agricultural management would help with food production, supply distribution, and rural “stability maintenance” in a crisis, such as when extreme scenarios emerge as a result of Sino-U.S. confrontation.
3. As the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate and fewer manufacturing jobs become available, unemployed migrant workers could find themselves back in the countryside instead of lingering in cities. The growth of a resentful rural population poses a threat to CCP rule and societal stability, and would justify Beijing’s decision to create the CALET back in 2018.
Ironically, the actions and behavior of the agricultural managers appear to be contributing to societal destabilization instead of “stability maintenance.” The more the peasantry is repressed, the greater their resentment will be towards the CCP regime. A vicious cycle could develop where the harder Beijing tries to “maintain stability” in the rural areas, the faster it contributes to “instability” and ferments the conditions for mass revolt and other social crises.
2 Information in leaked Pentagon documents could lead to greater Western pressure on China
Leaked documents on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China, and Taiwan
According to news reports about the highly classified leaked Pentagon documents, Ukraine is lacking in ammunition and weapons while the Russia-Ukraine war is “likely heading toward a stalemate.”
With regard to China, the leaked documents reportedly say that the PRC could use Ukrainian strikes on targets deep inside Russia “as an opportunity to cast NATO as the aggressor, and may increase its aid to Russia if it deems the attacks were significant.” The documents also reportedly noted that the Central Military Commission had “approved the incremental provision” of weapons to Russia and wanted to keep it a secret, although the Biden administration maintained that they “have not seen evidence that China has transferred weapons or provided lethal assistance to Russia.”
The Washington Post reported that the leaked documents say that “Taiwan is unlikely to thwart Chinese military air superiority in a cross-strait conflict, while tactics such as China’s use of civilian ships for military purposes have eroded U.S. spy agencies’ ability to detect a pending invasion.”
The Post also reported that U.S. officials were aware of up to four PRC surveillance balloons aside from the one that crossed the continental U.S. in February, citing the leaked documents. The spy balloon that was shot down appeared to be equipped with solar panels that could generate upward of 10,000 watts of solar power and power a type of radar that can generate images through clouds, smoke, topsoil, ice, snow, and at night.
Western ‘red lines,’ PRC concerns, anti-ship missiles to Taiwan
April 13
Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published a speech that he was supposed to deliver at the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing but could not after he tested COVID positive and canceled his China trip.
On Taiwan, Borrell said, “We remain fundamentally committed to the EU’s One China Policy” but warned that “any attempt to change the status quo by force would be unacceptable.”
On Ukraine, Borrell said that “it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the European Union to maintain a relationship of trust with China … if China does not contribute to the search for a political solution based on Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. Neutrality in the face of the violation of international law is not credible.”
April 14
The Financial Times reported that Beijing is refusing to reschedule U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to China due to concerns that the Federal Bureau of Investigations could release the results of its investigation into the PRC spy balloon while Blinken is in Beijing, citing four people familiar with negotiations.
PRC foreign minister also raised the issue of the FBI investigation with Americans who attended the China Development Forum in Beijing, noting that it is another example of issues that have made it difficult to stabilize Sino-U.S. relations, citing people familiar with the matter.
April 16
In remotely addressing a meeting of the Group of Seven foreign ministers in Japan, top EU diplomat Josep Borrell described China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival,” and added that which of those three relations the EU would lean towards “will be determined by China’s behavior.”
Borrell also said that “anything that happens in the Taiwan Strait will mean a lot to us.”
April 17
1. In a report about the G7 meeting, The Wall Street Journal said that the “U.S. and its allies are grappling with how to pare their economic relationships with China, attempting to limit ties in certain sectors they view as strategic while preserving broader trade and investment flows” to the PRC.
2. A senior State Department official told reporters on call that “The message is the same across the G7: that we want to work with China in those areas where China is prepared to work with us. We are certainly going to stand up against any coercion, any market manipulation, any efforts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”
3. Bloomberg News reported that Taiwan will buy as many as 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles from the United States. The Pentagon announced the $1.17 billion contract for the missiles on April 7 without naming the buyer.
April 18
1. In addressing the European Parliament, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said, “We have consistently called for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We stand strongly against any unilateral change in the status quo, in particular by the use of force.”
Von der Leyen added, “A strong EU China policy relies on strong cooperation between members and institutions, and willingness to avoid ‘divide and conquer’ tactics we might face. We have seen in recent days and weeks those tactics in action.”
Also addressing the European Parliament, Josep Borrell that the EU should have four main prongs to its China policy, namely, “values, economic security, Taiwan, and Ukraine.” Borell added that Taiwan was part of the EU’s “geostrategic perimeter” and that the bloc would “defend our interests without adding fuel to the fire, and I’m sure all European countries share this view.”
2. Politico’s national security newsletter reported that Republican and Democratic members of the House China Committee will carry out a wargame at the Center for a New American Security think tank on the evening of April 19 to decide the “best military, diplomatic and economic courses to take against China” in the scenario where Xi Jinping decides to invade Taiwan after Taiwan’s leadership considers “declaring itself an independent country” in 2027.
Our take
1. The U.S. assessment in the leaked documents about a stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict aligns with the prediction we made in our 2023 China Outlook.
We wrote at the time: “The Russia-Ukraine war could drag out and stalemate. This will sap the strength and resources of both countries and those backing either side. A prolonged Russia-Ukraine war could also further aggravate global energy, food, and financial problems, which will in turn negatively impact China economically and politically.”
2. The bleak situation for Ukraine, as well as Western concerns about the PRC providing lethal aid to Russia and seizing the opportunity to invade Taiwan, could see the U.S. and its allies progressively intensify pressure on China in the coming weeks and months to deter Beijing and force the Xi leadership to align the PRC with the agenda of the U.S.-led rules-based international order.
How quickly and strongly the U.S. and its allies would move to pressure China could depend on Beijing’s level of engagement and cooperation with the West on its agenda. The West could also be observing whether Beijing is willing to disassociate itself from its “revisionist” stances towards the war in Ukraine and seeking “reunification” with Taiwan before determining how tough they would get on China.
3. While the PRC would certainly make noise over what it will likely perceive to be Western efforts to “Ukranify” Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region to “contain” China, Beijing will unlikely be provoked into aggression or other provocations unless certain “red lines” are crossed. Instead, the Xi leadership will stick to “delaying and waiting for change” and focus its energies on resolving its many crises at home and abroad.
Xi Jinping signaled his intention to prevent regional conflict when inspecting the navy of the Southern Theater Command in Guangzhou on April 11. In a lecture to representatives of naval officers and soldiers, Xi said that the military should deepen military training and “prepare for war” while “thinking and dealing with military issues from a political perspective,” “firmly and flexibly carrying out military struggles,” and “striving to maintain the overall stability of the surrounding areas.”
In decoding Party speak, Xi wants the PLA to have realistic training without being provocative so as to avoid escalating regional tensions and achieve the political goal of “maintaining stability of the overall situation in the neighborhood.” Xi also likely wants CCP commanders to implement military policies from a diplomatic and overall “political perspective” and be “flexible” in their operations so as to sidestep the “sharp edges” of the West and countries in the Indo-Pacific region (including Taiwan).
4. Providing military and diplomatic support to Taiwan would certainly help deter the CCP from launching an invasion. However, being overly hawkish in assessing the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and deliberately pushing the PRC’s “red lines” on cross-Strait issues (i.e. overtly supporting Taiwan independence, openly garrisoning U.S. troops in Taiwan, promoting the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a PLA invasion, etc.) could also be detrimental to Washington’s effort to unite allies and partner nations in countering the CCP.
The U.S. should consider moderating its hawkish approach to tackling the CCP threat and lean more towards challenging the PRC on issues such as human rights, universal values, and morals. Washington would also benefit from focusing international efforts on exposing the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, propaganda, disinformation, and various influence operations. As we previously analyzed, the CCP “would find it hard to pick a fight with the U.S. when confronted on those issues, and America’s allies and partners will be less concerned about working with Washington in standing up to Beijing.” Also, the international community would much less likely be dragged into a hot conflict (with the potential of nuclear confrontation) with the PRC.
3 Xi’s ‘investigation and research’ campaign runs into Party culture problems
April 13
“China Comment” (Ban Yue Tan, 半月談), a mainland publication under Xinhua, published an article titled, “Dozens of Tasks are Being Left to a Single ‘Pen’; Media: Level-by-Level Research Cannot Become Level-by-Level Material” (幾十個任務壓給“一支筆”, 媒體: 逐級調研豈能成逐級要材料).
The article said that “China Comment” reporters recently conducted research and interviews at the grassroots level after the launch of a Party-wide “investigation and research” campaign. The reporters found “some bad tendencies,” including local authorities taking excessive policy steps (層層加碼) and excessive materials (層層要材料) breaking down “investigation and research” tasks (層層分解任務).
“China Comment” also found that much of the “investigation and research” work at the grassroots was assigned to just a few Party “pens” (i.e. propaganda workers). Meanwhile, persons-in-charge who should be personally engaging in “investigation and research” are not writing reports, but have instead delegated the report writing to the Party “pens” who are not qualified to carry out “investigation and research” work.
April 9 to April 18
“Study Group” (學習小組), an official WeChat account run by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, published four special commentary articles on the theme of “investigating and researching with the General Secretary” (跟總書記學調研).
The articles mainly depict Xi Jinping as having dutifully conducted “investigation and research” throughout his political career “with the fundamental goal of problem-solving” and without engaging in “formalism.” They were later republished in other major mainland official media.
The titles of the four articles are:
- “Five Keywords [Describing] Xi Jinping’s Investigation and Research” (習近平調查研究“五字訣”)
- “What Investigation and Research Methods Did Xi Jinping Use?” (習近平用過哪些調研方法?)
- “Investigation and Research Must Not Be Formalistic” (調查研究千萬不能搞形式主義)
- “How Did Xi Jinping Choose Investigation and Research Targets?” (習近平怎麼選調研對象?)
The article “Investigation and Research Must Not Be Formalistic” featured content from an October 2019 piece in Qiushi by Xi Jinping, including:
- “Don’t do ‘imperial envoy’-style investigation and research, with more instructions and less humility.”
- “Some [officials] knew that what was reported to them was false information, false figures, and false models, but they let it go and even went so far as to whitewash the falsehoods to create the impression that everything was going well.”
- “We must worship the people as teachers, learn from the people, let go of our airs, bring ourselves down [to the people’s level], be grounded, and understand the situation at the grassroots.”
The “Investigation and Research Must Not Be Formalistic” article also went over how Xi Jinping carried out investigation and research while he was in Fuzhou City and Zhejiang Province, as well as how to stop targets from escaping being “investigated and researched” or going through the motions.
Our take
We previously analyzed that Xi Jinping launched his “investigation and research” campaign at this time partly as a way to collect more on-the-ground information to “figure out the actual state of affairs in China and better navigate the regime through its various crises.” Xi could also be looking to more thoroughly “rectify” the regime through the campaign to eliminate opposition to his rule, “unify” the Party behind his leadership, and improve the CCP authorities’ governing ability.
The “China Comment” report and “Study Group” commentaries about the “investigation and research” campaign, however, suggest that the Xi leadership is still being hamstrung in its effort to fix and improve governance problems by Party culture in the officialdom and other systemic deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian dictatorship. In particular, the “China Comment” report indicates that officials have been falling into old habits, such “the top has policies, but the bottom has countermeasures” (上有政策, 下有對策), in dealing with the central government’s request to properly carry out “investigation and research” without engaging in “formalism.”
The high-pressure political environment created by the anti-corruption campaign and “Xi Jinping Thought” study campaign forces officials to do “investigation and research” work campaign and not openly engage in “improper discussions” of Party Central’s policy (妄議中央). But such a political environment also incentivizes officials to only report good things while hiding the bad (報喜不報憂), or produce work that merely pays lip service to the central government’s demands. The sloppy execution of “investigation and research” by the officialdom at large dooms the campaign to failure and ensures that Beijing will continue to struggle to fix the PRC’s governance issues and turn things around for the regime. Xi Jinping could also find himself working with information of poorer and poorer quality, which would increasingly handicap his ability to make prompt and proper policies to address the regime’s various crises.
Meanwhile, CCP officials and cadres would become increasingly resentful of Xi as they suffer from campaign fatigue and stress from the high-pressure political environment. Growing official resentment could translate into worsening governance and further alienate the Chinese people from the CCP regime. Should such trends persist, the Xi leadership could see its efforts to improve governance and win the people’s hearts backfire.
