1 Xi and Trump affirm ‘détente’ as US-China struggle plays on in the backdrop
Xi-Trump phone call
Feb. 4
1. Chinese leader Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump spoke by phone. Trump later posted details of his call on Truth Social, while official PRC media carried a readout of the call.
Per Trump’s social media post:
- Trump described his telephone conversation with Xi as “excellent.” He added that the Sino-U.S. relationship and his personal relationship with Xi are “extremely good” and “we both realize how important it is to keep it that way.”
- Trump said that he and Xi had “very positive” discussions about trade, military, his upcoming trip to China in April, Taiwan, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the current situation with Iran, the PRC’s consideration of purchasing additional agricultural products (20 million tons of soil beans for the current season and 25 million tons for next season), aircraft engine deliveries, and “numerous other subjects.”
- Trump said he believes there will be “many positive results” over the next three years of his presidency with Xi and China.
According to the PRC readout:
- Xi expressed the hope that he and Trump can “steer the giant ship of China-U.S. relations steadily forward through wind and storms, and accomplish more big things and good things” in 2026.
- Xi said he attaches great importance to the Sino-U.S. relationship and recalled the “successful” meeting he had with Trump last year in Busan.
- Xi said both sides should “follow the common understandings we have reached, enhance dialogue and communication, manage differences properly, and expand practical cooperation.” He added that it is “always right to do a good thing, however small, and always wrong to do a bad thing, however small,” and that both sides should progressive build up mutual trust and “find the right way to get along.”
- Xi said that the “Taiwan question” is the “most important issue in China-U.S. relations,” before reiterating the PRC’s stance on Taiwan. Xi also said that the U.S. “must handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence.”
2. Hours before calling Trump, Xi held a virtual meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
According to a Xinhua readout, Xi said that the two countries should ensure that the bilateral relationship continues to develop “along the right track” through “deeper strategic coordination and more proactive assumption of responsibilities of major countries.” Xi added that both countries should “work together to maintain global strategic stability as the international situation has become increasingly turbulent” since the start of 2026.
US proposes critical minerals trade bloc
Feb. 4
The U.S. held a critical minerals ministerial at the State Department. The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of 55 countries, including South Korea, Japan, India, Germany, Australia, Singapore, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance told the gathering, “We want to eliminate that problem of people flooding into our markets with cheap critical minerals to undercut our domestic manufacturers.” He added, “We will establish reference prices for critical minerals at each stage of production, … and for members of the preferential zone, these reference prices will operate as a floor maintained through adjustable tariffs to uphold pricing integrity.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that critical minerals are “heavily concentrated in the hands of one country” without mentioning China. Rubio added that this situation had become a “tool of leverage in geopolitics.”
Feb. 5
When asked about the U.S. critical minerals trade bloc at a regular PRC foreign ministry press conference, spokesman Lin Jian said that “all parties have the responsibility to play a constructive role in keeping the global industrial and supply chains on critical mineral stable and secure” and the PRC “opposes any country setting up exclusive blocs to disrupt international economic and trade order.”
Panama voids CK Hutchison port rights
Jan. 30
The Supreme Court of Panama annulled Hong Kong company CK Hutchison’s rights to operate ports at either end of the Panama Canal. The ruling was seen as a win for President Trump, who said that the PRC infrastructure that has been built up around the canal over the past thirty years represents a security threat to the United States. “China is operating the Panama Canal, and we didn’t give it to China,” Trump said in his inaugural address in 2025.
Feb. 3
1. CK Hutchison said its subsidiary started an arbitration process under International Chamber of Commerce rules against Panama. While Hutchison cannot appeal the Panama Supreme Court’s ruling, it can request clarifications that could drag out the termination of its operating license.
2. The PRC Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office wrote on its social media account that Panama’s ruling against Hutchison “ignored the facts, breached trust, and seriously damaged the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises in Hong Kong, China.”
The post added that the PRC “has sufficient means and tools, and sufficient strength and ability to defend a fair and just international economic and trade order,” and “heavy prices both politically and economically will surely be paid” if the Panamanian authorities “insist on having their own way.”
Feb. 5
Bloomberg News reported that the PRC had asked state firms to cease talks over new projects with Panama as part of retaliatory efforts against the latter over voiding CK Hutchison’s contract to operate two ports at either end of the Panama Canal. People familiar with the matter noted that projects already underway could be affected, but no final instructions have been given as yet.
Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter, said that the PRC’s move could “derail potential investments worth billions of dollars.” Also, Beijing has requested that shipping companies consider rerouting cargo through other ports if doing so does not result in significant extra costs. The people added that the PRC customs authorities are stepping up inspections on Panamanian imports like bananas and coffee.
Trump threatens tariffs on countries supplying Cuba with oil
Jan. 29
President Trump signed an executive order authorizing the imposition of new tariffs on countries that supply oil to Cuba. Trump said that the measure was necessary to secure “U.S. national security and foreign policy from the Cuban regime’s malign actions and policies.”
The executive order accused the Cuban regime of aligning itself with “numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors adverse to the United States,” including the PRC. The order added that Cuba “continues to build deep intelligence and defense cooperation with the PRC.”
Feb. 5
Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodriguez met with PRC foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing. Wang said that the PRC supports Cuba in “safeguarding its national sovereignty and security” and “opposes unwarranted interference by external forces.”
In a separate meeting, CCP International Department head Liu Haixing told Rodriguez, “Although (we are) on different continents, our hearts have always been closely connected.” He added that the PRC supports Cuba in “opposing foreign interference and blockage.”
US, PRC opt out of joint declaration on military AI use
Feb. 5
The U.S. and China did not sign a non-binding declaration on how to govern the deployment of technology in warfare at the Responsible AI in the Military Domain summit in Spain. Just 35 out of 85 countries that attended the event signed the declaration, including Canada, Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, South Korea and Ukraine.
Trump lets US-Russia nuclear arms treaty expire
Feb. 5
President Trump allowed the New START nuclear arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia to lapse, effectively ending decades of formal limits on how many nuclear warheads the two countries can deploy. In a Truth Social post, Trump said that the treaty was “badly negotiated” and called for a “new, improved, and modernized treaty that can last long into the future.”
A day earlier, Secretary Rubio said that any new nuclear arms control treaty should include China even though Beijing’s nuclear stockpile is much smaller than that of either the U.S. or Russia. Rubio said, “The president’s been clear in the past that in order to have true arms control in the 21st century, it’s impossible to do something that doesn’t include China, because of their vast and rapidly growing stockpile.”
Our take
The official PRC readout of the Xi-Trump call indicates that Xi Jinping was mostly conciliatory in speaking to Donald Trump. Notably, the readout did not state that Xi took the call “at the request” (應繳) of Trump, a departure from precedent which suggests that Xi initiated his latest phone call with the U.S. president. Trump’s details of the call also indicate that Xi committed to making big agricultural and other purchases from the United States. All this seems to indicate that Xi reached out to Trump because he is seeking something from America.
We see at least three possible reasons why Xi likely took the initiative to speak to Trump and show goodwill towards the U.S. at this time:
i) Xi could have reached out to reassure Trump that the military and political situation inside China is stable and that he is completely in charge. Such a move is likely warranted from Xi’s perspective given the international confusion and concerns that emerged in the wake of Xi’s purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, as well as his ongoing “rectification” of the People’s Liberation Army.
In particular, Xi would not want Trump and hawkish elements in Washington to believe that the CCP is currently in a state of political turmoil (as some of the wilder rumors circulating in overseas Chinese-speaking circles have suggested) and therefore move to exploit the PRC’s vulnerabilities to gain geopolitical advantages and undertake regime change operations. For instance, a U.S. that senses an opportunity to destabilize the CCP could conceivably move away from “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan and openly back “Taiwan independence,” including expanding military cooperation in a manner that encourages pro-independence sentiments. By reaching out directly to Trump and committing to big purchases, Xi is signaling that he is firmly in control and the U.S. would benefit from having him in charge (as opposed to deposing him or working towards that outcome) so that both countries will benefit from strengthened economic and trade cooperation, as well as enjoy geopolitical stability with a flourishing Sino-U.S. relationship.
ii) Xi could have sought to directly get Trump’s take on various geopolitical flashpoints and express his concerns about geopolitical matters in general. Since December 2025, Trump and his administration have made several international moves that threaten the CCP’s global interests and domination agenda, including releasing a new national security strategy and national defense strategy, announcing an $11 billion arms package for Taiwan, abducting Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, supporting anti-government protests in Iran, proposing that the U.S. acquire Greenland, having an in-person meeting with Colombian president Gustavo Petro, threatening to tariff countries that supply oil to Cuba, and several of the developments listed in the sections above in this newsletter.
While few of Trump’s moves and related international developments directly target the PRC, Xi could be increasingly concerned that himself and the CCP regime could come under tremendous pressure very quickly should the bulk of the developments and moves pan out in America’s favor. This could explain why Xi reiterated the CCP’s “redlines” to Trump by emphasizing that the “Taiwan question” was the most important issue in the bilateral relationship, as well as called for “enhancing dialogue and communication, managing differences properly, and expanding practical cooperation.” By maintaining the current “détente” and even improving the bilateral relationship, Xi could be looking to “struggle without rupture” with the U.S. while it builds up capabilities and self-reliance to avoid being suffocated by the U.S.-led “containment” of the PRC.
At this juncture, it is worth addressing the concerns of some international observers that Xi and the CCP will necessarily benefit from Trump’s alienation of allies with his maverick geopolitical moves and unfiltered remarks. Although it is likely that countries could seek to improve ties with the PRC to hedge against a seemingly erratic Trump and the U.S., Beijing is not likely to be able to properly capitalize on the trend given its current policies and priorities, as well as the increasing wariness of most countries towards China. Xi is looking to drag the Chinese economy out of its slump and build up the PRC’s self-reliance. This means that Beijing will be very selective with what it chooses to invest in overseas (mainly energy and technology sectors) even as it relies on foreign markets to soak up China’s excess capacity. Notably, Canada’s Mark Carney and Britain’s Keir Starmer only managed to secure limited and relatively modest deals with the PRC after their respective visits to Beijing despite talk of a “pragmatic reset” (UK) and “new strategic partnership” (Canada) with China. The growing recognition of the CCP threat in Canada, the UK, and other nations will also make it politically challenging for country leaders to engage too closely with the PRC; Starmer faced domestic pushback within days after he returned from China. All in all, the PRC’s geopolitical fortunes are not likely to be substantially improved even as Trump’s ruffles feathers abroad in pursuing his “America First” agenda.
iii) Xi could be concerned that the world is entering a new phase of nuclear arms competition with the Trump administration allowing the New START Treaty to expire and demanding that China be included in any new nuclear arms pact with Russia. Such competition could end up constraining the PRC’s military capabilities or provoking a nuclear arms race that would place unwanted strains on the weakening Chinese economy. Xi’s concerns over nuclear arms matters could partly explain why he spoke to Russia’s Vladimir Putin first before reaching out to Trump, and why Xi is keen to “steer the giant ship of China-U.S. relations steadily forward through wind and storms.”
2 Why Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli retained deputy status in the NPC
On Feb. 4, the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress held its 20th session in Beijing. The meeting voted to adopt a report by the NPCSC’s credentials committee concerning the qualifications of certain deputies, including the termination of qualifications of three senior figures from the defense, science, technology, and industry sectors:
- Zhou Xinmin: Male, Han ethnicity, born November 1969. Zhou worked for many years in the aviation sector, serving successively as chairman of Changhe Aircraft Industry Group, general manager of Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), and chairman of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). His deputy qualification was revoked by the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress.
- Luo Qi: Male, Han ethnicity, born October 1967, academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and nuclear power expert. Luo previously served as president of the Nuclear Power Institute of China and chief engineer of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). In addition to losing his deputy qualification, he was also removed from his positions as a member of the 14th NPCSC and as a member of the NPC’s education, science, culture, and public health committee.
- Liu Cangli: Male, Han ethnicity, born December 1961, academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and experimental physicist. Liu formerly served as president of the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), the core institution responsible for China’s nuclear weapons research and development. His deputy qualification was revoked by the Standing Committee of the Sichuan Provincial People’s Congress, and he was also removed as a member of the 14th NPCSC.
***
Normally, NPCSC sessions are held in the latter half of even-numbered months, and each session usually lasts about five to seven days. This bi-monthly arrangement can be circumvented if the Chairperson’s Council decides that there is a need for a special session. Going by the norm, the 20th session of the NPCSC can be considered to be an additional, ad hoc or emergency meeting.
The fact that the NPCSC did not revoke the deputy qualifications of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli — the disgraced top generals who were purged on Jan. 24 — during its 20th session drove rumors and speculation in overseas Chinese-speaking circles. Some observers have claimed that the NPCSC did not remove Zhang and Liu because some CCP Politburo members are questioning the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s move to detain Zhang and have suggested correcting the decision.
Our take
The dramatic and abrupt removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli near the end of January meant that the recent NPCSC meeting would naturally come under scrutiny for further developments in that case. The lack of developments, however, does not immediately point to trouble in Zhongnanhai or hint at a “stalemate” in factional politics over the Zhang and Liu case.
If anything, the CCP’s internal disciplinary and supervisory procedures, the legal operating processes of the NPC, and how cases involving senior officials who were purged in recent years such as Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe were handled all indicate that Beijing is following standard operating procedures in investigating and disciplining Zhang and Liu. The “procedural window” between the official announcement of investigation to the formal revocation of NPC deputy status is typically about six to nine months, and is sometimes even longer.
1. Both Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli belong to the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police committee of the NPC. This committee or its standing committee would need to seek political approval, gather internal evidence, and convene a vote on revoking the deputy status of Zhang and Liu before a report can be filed with the NPCSC and the decision can be subsequently announced.
As there were just 11 calendar days between when Zhang and Liu were officially purged and the NPCSC’s 20th session on Feb. 4, it is unlikely that the NPCSC would have completed the legal procedures for revoking Zhang and Liu’s deputy status within the short time frame. On top of that, other members of the PLA and PAP committee of the NPC could be subjected to political rectification linked with the Zhang and Liu case, a development that would disrupt the convening of the committee. Given the NPC’s standard procedural arrangements for revoking deputies and the extenuating circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that there is necessarily something “unusual” about Zhang and Liu not being removed from the NPC at the recent meeting.
2. A review of the purge of other high-level officials in recent years shows that it can take months after the official investigation announcement before they lose NPC membership.
Qin Gang (8 months between probe and revocation of deputy status)
- Late June 2023: PRC foreign minister Qin Gang stopped making public appearances.
- July 2023: The 4th session of the NPCSC removed Qin from his post of foreign minister.
- Oct. 24, 2023: The 6th session of the NPCSC removed Qin from his post of state councilor.
- Feb. 27, 2024: The NPCSC announced that the Standing Committee of the Tianjin Municipal People’s Congress had accepted Qin’s “resignation” as an NPC deputy. Qin’s resignation rather than dismissal from the NPC suggests that his case did not involve serious criminal charges and Beijing was leaving room for flexibility in the official characterization of his case.
Li Shangfu (13 months between probe and revocation of deputy status)
Li’s case offers greater value for comparison with that of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli because he is also a senior military leader and a CMC member.
- August 2023: PRC defense minister Li Shangfu is officially investigated.
- Oct. 24, 2023: Li is removed as defense minister, state councilor, and CMC member.
- June 27, 2024: The Politburo expelled Li from the Party and the military, revoked his general rank, and transferred his case to the judicial authorities.
- Sept. 13, 2024: The 11th session of the NPCSC announced that the PLA and PAP deputies committee had decided to revoke Li’s deputy status.
Wei Fenghe (9 months between probe and revocation of deputy status)
- Sept. 21, 2023: Former defense minister Wei Fenghe was formally placed under investigation.
- June 27, 2024: Party Central expelled Wei from the Party and transferred his case to military prosecutors.
- Sept. 13, 2024: The 11th session of the NPCSC announced that the PLA and PAP deputies committee had decided to revoke Wei’s deputy status.
PLA Rocket Force generals’ corruption cluster (5 months between probe and revocation of deputy status)
- July 31, 2023: The CMC appointed a new PLARF commander and political commissar, indirectly signaling the removal of former commander Li Yuchao and former political commissar Xu Zhongbo.
- Dec. 29, 2023: The NPCSC announced the simultaneous revocation of deputy status for nine military generals, including Li Yuchao, Zhou Yaning, and Ding Laihang.
3. The significant time lag between the official probe and revocation of deputy status for senior officials chiefly stems from the rigid requirements regarding the investigation period under PRC’s Supervision Law and internal Party disciplinary regulations.
Detention limits and the “3+3” mechanism
According to Article 43 of the Supervision Law, the supervisory measure known as “liuzhi” (retention in custody) may not exceed three months. “Liuzhi” may be extended once for a period not exceeding three months under special circumstances with the approval of higher-level supervisory authorities. This means that the legally permitted maximum investigation (detention) period for most officials is six months.
Centrally managed officials or members of the CMC, however, could be detained up to nine months given the likely complexity of their case:
- The probe of major and complex cases involving many individuals and the wide-ranging transfer of benefits requires coordination across multiple military theaters or departments.
- Cases involving “political disloyalty” or “resisting organizational investigation” require more time for political scrutiny and evidence consolidation given intertwining political and economic issues.
- Procedural coordination could tie up the conclusion of cases. Before the detention period ends, investigators must produce a review report, transfer the case to disciplinary review bodies, and ultimately submit Party disciplinary decisions for Politburo approval. Officials are usually only removed from NPC positions after the CCP’s disciplinary authorities conclude their probe, reflecting the principle that “the Party manages cadres.”
NPC dismissal procedures
Removing an NPC deputy is not an administrative order but a formal legal act governed by the Deputies Law and the Election Law:
- Initiating a dismissal proposal requires joint sponsorship by a legally specified number of deputies or a proposal from the leadership body of the original electing unit.
- PRC law guarantees that the deputy facing dismissal has the right to present a defense at the relevant meeting, requiring advance notice time.
- The original electing body (such as a provincial people’s congress standing committee or the PLA deputies’ committee) must first vote on removal before a deputy’s status can be revoked.
- The NPCSC confirms the revocation of deputy status after reviewing the credentials committee’s report and issuing a public statement.
When the Feb. 4 NPCSC meeting was held, the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli case was likely at the preliminary stage — initial verification and urgent evidence collection — and the PLA’s internal dismissal procedures had not yet begun. Therefore, the NPCSC would have neither the authority nor the procedural basis to revoke their status.
The NPCSC revoking the deputy status of Zhou Xinmin, Luo Qi, and Liu Cangli at its 20th session provides a useful reference on how procedures play out. Their removals were not rushed and instead were the legal conclusion of previously established cases. According to publicly available information:
- Evidence regarding Zhou Xinmin had already accumulated internally. His predecessor as AVIC chairman, Tan Ruisong, was investigated in August 2024. The Tan case had been under review for over a year, producing extensive evidentiary links relevant to Zhou.
- Luo Qi and Liu Cangli had long been absent from major public events or removed from their respective posts for unclear reasons. This suggests that official investigations into the two men were already nearing completion.
- The official announcement stated that their dismissals were decided respectively by the Shanghai, Shandong, and Sichuan people’s congress standing committees. This indicates that local procedures had already been completed before Feb. 4. The NPCSC’s special session was likely convened largely to finalize these cases ahead of the “Two Sessions” meetings in early March to facilitate a vetted and politically reliable delegate list.
4. In sum, the NPCSC not addressing the deputy status of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli at its recent session is less a reflection of potential turmoil in the CCP elite and more a legal and procedural issue. With Xi Jinping having consolidated power to an extensive degree, his anti-corruption campaign has trended towards procedural formalization and rules-based handling even as political decisions are made quickly. Maintaining complete legal procedures (such as submitting cases to the NPC credentials committee) helps the Xi leadership project institutional stability and play up the CCP system’s capacity for self-correction.
With procedures taking at least six months to run their course, observers would be better served focusing on the second half of 2026 to early 2027 when the final reports on the disposition of Zhang and Liu are likely to be released and this political episode is concluded.
