Xi will likely rely even more on propaganda and discipline as China’s problems worsen
A little over a decade ago, China’s economy was the envy of the world and everybody wanted to be friends with Beijing. Fast forward to the present, however, and everything seems to have flipped on its head.
Official data and other indicators paint a picture of doom and gloom for the Chinese economy. Countries are growing more wary of the threat from the Chinese Communist Party. And dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping is so high that rumors and speculation about his health and political situation refuse to die down.
In response, the Xi leadership doubled down on two familiar tools of control — propaganda and Party discipline.
Propaganda
Xi Jinping has relied on propaganda since his first term in office to build up his “quan wei” (authority and prestige), consolidate power, and strengthen the CCP’s governance control over the Party, military, and country. However, growing domestic and external crises facing the People’s Republic of China are steadily undermining the “quan wei” that Xi has painstakingly accumulated over the past decade.
Given the importance of “quan wei” to governance and control, the Xi leadership has stepped up propaganda efforts after the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee. Since the conclusion of the plenum in late July, members of the Central Propaganda Group have toured the PRC’s 31 provincial-level administrations, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, as well as relevant systems, departments, and units to oversee activities related to the study and implementation of the “spirit of the Third Plenum,” according to state mouthpiece Xinhua’s report on Sept. 2.
Xinhua said that the propaganda activities include delivering 52 reports and holding 57 interactive exchange activities in various formats. Nearly 980,000 people directly attended those events, with over 20 million people indirectly participating through television broadcasts, online streaming, and other channels. Xinhua added that “consensus” was built during those propaganda activities and “thoughts were elevated” through studying.
On Sept. 1, Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published in its 17th issue of the year parts of Xi’s speech at the National Education Conference on Sept. 10, 2018. The article said that the “fundamental task of education must be to cultivate socialist builders and successors,” and warned that “various hostile forces have never ceased their efforts to implement strategies of Westernization and division against China, nor have they stopped their attempts to subvert and undermine the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system of China.” The article further called for efforts to strengthen the education of students in Party and PRC history, as well as for students to “be educated and guided to love and support the CCP, and to be determined to listen to and follow the Party.”
The Xi leadership also took advantage of Deng Xiaoping’s 120th birth anniversary to promote Xi Jinping. An effort was made in Xi’s speech commemorating Deng at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Aug. 22, as well as in other official articles, to repackage and reinterpret Deng’s political achievements and theories to validate Xi’s political theories. For instance, Xi’s speech and state media articles noted that the best way to remember Deng is to advance the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and this entails undertaking Xi’s agendas like “further deepening comprehensive reforms,” fully promoting “Chinese-style modernization,” promoting “common prosperity,” and promoting “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party.” Also, Deng’s theory of “emancipating the mind” includes accepting Xi’s various political theories.
The Xi leadership further sought to enhance political indoctrination in the military. On Sept. 2, the PRC National Defense University held a special seminar for senior military officers to study and implement the spirit of the Central Military Commission’s political work conference that was held in Yan’an City. In an opening speech, CMC vice chairman He Weidong stressed that studying and implementing the spirit of the CMC’s political work conference is a “major political task.” He further emphasized that there was a need to resolutely implement the decisions and deployments of CMC chairman Xi Jinping, including abiding by Xi’s political theories on political military-building.
Finally, the Xi leadership could have acted indirectly to quash some of the unflattering rumors about Party elite politics that are eroding Xi Jinping’s “quan wei.” On Sept. 8, the Washington Post reported that former PRC foreign minister Qin Gang has been assigned a low-level job at World Affairs Press, a state-owned publishing house affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, citing two former U.S. officials. The Post’s report, if accurate, would refute a widely-believed claim by Politico Europe in December 2023 that Qin had died from suicide or torture” in late July 2023.
We previously expressed skepticism at Politico’s information and noted that Qin’s downfall could be linked to efforts by the “anti-Xi coalition” to exploit the Xi leadership’s prioritization of national security matters to “manipulate” the Chinese leader into removing his allies and ultimately undermining his own interests. We also assessed that the persistent negative rumors about Xi are partly an attempt by “anti-Xi” forces both inside and outside the country to shape the narrative environment against him so that the rumors can be “weaponized” at critical junctures to destabilize him.
Discipline
The Xi leadership has also re-emphasized Party discipline following the Third Plenum.
On Aug. 29, the CCP General Office issued measures for the organizational handling of unqualified Party members and required all regions and departments to follow and implement them conscientiously.
On Aug. 30, the Central Leading Group for Party Building convened a meeting to convey instructions from Xi Jinping and review an opinion on “promoting the normalization and long-term effectiveness of Party discipline study and education.” In his instructions, Xi called for continually normalizing the study and education of Party discipline. Xi also called for focus to be placed on eliminating the “soil and conditions” (i.e. environment) that breed corruption, and effectively curb any increase in corruption and eliminate existing problems. The meeting stressed that Xi’s instructions are “highly political, ideological, targeted, and instructive,” and all Party members should study the instructions carefully and comprehensively implement them.
Stable but troubled
Beijing’s recent propaganda and discipline activities indicate that Xi Jinping’s grip on power is stable, contrary to various rumors and speculation. However, those activities also indirectly hint at growing elite and public resentment towards Xi, as well as the general ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign in resolving discipline issues in the officialdom and improving the Xi leadership’s governing efficiency.
Xi will likely rely even more on propaganda and discipline as China’s problems worsen. But doing so could further alienate Xi from officials and the Chinese people instead of strengthening his “quan wei,” thereby increasing Xi and the CCP’s political risks.
