1 Reading Li Qiang’s press conference remarks and replies
New PRC premier Li Qiang delivered opening remarks and answered questions from Chinese and foreign journalists at a press conference in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 13.
Notable points from Li Qiang’s comments include:
- When asked about the goals and priorities of the new PRC government, Li said that the government plans to “follow a people-centered development approach,” “promote high-quality development,” and “remain steadfast in deepening reform and opening-up.” Li also indirectly made excuses for the CCP’s “modest” GDP target (“honestly speaking, most people do not keep their eyes on GDP growth all the time”) and poor economic prospects (focus on “high-quality development” and “providing for people’s basic needs”). Finally Li talked about “eating the meal of reform and walking the path of opening up” (吃改革飯、走開放路) to reassure the people and foreigners that the regime is still open for business despite the Party’s greater control over the regime.
- When asked about economic work, Li offered four policy contributions, including “macro policies,” “policies for expanding demand,” “policies for advancing reform and innovation,” and “policies for preventing and defusing risks.” He added that the Chinese economy will “break winds and waves, and sail toward a brighter future” (長風破浪, 未來可期).
- When asked about whether the PRC is prepared for a new wave of COVID-19, Li repeated CCP propaganda about how the regime had “achieved a major and decisive victory in the battle against the disease” and “China’s COVID strategies and measures are completely right and our COVID response has been highly effective.”
- When asked about the private economy, Li brought up the “two unwaverings” and said that “this is a long-term policy that did not change in the past and will not change in the future.” He noted that there were “incorrect discussions about private entrepreneurs last year, which made them feel concerned,” but expressed confidence that private entrepreneurs would “continue to write their exciting entrepreneurship stories in the new era and on the new journey.”
- When asked about employment and China’s negative population growth, Li said he did not think it was “that simple” that the country’s demographic dividend had disappeared and that a “talent dividend is in the making.” The “driving force for China’s development remains strong,” he added.
- On the topic of postponed retirement, Li said that the authorities will “conduct careful studies and thorough analysis to roll out the policy prudently in due course.”
When asked about Hong Kong and Macau experiencing difficulties in economic development, Li said that the central government will fully support both territories in “integrating into the country’s overall development.” - When asked about Taiwan, Li repeated the CCP’s longtime stance on the issue and added that “we will continue to promote economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus.”
- When asked about rural matters and food security, Li said that the authorities would focus on three keywords in promoting rural revitalization, namely, “comprehensive” (全面), “distinctive features” (特色), and “reform” (改革). He added that “the government’s policy in support of grain production will only increase, not decrease,” and urged farmers to “produce more grain so as to make sure that the rice bowl of the over 1.4 billion Chinese people will always be firmly held in our own hands.”
- When asked about China’s opening up to the world, Li claimed that “most foreign companies are still optimistic about their development prospects in China.” He added that opening up is a “basic state policy for China” and “no matter how the external situation may evolve, we will stay firmly committed to pursuing this policy.”
Backdrop
The State Council was essentially downgraded to a subsidiary CCP organization after the implementation of institutional reforms at the Two Sessions.
Big picture
Li Qiang’s press conference came amid worsening Sino-U.S. tensions and growing signs of a U.S.-led “containment” of China. Meanwhile, the U.S. saw the collapse of two large banks within three days and the slumping of global bank stocks.
Our take
1. Li Qiang was Xi Jinping’s former secretary in Zhejiang Province and now appears to have reprised his old role in his new post as head of the weakened State Council. Unlike his predecessors, Li will not bring his own stamp on economic matters but will instead stay largely in sync with what Xi wants. While media outlets may later report “differences” between Xi and Li, those “differences” will likely for the most part turn out to be normal give and take in the process of policy implementation and not signs of a so-called “Xi-Li split” given the clear “superior-subordinate” dynamic (in contrast to Xi and Li Keqiang being political allies) and huge power disparity between the two.
2. Li Qiang mostly resorted to rehashing recent propaganda and outlining “pie in the sky” objectives in answering questions at the press conference, likely to avoid directly acknowledging the serious problems plaguing the Chinese economy and offering his specific policies on how to address those problems. Li’s reticence in offering solutions could be both his not getting ahead of Xi Jinping and playing the role of the dutiful “secretary” or “office manager” to the Party boss, as well as the CCP having no good plans at the moment for resolving its many crises.
By sticking to propaganda, Li is likely trying to maintain the CCP’s so-called “positive energy” and build on the “strong confidence” effort to boost people’s belief in China’s economic recovery. Li also relied on factual “sleight of hand” to gloss over some issues that the regime is having massive trouble with such as the disappearing demographic dividend. For instance, Li’s claim that a “talent dividend [is] in the making” because more people in China have received higher education belies the phenomenon of high unemployment among the well-educated and anecdotes in recent years that tens of thousands of master’s degree holders ended up working in food delivery.
3. Li Qiang not getting into the specifics during his press conference could also be part of the CCP’s present strategy for ensuring regime survival and future dominance. The CCP is known to play the long game and “delay and wait for change” (以拖待變) before seizing its opportunities. The Party has also been floating the idea of “the East is rising, the West is in decline” after the 2008 global financial crisis.
The brewing banking crisis in America could have convinced Beijing that it just has to keep its head above water in dealing with its many problems and wait for financial and economic troubles to stymie the effort by the U.S. and its allies to “contain” the PRC. The CCP will then rely on its so-called “authoritarian advantages” like propaganda and tight control over society to steady the ship at home and ride out the “various risks, challenges, and even turbulent waves” facing the regime.
However, the CCP will find “delaying and waiting for change” to be immensely difficult this time because too many serious problems are coming to a head all at once. Also, the systemic deficiencies of the Party’s authoritarian dictatorship will exacerbate its problems, undermine efforts to revive the economy, and destroy the Chinese people’s faith in the regime. Worse for Beijing, the U.S. and its allies could double down in pressuring the PRC as domestic problems worsen in their respective countries and governments increasingly spotlight the “China challenge” to distract their populace from political and domestic issues.
2 Xi continues to shore up his ‘quan wei’ through propaganda
March 13
Xi Jinping delivered a closing speech to the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Xi noted his election at the Two Sessions to serve as PRC president for the third time and thanked the NPC deputies and the Chinese people for placing their “trust” in him. He also said that he would take the “people’s interests as the yardstick to follow” in fulfilling his duties.
Xi then said that the “central task” of the Party and the Chinese people is to “complete building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects and advance national rejuvenation on all fronts.” He also called for implementing the “strategic plans made at the 20th Party Congress” to make achievements on the “new journey” in the “new era.”
Xi described security as the “foundation of development and stability is the prerequisite for prosperity.” He also mentioned a “new security architecture” for “better safeguarding China’s development pattern.” Xi further called for “building the people’s military into a great wall of steel” to secure the regime’s “sovereignty, security, and the interests of our development.”
On the external front, Xi also called for “building a community with a shared future for mankind” and the promotion of his new policy initiatives (Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative) to “add more stability and positive energy to world peace and development.”
Finally, Xi said that it is “essential to uphold the leadership of the CCP and the Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership,” as well as “strictly govern the Party” (從嚴治黨). Doing so would ensure that “the Party never changes its nature, its conviction, or its character, which will serve as a strong guarantee for building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation,” he said.
March 14
State mouthpiece Xinhua published a nearly 18,000-character feature titled, “Xi Jinping: Leading China’s New Journey By Popular Demand” (習近平: 眾望所歸引領中國新征程).
The feature sought to explain and justify Xi’s re-election as president and was divided into five sections:
- “The strong core leads the great cause of rejuvenation the Chinese nation” (引領中華民族復興大業的堅強核心)
- “The helmsman ensuring the steady and sustained journey of the Chinese modernization ship” (確保中國式現代化航船行穩致遠的掌舵人)
- “A selfless person who does everything for the people and relies on them” (一切為了人民並依靠人民的無我擔當者)
- “A leader of a great country who contributes wisdom and impetus to world peace and development” (為世界和平發展貢獻智慧和動力的大國領導人)
- “A pioneer and builder of a new form of human civilization” (人類文明新形態的開拓建設者)
The feature rehashed the various propaganda narratives associated with Xi Jinping in providing more granularity to his “leadership image.” Some notable points include:
- The feature touts Xi’s “rich experience and outstanding achievements,” as well as his caring for the well-being of the Chinese people and valuing of Chinese culture.
- The feature said Xi did not leave the country to make a fortune but instead chose the path of “being a public servant of the people.”
- The feature quoted from Xi’s past speeches in explaining that his power centralization and anti-corruption campaign were undertaken for the sake of the people and the regime, and that his actions “won” him a “high degree of support” in the Party and the public. Some quote include:
- “The core of Party Central and the core of the entire Party is my responsibility. I will devote my whole life and energy to repaying the trust of the Party and the people, and not give up this undertaking (鞠躬盡瘁、死而後已，赴湯蹈火、萬死不辭).”
- “It is especially important to emphasize that in governing such a big Party and country like ours, nothing can be accomplished with the ‘quan wei’ and centralized leadership of Party Central and without the unity of thought and pace of the whole Party and whole country.”
The feature made several justifications for why Xi was re-elected, including:
- Indirectly indicating that Xi had cleaned up the mess left behind by his predecessors, such as:
- Resolving “many difficult problems that had not been resolved for a long time” during his decade in office and accomplished “many major issues of long-term importance.”
- Eliminating “serious hidden dangers in the Party, the state, and the military.”
- China has entered a period where “strategic opportunities and risks and challenges coexist” and “uncertainties and unpredictable factors are increasing.” Therefore, China needs a “helmsman” like Xi Jinping to get ready to “withstand the major test of high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.”
- Xi’s “great power diplomacy” and international political influence are crucial for the regime. His “Chinese-style modernization” was also described as a “major innovation in the theory and practice of world modernization.”
Our take
Xi Jinping closing remarks at the Two Sessions and Xinhua’s feature justifying his re-election hint at Xi’s vulnerabilities and concerns even as he centralized power to an even higher degree with the recent State Council reforms and personnel appointments.
Xi attributed his re-election to the “trust” placed in him by officials and the Chinese people, a very misleading claim. For one, the Chinese people never had a say in the “election” of CCP officials since the founding of the PRC in 1949 and are unlikely to ever be enfranchised as long as the Party is in power. Moreover, expressions of dissatisfaction towards Xi’s re-election by Chinese netizens (see item three in this newsletter) suggest that there is not much trust between the people and the increasingly authoritarian Xi. As for Party officials, Xi saw to it that they voted unanimously to keep him as PRC president through fear (the anti-corruption campaign) and deference to his paramount position in the regime. There is little trust between Xi and the bulk of the officialdom, only mutual suspicion and obligation to the power hierarchy.
Without genuine trust from officials and the people, a lack of political achievements outside the anti-corruption campaign, and mounting policy failures, Xi can only turn again to propaganda to prop up his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and give his re-election a veneer of “legitimacy.” Thus, Xi and the Xinhua feature hyped up his various policies and “achievements,” and billed him as the only person who can, in Party parlance, “focus energies in accomplishing major matters” (集中力量辦大事) like guaranteeing the people’s livelihood, reviving the economy after the pandemic, taking reform into so-called “deep water territory,” handling U.S. pressure, and even bringing about “world peace and development.”
Propaganda, however, can only do so much in helping Xi and the CCP gloss over their policy failures and generate “positive energy” to drag the regime out of its many internal and external crises. The Chinese people will get angrier as propaganda becomes increasingly disconnected from reality, and rapidly growing social tensions will lead to more domestic instability. Xi and the CCP will have no choice but to tighten information controls and double down on propaganda, but will only dig a deeper hole for themselves.
3 CCP targets ‘self-media’ as netizens mock Xi
On March 13, the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission announced that it would be kicking off a two-month “special action” to rectify the “chaos” stemming from “self-media,” social media, short videos, webcast, and other platforms as part of its “Qinglang” (清朗) series of campaigns. The “special action” will focus on curbing “rumors and disinformation, counterfeiting, illegal profit-making, and other prominent problems” associated with “self-media.”
The notice added that the crackdown on “self-media” will target “harmful information” on “public policy, the macroeconomic situation, major disasters and accidents, hotspot events in society, distorted information without context, inversion of right and wrong and smear attacks, and embellishment of sadness and incitement of confrontation.” The crackdown also targets “harmful information” that “damages the image of the Party and the government, and interferes with economic and social development.”
Mocking Xi
The Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission’s campaign to tackle online “chaos” happened to be announced shortly after Chinese netizens rushed to mock Xi Jinping after his re-election as PRC president on March 10. Netizens flocked to the comments section of articles about Xi’s re-election to express their dissatisfaction towards him by posting the characters “二次袁,” a homonym for a popular word meaning “two-dimensional” (二次元) but with the final character swapped to have it mean the “second coming of Yuan Shikai” (二次袁). Yuan was sworn in as president of the Republic of China on March 10, 1912. However, Yuan would proclaim himself emperor three years later, a move that sparked nationwide protests and rebellion up until his death in 1916.
Regime censors quickly moved in to clamp down on the displays of displeasure towards Xi. WeChat banned keyword searches of “Xi Jinping” and “Yuan Shikai,” and deleted many articles (even innocuous ones about “today in history”) or information that could be used to mock Xi by referencing Yuan. Meanwhile, users on the “Little Red Book” (Xiaohongshu) app were banned from uploading photos of Yuan Shikai.
Netizens started invoking Yuan Shikai to ridicule Xi as early as 2018 when the CCP amended the constitution to abolish term limits for the PRC presidency. At the time, netizens used terms like “Yuan Shikai,” Yuan Xiangcheng” (a reference to Xiangcheng City in Henan Province where Yuan was from), and “Hongxian” (Yuan styled himself the “Hongxian Emperor”). Weibo would go on to censor dozens of Yuan Shikai-related terms.
Our take
The CCP authorities’ effort to target “self-media” after the latest round of netizen mockings suggests a correlation between the two. If so, Xi Jinping and the CCP are growing increasingly unpopular in China, and both are losing political legitimacy even as their control over the regime was strengthened after the Two Sessions.
The authorities’ campaign to rectify online “chaos” could also be part of a broader effort to tighten control over the Chinese people’s access to information and prevent social incidents from flaring up over unwelcome news as internal and external crises worsen for Xi and the CCP. The CCP’s fear of what information is disseminating in public and attempt to ramp up censorship suggests the regime is likely in a more fragile state than appearances indicate.
4 Western misconceptions of Xi and the CCP threat persist
March 11
The New York Times editorial board published an op-ed titled, “Who Benefits From Confrontation With China?”
The op-ed backed the policy of engagement with China, arguing that the U.S.-China relationship, “for all its problems, continues to deliver substantial economic benefits to the residents of both countries and to the rest of the world.” It added, “Americans’ interests are best served by emphasizing competition with China while minimizing confrontation.”
The op-ed noted that the “Biden administration’s continuation of Trump-era restrictions on trade with China, and its imposition of a host of new restrictions, is also a dubious strategy.” Further, the “confrontational turn” makes it harder for the U.S. and China to “cooperate on addressing climate change and on other issues where national interests could plausibly align.”
March 12
The Wall Street Journal published a piece about how Xi Jinping ended the PRC’s “reform era.”
The article sought to cast Deng Xiaoping in a favorable light while throwing shade on Xi. “Where Deng introduced a collective-leadership system to protect against one-man rule, gave private enterprise wider room to flourish and marked a separation between the party and the government, Mr. Xi has done away with term limits, narrowed the scope for the private sector and placed the Party—and himself—at the center of Chinese society,” writes the Journal.
The article also noted that Xi assembling a “team of senior Party apparatchiks known for their loyalty to the supreme leader” and getting rid of “officials who combined political standing with technocratic skill” is a “general change” that “Mr. Xi’s priority on fortifying the Chinese system against a prolonged period of tension with the U.S.-led West, a contrast with the Deng era, which focused on building ties with the developed world.” However, the article added, “To be sure, Mr. Xi still wants growth. He isn’t slamming the door to the outside world, nor returning China to a planned economy.”
Later on, the article observed that Xi “celebrated the reforms started by Deng” early in his tenure and only switched gears “in the wake of a 2015 stock-market crash.”
In the concluding paragraphs, the article juxtaposed Xi Jinping’s response to the PRC spy balloon incident with Jiang Zemin’s handling of the U.S. bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade. The article painted a favorable picture of Jiang, noting that the latter stuck to Deng’s “reform and opening up” and that the Clinton administration helped China join the World Trade Organization. In contrast, Xi is said to have “lashed out at the U.S. in a rare direct rebuke, blaming Washington-led ‘containment, encirclement and suppression’ for worsening China’s challenges at home, suggesting a willingness to alienate the U.S., even when that threatens to inflict further damage on the Chinese economy.”
Our take
1. The op-ed by the editorial board of The New York Times suggests that pro-China and pro-engagement views are still strong in the U.S. even as consensus is rapidly building in Washington and the international community about the CCP threat. We previously outlined in July 2019 why the CCP regime should be confronted and the failure of the engagement policy in dealing with an authoritarian regime that has global domination on its agenda.
2. The Wall Street Journal’s romanticization of Deng Xiaoping’s rule and his “reform and opening up” policy reflect fundamental misconceptions about CCP leaders, the Party’s “survival-dominance” dynamic, and factional struggles in the Party elite.
CCP leaders have never untethered themselves from Marxism-Leninism, including the so-called “liberal” and “moderate” Party leaders like Deng and Jiang. This adherence to ideology would lead the “moderate collective leadership” before Xi to continually advance the CCP’s domination agenda and perpetuate gross human rights abuses back home, as we previously laid out. We also noted that “reform-minded CCP cadres or Party bosses are a threat to regime survival and tend not to stay in power for long,” with Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang being prime examples.
Deng Xiaoping managed to stay in power and rule as paramount leader without ever holding the titles of “chairman” or “general secretary” by being ruthless and tweaking CCP political operations in his favor. For instance, the collective leadership system set up ostensibly to prevent one-man rule ended up enabling Deng and Jiang to pull strings and effectively rule as “Party godfathers” from behind the scene. Also, Deng created greater separation between the Party and the state apparatuses in the CCP’s parallel system of governance to benefit the state side where he had more allies and influence over. Xi’s subordination of the state under the Party side where he is stronger may seem like the reversal of a political “norm” established under Deng, but actually is in sync with what the latter sought to accomplish on the power consolidation front. Put another way, there is no real daylight between Xi and Deng in considering their respective actions from the perspective of CCP factional politics and political operations; both leaders merely did what they had to do to expand their power and maintain their paramount positions.
Meanwhile, Deng’s “reform and opening up” was partly aimed at ensuring regime survival and dominance, as well as partly a method of power consolidation. With regard to power consolidation, Deng needed something to rally his supporters around, contrast himself from Hua Guofeng and the “Two Whatevers,” and later, marginalize Party elders who threatened his power; Xi is doing something similar now with various policies (“great power diplomacy,” “common prosperity,” “Xi Jinping Thought,” etc.) to differentiate himself from his predecessors who stuck with “reform and opening up” (Deng, Jiang, Hu). As for regime survival and dominance, the CCP has historically been flexible in interpreting ideology, forging alliances, and deploying methods in the pursuit of power and holding on to it. “Reform and opening up” was a shrewd way for Deng to restore the Party’s tarnished political legacy, preserve the regime after the disastrous Mao years, and pave the way for the PRC to dominate further down the road by building up China’s economic strength.
The Journal noted that Xi Jinping moved away from the “reforms started by Deng” after the 2015 stock market crash, but did not elaborate on why. We previously explained that Xi did so and pursued power consolidation in earnest to eliminate factional forces and other interest groups that were impeding the proper implementation of his policies, and not because he was bent on abandoning reform (CCP-style reforms to benefit the authoritarian dictatorship, not liberal reforms) or restoring the “Mao model.”
We wrote earlier that Xi Jinping is “a symptom, and not an aberration, of the Party system. Because the CCP’s cutthroat political culture does not lend itself to change, Xi’s successors, far from ‘reforming’ the Party, could ultimately prove to be just as willing—if not politically obliged—to continue in the same pernicious cycle of expanding regime power and human rights abuse.” Efforts to differentiate between Xi and the Party instead of focusing on the CCP on the whole amount to disregarding the threat posed by the Party and its ideology, allowing the regime opportunities to continue its pernicious agenda.
