1 Does Xi face resistance from the CCP’s ‘vast technocratic bureaucracy’?
In early February 2025, an article allegedly written by a staffer in the CCP General Office titled, “The Inevitable Failure of Xi Jinping” (習近平注定失敗的真相) began circulating online.
The article said Xi Jinping used the anti-corruption campaign and political purges after taking office to eliminate Party factions, seize full control over the CCP leadership and the military, and consolidate power over all key positions. Despite doing so, Xi faces continued resistance from the CCP regime’s “vast technocratic bureaucracy,” the article claimed. The article added that “vast technocratic bureaucracy” has persistently weakened the implementation of Xi’s policies through “subtle defiance and the inherent complexity of the system.”
The article said that the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” took shape over 40 years, from the start of “reform and opening up” in 1978 to 2018. The officials in the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” are spread out across key positions in economic and political-legal sectors at both the central and local government levels, and serve as an “indispensable backbone of national governance.”
The article outlines the distribution and influence of “technocrats” at various levels of government:
i) Central ministries and commissions: Primarily composed of division and bureau-level officials. These officials form the “core layer” responsible for national policy formulation and technical implementation.
ii) Provincial government: Primarily composed of “technocrats” at the division, deputy bureau, and bureau level. These officials are concentrated in provincial departments, commissions, offices, and bureaus, and play a key role in policy formulation, technical support, and implementation.
iii) Municipal government: Primarily composed of division and deputy bureau-level officials. These officials are responsible for coordinating local resources and acting as intermediaries for policy transmission.
iv) County government: Primarily composed of section and deputy division-level officials. These officials are the frontline force implementing policies at the grassroots level.
v) Various key sectors: The “technocrats” are active not only in traditional financial and economic fields but also in propaganda and education (which have a profound impact on promoting ideology in the regime). The sectors include —
- Financial system: The People’s Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Finance, and the National Financial Regulatory Administration, as well as state-owned banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China).
- Economic and planning agencies: The National Development and Reform Commission and other departments that control macroeconomic regulation and resource allocation.
- Propaganda and education system: The Central Propaganda Department, Cyberspace Administration of China, and Ministry of Education. The “technocrats” in those ministries and departments are responsible for spreading Xi Jinping’s ideology by shaping narratives, interpreting policies, controlling mainland media, and drafting textbooks. But the article claims that those “technocrats” have been significantly undermining the effectiveness of Xi’s ideological campaigns and creating “ideological confusion” through “behind-the-scenes maneuvering, vague policy language, and delayed execution.”
- Political and legal affairs system: The Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and the Supreme People’s Court oversee core judicial and security affairs.
- Diplomatic system: Professional bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handle “complex international negotiations and strategic planning.”
The article claims that the “technocrats” in the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” weaken the implementation of Xi’s policies through “covert resistance,” including:
- Pretending to follow orders while stalling implementation (表面服從，實際拖延).
- Steer Xi towards “compromise” through the selective presentation of data (用數據引導習近平妥協).
- Crafting policy specifics in a manner that undermines the effectiveness of the policy when it is implemented (通過細節設計削弱政策執行).
- Creating “ideological dilemmas” (制造意识形态困境), i.e. introducing inconsistencies in Xi’s ideologies that could hinder ideological campaigns.
The article said that the “technocratic groups” have developed a deep-seated consensus that the CCP can only be saved through the removal of Xi Jinping. The “technocrats” aim to create internal and external crises for Xi through tactics such as complicating situations, weakening the effectiveness of policy implementation, and exacerbating contradictions. Some specific tactics include:
- “Creating dilemmas and worsening crises” (製造難題，強化困局). On the issue of local debt resolution for example, the “technocrats” use “legitimate data” to create an illusion of stability while allowing debt risks to accumulate and create a larger financial crisis.
- “Using subtle means to allow situations to spiral out of control” (以軟性方式讓局面失控). The “technocrats” use delays, vague policy implementation, and other means to ensure that Xi’s policies continuously fail. Such “subtle means” allow the “technocrats” to avoid direct confrontation with Xi.
The article said that the “technocrats” have not formed an explicit alliance, but have reached a tacit understanding through their actions — using covert maneuvering to gradually push Xi Jinping towards failure.
In its conclusion, the article claimed that CCP officials will never let it be read by Xi. The article added that while Xi appears to wield absolute power, he is in fact cut off from channels that would allow him to understand the true situation in China. The article believes the “technocrats” will ultimately drive Xi to “complete failure.”
Our take
1. “The Inevitable Failure of Xi Jinping” is similar in theme and effect as a widely-circulated article in early 2022. Like “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping” by “Fang Zhou and China,” the “Inevitable Failure” presumes that Xi Jinping is the central problem in the CCP regime while other CCP officials are essentially blameless for the regime’s ills. And just as the “Objective Evaluation” lauds Jiang faction member and Xi rival Bo Xilai, the “Inevitable Failure” essentially glorifies the “technocrats” who are passively resisting Xi.
The “Inevitable Failure” is correct in identifying bureaucratic resistance and policy failure as some of the factors behind Xi Jinping’s struggles to improve the CCP’s governance and rescue the regime since taking office. We have noted on numerous occasions that while Xi has consolidated power to a very high degree and is the undisputed paramount leader, he remains unable to overcome the serious deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian system so long as he insists on working within the system and clings on to Marxism-Leninism and derivative ideologies.
However, the “Inevitable Failure” reveals its bias by only holding Xi accountable for the CCP regime’s crises while ignoring the problems developed over the decades through bureaucratic malpractice and corruption on the part of the “technocrats” themselves. Neither does the “Inevitable Failure” find any fault with the deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian system and its malign ideology, which are arguably the root cause of many crises in Communist China today.
We believe that the author of the “Inevitable Failure” could belong to a Party faction rivaling the Xi camp and/or the broader “anti-Xi” movement. The details in the article of the “vast technocratic bureaucracy’s” attempt to undermine Xi could be accurate, but the strength of the bureaucratic resistance and the extent of the resistance could be exaggerated. The intent of the article is likely political mobilization to get more officials to partake in bureaucratic resistance and accelerate the process of bringing about Xi’s “inevitable” downfall, as well as encourage “anti-Xi” observers and commentators overseas to take up the “inevitable” demise of Xi. The article could also be intended to demoralize the Xi camp and ratchet up Xi Jinping’s paranoia in the hopes of provoking unforced errors from him.
2. The CCP’s “vast technocratic bureaucracy” indeed has its roots in 1978 and Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” movement, as claimed in “Inevitable Failure.” To counterbalance the Maoist revolutionary elites and advance his policies, Deng oversaw the gradual strengthening of the state apparatus and promotion of a group of young cadres throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From the 1990s to the 2000s, the central government would favor the hiring of Western-educated officials to develop the Chinese economy.
During the Jiang Zemin faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012), Jiang and his lieutenants would co-opt the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” through the so-called “governance through corruption” (以貪治國) model. The “vast technocratic bureaucracy” had minimal friction with Hu Jintao, whose administration was essentially “hijacked” by the Jiang faction-dominated “collective leadership.” Meanwhile, the bureaucratic system benefited immensely from the PRC experiencing rapid economic growth in the 2000s and 2010s following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. The “vast technocratic bureaucracy” would maintain its advantages during the aforementioned period through corruption, malpractices, and “stability maintenance,” often at the expense of the lower classes in China. The actions of the Jiang faction, the “hijacked” Hu-Wen administration, and the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” would lay the groundwork for the serious economic and other crises that would metastasize during the Xi era.
Xi Jinping would inevitably butt heads with the “vast technocratic bureaucracy” after taking office. In his first term, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and power consolidation moves were meant to ensure his personal and political survival in “you live, I die” struggle with the still-influential Jiang faction. Xi continued with his anti-corruption efforts, political purges, and centralization of power in his second and third term to deal with the remnant Jiang faction and other “anti-Xi” elements, as well as to “strongarm” the officialdom into elevating governing efficiency and better resolve the many crises plaguing the regime. However, Xi’s “self-revolution” and expansion of one-man rule over the “collective leadership” would directly hurt the interests of the “vast technocratic bureaucracy.” As the “technocrats” find increasingly less space to profit through corruption and abuse of power, they would naturally become more willing to engage in both coordinated and uncoordinated passive resistance (including rigid ideological conformity [“prefer left rather than right,” depriving Xi of actual information and intelligence to hurt his policy formulation, etc.) towards Xi. Passive resistance prevents the effective implementation of Xi’s policies as officials either go to extremes in carrying out policy and cause even greater problems, or generate “bureaucratic inertia” by locking policy implementation in a cycle of “propaganda, meetings, documentation, and empty sloganing” (宣传、會議、文件和口頭之上).
3. Bureaucratic resistance and discontented officials are only partial reasons for the Xi leadership’s governance failures. Despite Xi Jinping’s best efforts, the officialdom remains deeply corrupt and as such undermines Beijing’s agenda even discounting conscious efforts at putting up resistance.
A notable example is corruption in the People’s Liberation Army that led to the downfall of defense minister Li Shangfu and several senior military officials in 2023. In early 2024, Western media reported U.S. intelligence as indicating that Xi’s sweeping military purge came after he learned that “widespread corruption undermined his efforts to modernize the armed forces and raised questions about China’s ability to fight a war.” For instance, Beijing found that missiles were filled with water instead of fuel and there were vast fields of missile silos in western China with lids that do not operate in a manner that would allow the missiles to launch effectively.
Reports of the severe impact of corruption in the PLA continue to surface. On Feb. 3, Dajiyuan (Chinese edition of The Epoch Times) published an interview with Zhao Jie, an individual with many years of experience in the PRC’s military-industrial sector. Zhao revealed that PLA weaponry is primarily based on reverse engineering (sometimes from black market samples) and the military still relies on imports for key equipment. Zhao noted that corruption in the PLA has severely impacted the equality of military equipment, citing an incident where a Changhe Z-10 attack helicopter crashed because substandard bolts were used due to cost-cutting and theft of material. In concluding, Zhao claimed that the PRC defense industry might appear strong on the surface, but in fact as fragile as the Qing Dynasty’s Beiyang Fleet (which was crushingly defeated by the Japanese navy in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War) or the Soviet Union’s so-called “torrent of steel” armored divisions (which suffered from severe deficiencies in quality and morale), and cannot withstand actual combat.
