1 Is the MSS subtly criticizing Xi in its article on the Han Dynasty?
MSS draws lessons from the Han Dynasty
March 15
The PRC Ministry of State Security published a commentary on its official WeChat account titled, “The Han Dynasty: Economic Cycles and Lessons for National Security” (漢朝: 經濟興衰與國家安全啟示錄). The article, which is part of the MSS’s “Overall National Security Outlook Study and Guidance Series” (整體國家安全觀學習輔導系列述評), explores how the Han Dynasty ultimately declined from its peak and collapsed to emphasize the importance of balancing economic development with national security.
The article described how the rulers in the early Han period implemented unprecedented policies in macroeconomic guidance, land distribution, taxation, and resource conservation. These policies and other measures — such as “governing by non-intervention” (無為而治) to help the country recuperate after troubled times, emphasizing agriculture and sericulture to restore the economy, and reducing corvée labor and taxes to nurture the people’s strength — helped lay a strong economic foundation that enabled the Han Dynasty to establish its dominance.
The article added that the Han court spent much of its efforts suppressing border threats due to continuous border conflicts during the Han period. This led to fiscal exhaustion, social decline, and widespread hardship during the later stages of both the Western and Eastern Han periods. In the late Han period, regional warlords rose in armed rebellion and plunged the empire into deeper chaos, eventually leading to the dynasty’s downfall. The article specifically highlighted how Emperor Wu’s “relentless militarism” (窮兵黷武) drained the economy while his “heavy corvée and excessive taxation” (重徭厚賦) weakened the state.
The article argued that the Han rulers failed to maintain their early policies of economic recovery and eventually squandered the wealth accumulated during the reigns of Emperors Wen and Jing. Their policies undermined the social environment necessary for national economic development and the secure functioning of the economy. Also, the levying of excessive taxes to increase fiscal revenue hindered the development of a commodity economy.
In concluding, the article said that economic security is the foundation of national security and centering efforts on economic development is the key to national prosperity. The article also stressed the need to actively guard against various risks to safeguard the nation’s economic security.
***
Some overseas Chinese-language commentators believe that the MSS article is an implicit critique of Xi Jinping, drawing parallels between Xi’s policies and Emperor Wu’s “relentless militarism” and “heavy corvée and excessive taxation.”
Backdrop
Chen Yixin, an ally of Xi Jinping, took over the MSS at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Since then, the MSS under Chen’s leadership has published multiple articles on its WeChat account emphasizing the need for national security agencies to intervene in the economy to safeguard the regime’s financial and economic security.
Our take
1. The MSS’s commentary on the Han Dynasty appears to be part of its broader series of “educational” material promoting the importance of vigilance and national security to the PRC’s economic health and development.
Taken at face value, the article selectively chooses aspects of Han Dynasty history to make the case that “enlightened” central government leadership (i.e. one that is not “militaristic” or levies heavy taxes) is crucial to economic growth and security. This is in line with the Xi Jinping leadership’s rhetoric after the 20th Party Congress emphasizing economic and financial security.
2. The argument by overseas Chinese observers that the MSS commentary is actually a veiled criticism of Xi Jinping is not entirely unfounded. For one, the article “invites” comparisons between the current CCP leadership and the Han rulers, while previous articles were focused on the threat to the PRC’s economic and financial security from “hostile foreign forces.”
The article’s discussion of Han court policies can also be interpreted as an implicit criticism of the Xi leadership. For instance, the Han rulers’ “governing by non-intervention” and “reducing corvée labor and taxes” stand in stark contrast with the Xi leadership’s “the Party leads everything,” heavy-handed centralized control over China and “the state advances while the private sector retreats” (國進民退) model. Also, the discussion of Emperor Wu’s “relentless militarism” and “continuous border conflicts” appear to parallel Xi’s promotion of a “strong military” (强軍) and mounting geopolitical pressure on the PRC (including the escalating U.S.-China trade war, Western technology restrictions, international concerns about the PRC invading Taiwan, etc.).
In considering the above points, the MSS article could be interpreted as suggesting that Xi Jinping, like Emperor Wu and other Han rulers, is undertaking policies that will ultimately lead to the collapse of the regime.
3. We believe that there are at least two ways to view the MSS article.
First, the author of the piece merely used “historical analysis” (i.e. selective picking of historical facts and framing) to discuss the importance of the CCP’s strong central leadership and policies to economic security without any deeper political implications. The resulting blowback from the article, however, could eventually find its way to the MSS and lead to its retraction. If so, then the article is most likely the result of an individual writer’s interest rather than the Chen Yixin-led MSS, and was likely a mistake that the censors somehow did not catch.
A second possibility is that the author harbors dissatisfaction with Xi and deliberately wrote the piece that way to outwardly conform to the official narrative of “coordinating development and security” while making a subtle criticism. At this point, however, this would likely be a one-person “hit job” and not the effort of the Chen-led MSS as there are no other publicly visible signs at the time of writing that the state security apparatus is opposed to the Xi leadership. This interpretation could change if the Chen-led MSS continues to publish such veiled criticisms of the Xi leadership.
2 Xi inspects regional military unit without a CMC vice chairman
Xi conducts post-Two Sessions regional inspections
March 17 to March 20
Xi Jinping embarked on his post-Two Sessions inspection tours to Guizhou and Yunnan. Xi was accompanied by first-ranked secretary of the Secretariat Cai Qi, vice premier He Lifeng, as well as local Party secretaries and provincial governors.
On the morning of March 20, Xi met with senior officers (at the rank of colonel and above) and military representatives of troops based in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan. Per official media reports, no vice chairman of the Central Military Commission was present with Xi for this inspection. According to publicly available information, at least one CMC vice chairman had accompanied Xi on 15 of the 16 occasions when he inspected central or regional military units since the 20th Party Congress (November 2022 to the present).
Backdrop
Rumors emerged after the Two Sessions claiming that CMC vice chairman He Weidong, former CMC member Zhao Keshi, and other active senior military officers are under investigation.
Concurrently, the Xi leadership has been intensifying political indoctrination in the Party, government, and the military post-Two Sessions.
Our take
Xi Jinping’s recent inspection of the troops in Kunming without being accompanied by a CMC vice chairman is somewhat unusual. We see several possible explanations for this:
i) The two CMC vice chairs did not follow Xi on his inspection trip because they are preoccupied with work of higher priority. This would include leading political study sessions (particularly Xi’s post-Two Sessions “education initiative”) and overseeing the anti-corruption investigations in the People’s Liberation Army.
Those tasks would take priority over routine inspections in light of the exposure of widespread corruption in the military following the removal of former defense minister Li Shangfu and other PLA Rocket Force senior officers in mid-2023 and the investigation of CMC Political Work Department director Miao Hua in November 2024.
ii) If recent rumors of the investigation into He Weidong, Zhao Keshi, and other senior military officers are accurate or partly accurate, then the CMC vice chairs could be too preoccupied with sensitive rectification and ideological reinforcement efforts to eliminate the “lingering poison” (餘毒) in the senior officer ranks to accompany Xi on his post-Two Sessions inspections. There is a relatively recent precedent in the CCP regime of an apparatus being subjected to political study shortly after trouble in the leadership ranks. After Chongqing mayor Bo Xilai and security czar Zhou Yongkang of the Jiang faction attempted a coup against the Hu Jintao leadership in early 2012, Beijing ordered all political and legal affairs officials to attend closed-door ideological training that March.
Given the opacity of the situation, it is difficult to verify whether the rumors about ongoing probes into various senior military officers are true. The CCP authorities have reduced disclosures about military matters to a trickle since the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The lack of information, and particularly those pertaining to military personnel changes and developments, makes it hard to say for certain that CMC vice chairs not following Xi on inspection trips to regional units likely means that high-level purges are underway. A potential and more reliable signal that senior military officers are being targeted is the scrubbing of information and mentions about them from official media reports and official websites.
iii) Xi could have decided that it was unnecessary to have a CMC vice chairman accompany him for military inspections because he is very confident in his command over the PLA. It is also possible that the senior-most troops in Kunming were not sufficiently high in rank (corps level [正軍級] at best) to warrant the presence of a CMC vice chairman.
Why it matters
Xi Jinping’s control over the military is likely secure despite the various rumors being circulated and recent personnel adjustments following the 2023 exposure of serious corruption in the PLA. However, Xi’s efforts to rectify the military will almost certainly have a destabilizing effect as senior officials grow paranoid about whether they are next on the chopping block and as the troops get used to new military leaders after personnel changes are made. This will weaken the PLA’s warfighting ability in the short term, reduce its effectiveness in helping with domestic “stability maintenance” operations, hinder the military’s preparations for a potential invasion or blockade of Taiwan, and throw sand in the gears of Xi’s ambition to build a “world-class” military by 2049.
If Xi is unsure of the military’s ability, he could demand greater restraint on the part of the PLA in conducting regional military exercises and other “gray zone” operations to avoid escalating geopolitical tensions. Greater restraint, however, does not mean that the CCP will cease those operations and maneuvers.
