1 What the naming of a memorial hall dedicated to Xi’s father says about Xi Jinping’s political status
On May 24, CCTV’s prime-time program Xinwen Lianbo and People’s Daily reported on the opening of the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall in Fuping County, Shaanxi Province. The reports said that the memorial hall showcases the “glorious revolutionary career and noble character” of Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping.
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Xi Zhongxun was born on Oct. 15, 1913, and passed away on May 24, 2002. This year marked the 23rd death anniversary of Xi Zhongxun.
The “Guanzhong” in Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall is a reference to the central region of Shaanxi Province where Xi Zhongxun lived and where he participated in the CCP’s revolution. The “national patriotic base” in Fuping County consists of the Xi Zhongxun Mausoleum (習仲勳陵園), Xi Zhongxun’s former residence, the Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall, and now the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall, which is located about 400 meters from the elder Xi’s memorial.
The CCP’s efforts to commemorate Xi Zhongxun began in the 1990s when the Fuping local government carried out preliminary renovations of his former residence. In 2005, initial work on the Xi Zhongxun Mausoleum was started, with Xi Zhongxun’s former residence incorporated into the mausoleum complex. After Xi Jinping came to power, the Fuping local government expanded the Xi Zhongxun mausoleum area to about 100,000 square meters between 2012 and 2015, including the burial site, an ecological park, and the Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall.
The Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall occupies an area of about 1,200 square meters, including 300 square meters for the exhibition hall. By comparison, Deng Xiaoping’s former residence exhibition hall takes up 6,700 square meters, 3,800 square meters of which are buildings. The Mao Zedong Memorial Hall dwarfs both, being 57,200 square meters, including 33,867 square meters for structures.
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Some overseas Chinese commentators argue that the fact that the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall was not named after Xi Zhongxun is another sign that Xi Jinping is “losing power.” Rumors circulating in overseas Chinese language circles claim that the memorial hall was originally going to be named the “Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall,” but was changed at the last minute due to intra-Party opposition.
Background
Since the founding of the PRC, there have been many memorial halls named after the CCP’s founding revolutionaries. The bulk of these memorial halls are small in scale and were mostly created to serve the purposes of “red” tourism.
Currently, six memorial halls for founding revolutionaries have been designated as “national first-class museums”:
- Chen Yun Memorial Hall (Qingpu City, Shanghai Municipality)
- Deng Xiaoping Memorial Hall (Guang’an City, Sichuan Province)
- Liu Shaoqi Memorial Hall (Ningxiang City, Hunan Province)
- Mao Zedong Memorial Hall (Shaoshan City, Hunan Province)
- Zhou Enlai Memorial Hall (Huai’an City, Jiangsu Province)
- Zhu De Memorial Hall (Yilong City, Sichuan Province)
These memorial halls are large in scale (with buildings occupying between 2,000 and 10,000 square meters), house extensive collections (thousands to tens of thousands of items), and attract many visitors annually (hundreds of thousands to millions of visitors). The founding revolutionaries honored in these core “red tourism” attractions were all former members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and central figures in the first or second generation CCP leadership.
Our take
While the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall does not directly include Xi Zhongjun’s name, it is undoubtedly dedicated to the elder Xi. This is clear from the memorial hall’s showcasing of Xi Zhongxun’s “glorious revolutionary career and noble character,” the fact that it was opened on his death anniversary, and state and Party media reporting of the memorial hall’s opening.
The prominent launch of the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall reflects Xi Jinping’s paramount position and considerable political strength in the CCP, not his supposed “loss of power” as some overseas Chinese commentators are claiming.
1. The scale of memorial buildings and grounds dedicated to Xi Zhongxun exceeds that which someone of his political position in life should be afforded under normal CCP regime practices. The highest office that the elder Xi held was PRC vice premier (national level), and only 11 of 26 Mao era (1949 to 1976) vice premiers who attained the national level rank (Dong Biwu, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, He Long, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, Xi Zhongxun, Ulanhu, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen) have memorial museums that are named after them or are primarily dedicated to their achievements. And of the 12, only Deng Xiaoping’s memorial buildings and grounds hold the distinction of being a “national first-class museum.”
Given the prior existence of a Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall, the construction of an additional large-scale facility, the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall, is an implicit and retroactive elevation of the elder Xi’s status. This also paves the way for the future designation of Xi Zhongxun’s memorial buildings and grounds as a “national first-class museum.”
Xi Zhongxun was likely “upgraded” to the echelon of officials just outside the CCP’s pantheon of founding revolutionaries like Mao and Deng chiefly because Xi Jinping holds paramount status in the CCP regime and the favorable memorialization of his father is part of building the Xi cult of personality. The construction of the new memorial hall aside, CCTV aired a six-episode documentary series about Xi Zhongxun’s life titled “Chicheng” (“Sincerity”) in 2023 to commemorate the 110th anniversary of the elder Xi’s birth. Xi also likely feels the need to embellish his “red” roots to improve his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) since power consolidation is a never-ending process in the CCP. Finally, local officials could have proactively expanded memorial buildings and grounds dedicated to Xi Zhongxun to curry favor with the Xi leadership.
2. That the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall did not include Xi Zhongxun’s name is likely because Xi Jinping did not want to arbitrarily break CCP political norms and expend precious political capital for a relatively trivial matter, not because he faced intra-Party resistance at the eleventh hour.
The rumor of “last minute opposition” might seem reasonable to those who put stock in the “Xi losing power” narrative (which we have been debunking and explained its dangers here), but runs counter to the logic of CCP operations and power play. Had Xi truly faced opposition, it would have been over the dedication of the memorial hall to the “glorious revolutionary career and noble character” of his father, and not just the name of the hall. Moreover, the ability of Party elders opposed to Xi and the remnant Jiang Zemin faction to directly challenge Xi appears to have been limited starting from Xi’s second term and even more so after the 20th Party Congress when the bulk of key personnel reshuffles ended up in the Xi camp’s favor. And if “anti-Xi” elites with some measure of “quan wei” were to challenge Xi, they would not do so over the relatively minor thing of how a memorial hall dedicated to Xi Zhongxun should be named, but over more crucial issues like China’s economic policy.
Xi Jinping may currently occupy the paramount position in the CCP regime, but that does not mean that he is all-powerful and can afford to casually flout Party political norms as he pleases. In fact, Xi has only broken CCP political norms on the rare occasion that he needs to appoint a tiny handful of close allies or loyalists to top positions (notably, Wang Qishan to PRC vice president at the 19th Party Congress and the “rocket promotion” then-Shanghai Party boss Li Qiang to PRC premier at the 20th Party Congress), but otherwise sticks to those norms.
Meanwhile, Xi creates theoretical justifications to legitimize his policies without breaking political norms. For instance, the Xi leadership came up with the “self-revolution” and “cycle” theories to give grounds for the endless prolonging of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. The Xi leadership also came up with the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Safeguards” to entrench Xi Jinping’s paramount status without openly repudiating the “collective leadership” system (therefore expanding CCP political norms without breaking them). By grounding his policies in theoretical orthodoxy, Xi leaves no room for his political enemies to challenge him while carefully entrenching his position. Xi’s usual mode of operation means that it is highly unlikely that he would push for a memorial hall to be named after his father (even if the hall is dedicated to Xi Zhongxun) and would work within Party political norms as much as possible (even if he is skirting the edges); if so, the idea of “last minute opposition” to the naming of the memorial hall is moot.
2 Is the US-China tariff truce on the rocks?
Trump claims PRC violated Geneva trade deal
May 29
1. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News that U.S.-China trade talks “are a bit stalled” even as more talks will be had in the next few weeks.
Bessent added, “I think that given the magnitude of the talks, given the complexity, that this is going to require both leaders to weigh in with each other. They have a very good relationship and I am confident that the Chinese will come to the table when President [Donald] Trump makes his [preferences] known.”
May 30
1. President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that China was in “grave economic danger” after the U.S. imposed steep tariffs on Chinese imports until he made a “fast deal” to “save them from what I thought was going to be a very bad situation, and I didn’t want to see that happen.”
Trump added that while “everything quickly stabilized and China got back to business as usual” because of the deal, “the bad news is that China, perhaps not surprisingly to some, HAS TOTALLY VIOLATED ITS AGREEMENT WITH US.”
2. In a separate post, Trump wrote that U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum would be raised to 50 percent from 25 percent, effective June 4, 2025.
The New York Times previously wrote that Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs will strike at China, noting that while China does not export a lot of those metals to the U.S., their low-cost exports will go to American allies like Canada and Mexico, who will in turn export sizable shares of their more expensive output to the United States. Also, the Times said that China flooding the world with its steel and aluminum overcapacity upsets “producers and labor unions in the United States.”
3. When asked at the Oval Office about the China trade deal, Trump said, “I’m sure that I’ll speak to President Xi, and hopefully we’ll work that out.”
4. Reuters reported a U.S. official as saying that it appeared that the PRC was “moving slowly on promises to issue export licenses for rare earths minerals.” The trade deal that the U.S. and China had agreed in Geneva called for the PRC to lift trade countermeasures that restrict its exports of critical metals needed for U.S. semiconductor, electronics, and defense production.
Also, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told CNBC, “The Chinese are slow-rolling their compliance, which is completely unacceptable and it has to be addressed.”
US pauses export of some tech to China, revokes visas for Chinese students
May 28
1. The Trump administration suspended some sales of critical technology to China, including design software and chemicals for aviation equipment, semiconductors, butane and ethane, and machine tools. Some of the companies that have been told to stop supplying their technology to China include Cadence, Synopsys, and Siemens EDA.
2. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the State Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security to “aggressively revoke” visas for Chinese students, including “those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.”
Rubio added that the U.S. will also “revise visa criteria to enhance scrutiny of all future visa applications from the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong.”
Our take
1. The CCP has long resorted to “delaying and waiting for change” (以拖待變) when addressing its problems, and appears to be applying this tactic in its current trade dispute with the United States.
The Trump administration’s concerns that the PRC is slow-rolling its compliance with the Geneva trade deal is not unwarranted in considering recent developments:
- May 12: On the day that the Geneva deal was announced, the PRC National Export Control Work Coordination Office held a special meeting in Hunan’s Changsha City where it issued directives to the departments of 10 ministries and seven provinces urging them to strictly prevent the illegal outflow of strategic minerals.
- May 13: Reuters reported that Beijing issued export permits to at least four rare earth magnet producers. However, the permits were issued before the U.S.-China trade truce was agreed on and only to suppliers for customers in Europe and Vietnam.
- May 14: The PRC commerce ministry reiterated its commitment to strengthening export controls on strategic minerals.
- May 29: The New York Times reported that China only granted some export licenses for rare earth magnets to be shipped to Europe and the United States, citing two industry executives.
As Beijing moved slowly on compliance with the Geneva deal, it stepped up support for domestic manufacturing, developing new industries, mastering key technologies, and promoting a so-called “international cycle of exports:
- May 15: The PRC State Council held a meeting to advance efforts to strengthen the domestic economic cycle. Premier Li Qiang said:
- The domestic cycle should drive the international cycle.
- The deep integration of technological and industrial innovation should create new industries and growth tracks.
- A self-sufficient and complete industrial and supply chain should enhance the resilience of industrial development.
- May 19 to May 20: Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour in Henan Province. In remarks during his trip, Xi said that advancing “Chinese-style modernization” requires continued efforts to strengthen manufacturing, adhere to self-reliance, and master key core technologies.
- May 20: State media Securities Times reported that with the easing of trade tensions in May, the local governments of several regions have established foreign trade working groups and provided financial support to enterprises to help them “seize the foreign trade window.” The regions include the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Yunnan, and Chongqing.
Likely as part of its tactic of “delaying and waiting for change,” Beijing has taken steps to further open its financial markets and signaled a commitment to fulfilling its World Trade Organization obligations following the Geneva trade deal. However, these measures for more openness appear to be primarily aimed at attracting foreign investors to inject liquidity into the Chinese financial system rather than a genuine effort at economic reform. Crucially, the PRC has not relaxed sectors such as telecommunications, the internet, or the media, indicating that Beijing is not interested in opening up China in the way that Trump and others in his administration expect.
Finally, the CCP has signaled internally that it is gearing up for a long fight with the U.S. on trade and tariffs. On May 29, the CCP Central Committee’s ideological journal Qiushi published a piece titled “Telling the Story of China’s Economic Certainty.” The article said that China must prepare for the worst-case scenario in the U.S.-China trade war and promoted a propaganda narrative of China’s economic strength. The article further urged PRC policymakers to fully consider Washington’s tariff policies, comprehensively assess risks, and prepare countermeasures.
2. The CCP likely believes that it has room to “delay and wait for change” instead of duly abiding by the U.S.-China trade deal given Trump’s various domestic obstacles.
Trump’s tariffs have already caused fluctuations in the U.S. stock markets and the dollar, as well as disruptions to supply chains in certain industries. The CCP could be hoping that the pains of businesses, investors, and consumers would translate into political pressure and convince Trump to eventually ease off on the China tariffs.
Beijing could also be hoping that Trump’s tariffs will amount to an “own goal” for the U.S. as the Federal Reserve limits interest rate cuts. Fed chair Jerome Powell said on May 7 that sustained high tariffs are “likely to generate a rise in inflation, a slowdown in economic growth and an increase in unemployment.” Powell then showed an unwillingness to adjust rates, saying that “we don’t feel like we need to be in a hurry” and “it’s appropriate to be patient.” The CCP could believe that Trump would be forced to lower the China tariffs without it having to do anything should the U.S. see slower growth, rising unemployment, and increased recessionary risks as interest rates are kept at the current level or even heightened.
Finally, the CCP could be hoping that the U.S. judicial system somehow upsets Trump’s tariff plans. On May 28, the U.S. Court of International Trade blocked most of Trump’s tariffs on the pretext that the president had overstepped his authority. However, the White House successfully appealed the court ruling the following day and the tariffs remain in place. The case is expected to eventually go to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Beijing would be hoping that the above factors continue to develop in a manner favorable to its interests, allowing the PRC to withstand U.S. tariffs and seize new opportunities to improve regime survival.
3. In analyzing the Geneva deal, we observed that the CCP will struggle to make concessions to the U.S. within the 90-day trade truce period due to China’s economic realities, the CCP’s overriding concerns about regime stability, and its adherence to ideological orthodoxy. The last point is perhaps the most pertinent as the CCP’s ideology makes it view truces as a pragmatic tactic to extend its survival and not a starting point for fundamental change.
Communist China has demonstrated that it views negotiations or agreements as merely a means to achieving its ends. Most notably, Deng Xiaoping promised that Hong Kong’s autonomous system would remain unchanged for 50 years after its “return” to the mainland, but the CCP then proceeded to slowly turn Hong Kong “red” through united front operations and legislation. Two decades after Hong Kong’s “return,” the Xi leadership said that the Sino-British Joint Declaration is merely a “historical document” that “no longer has any practical significance” and is “not at all binding for the central government’s management over Hong Kong.” The Xi leadership would later pass the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020, marking a de facto end to the “one country, two systems” arrangement.
The CCP’s adherence to ideology and its “delay and wait for change” tactics bode ill for the U.S.-China trade truce. Unless Beijing moves quickly with compliance, it can expect some sort of reaction from the Trump administration and a worsening of trade tensions. A prolonged trade conflict between the U.S. and China will have serious negative consequences for the Chinese economy and the stability of the CCP regime.
