1 Beijing tightens military discipline, calls for more ‘self-revolution’ as Xi faces ‘loyalty’ crisis
Xi leadership emphasizes ‘self-revolution’
Nov. 28
The CCP Politburo held a meeting to hear comprehensive reports from the fifth and sixth rounds of the 20th Central Committee’s inspections of China’s 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.
The meeting demanded that all provinces and regions take a tough, uncompromising approach to inspection rectification, enforce political responsibility for governing the Party, strengthen oversight of leading cadres (一把手), consolidate the results of education on implementing the spirit of the Eight-Point Regulations, and maintain a high-pressure stance on anti-corruption.
Nov. 30
PLA Daily reported that the Central Military Commission issued revised supplementary provisions on the implementation of the CCP disciplinary punishment regulations in the military (軍隊貫徹執行〈中國共產黨紀律處分條例〉的補充規定), and that those provisions will go into effect on Jan. 1, 2026.
The provisions list as key disciplinary violations:
- Failure to implement the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.
- Making incorrect political statements or inappropriate remarks.
- Inadequate implementation of CMC decisions and deployments.
The provisions also adopted the goal of “orienting toward war and preparing for war” (向戰爲戰, or all work must focus on being able to fight and win wars, and all construction and management must serve that goal). Further, the provisions adopted explicit disciplinary clauses covering:
- Party Committees “commanding and fighting wars” (領戰務戰, or leaders at corps level and above are required to be capable of leading and engaging in warfare).
- Execution of military missions.
- Eliminating falsification of combat readiness and false reporting of combat capabilities (戰鬥力治虛打假).
Dec. 1
The 23rd issue of Qiushi for 2025 published an article signed by Xi Jinping titled “To Advance the Party’s Self-Revolution, We Must Achieve ‘Five Further Improvements’” (推進黨的自我革命要做到“五個進一步到位”). The article, which contained around 3,200 words, was originally a speech by Xi delivered during the Politburo’s collective study session on June 30, 2025.
The article states that corruption remains severe and that the “four forms of decadence” (四風, or formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance) persist beneath the surface, with “conduct and corruption intertwined” (風腐一體). Therefore, a long-term struggle must be undertaken. The article also emphasizes that the key to advancing the Party’s self-revolution is ensuring that the implementation of policies is genuinely carried out.
The article said that the following must be “further achieved”:
- Understanding of the Party’s self-revolution.
- Strengthening Party nature (黨性) among Party members and cadres,
- Standardize the operation of power.
- Strict supervision and discipline enforcement,
- Fulfilling the responsibility of governing the Party strictly.
The article further stressed that the Politburo must set an example in fully and strictly governing the Party.
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The central message of the Qiushi piece is that the CCP must push forward its “self-revolution” with unwavering resolve and with determination to “leave a mark on iron when grasping it” under the “new circumstances” in which the task of “Chinese-style modernization” is “arduous and the governing environment is complex.” By ensuring the “five further steps in place” (五個進一步到位), the CCP can make comprehensive and strict governance of the Party truly take root and be effective, thereby enabling the Party to remain forever “advanced and pure” and never “change its nature, its color, or its character.”
Our take
1. The anti-corruption and disciplinary focus of the Nov. 28 Politburo meeting suggests that the Xi leadership will more closely target provincial and ministerial-level leading cadres in subsequent rounds of “self-revolution” inspection. This suggests that Beijing is looking to root out corruption “where power is concentrated” and foreshadows the investigation of more senior officials.
Already, there has been some speculation that Ma Xingrui, the Politburo member who stepped down as Xinjiang Party secretary in July 2025, is in trouble given his absence from the Politburo’s collective study session later on Nov. 28. It is possible that Ma is actually being probed, or he has a legitimate excuse for not attending the study session such as having suddenly come down with an illness. Regardless, the absence of Ma or other senior officials from public events will inevitably fuel speculation about political turmoil in the CCP and contribute to political turbulence.
2. The CMC’s supplementary provisions on the implementation of the CCP disciplinary punishment regulations in the military essentially make it a punishable offense for military personnel to criticize Xi Jinping or improperly execute (including “laying flatism” and “inaction”) his orders or policies. This refinement of military disciplinary regulations is likely a crisis-management move by the Xi leadership following a sweeping purge and ongoing investigations (evidenced by many military leading cadres not showing up for major public events) in the senior ranks of the military. The move also suggests that Beijing believes the People’s Liberation Army has serious loyalty problems and is not sufficiently aligned with the Xi leadership and Party Central.
While the supplementary provisions also include clauses pertaining to the military’s operational aspects (combat readiness of senior officers, etc.), the political discipline aspects are mentioned first, which indicates a higher priority. This suggests that the Xi leadership’s core task for the PLA at present is not training or combat readiness, but rebuilding the military’s absolute political obedience to Xi Jinping.
Until signs emerge in the CCP’s propaganda discourse indicating Beijing’s satisfaction with the PLA’s political loyalty to Xi, political discipline will take priority over operational readiness for the time being. This, along with the Xi leadership’s “self-rectification” efforts targeting the military, will negatively affect the PLA’s ability to wage war and engage in other acts of aggression over the short term.
3. Xi Jinping’s latest Qiushi piece is essentially an admission that the nearly decade-long “self-revolution” campaign has done little to resolve the structural issue of corruption in the CCP regime.
Xi first proposed “self-revolution” in his speech at the CCP’s 95th anniversary celebration in July 2016. The concept was later written into the 19th Party Congress work report and the Party Constitution in October 2017. “Self-revolution” was also included in Xi’s “historical resolution” (adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021) and billed as the Party’s “second answer” to Mao Zedong’s question of whether the CCP can escape the “historical cycle” of governments rising and falling.
Despite being a campaign that has been undertaken for nearly 10 years, “self-revolution” does not appear to have taken over the CCP’s zeitgeist. Xi Jinping notes in his latest Qiushi article that when it comes to “self-revolution,” Party cadres “often merely respond perfunctorily and make superficial statements; it does not enter their minds or hearts. Some even act as bystanders and outsiders.” Moreover, leading cadres, and especially senior ones, seem to use the “Marxist flashlight to shine only on others, not on themselves,” therefore undermining the “self-revolution” effort.
Years of improper “self-revolution” have seen the CCP’s governing environment become “extremely complex,” with the “corruption problem still severe” and requiring a “protracted battle” according to Xi. Xi’s observation that “the key is that implementation must truly be in place” suggests that his leadership continues to struggle with the “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” problem; Xi’s power consolidation and anti-corruption campaign have merely increased his power and heightened the political risks he faces without actually bearing fruit in the form of increased governing efficiency and the resolution of longstanding structural issues in the regime.
4. Xi Jinping’s increasing surveillance and punishment of Party officials and the military is intended to suppress dissent towards his leadership and improve the CCP’s governing efficiency so that it can overcome its many internal and external crises. However, Xi’s heavy-handed approach will not make internal dissatisfaction towards him disappear or improve loyalty; instead, loyalty will become more formalistic and dissent will morph into troubling silence or misleading “positive” feedback. The CCP bureaucracy will also grow more conservative and passive as officials try to avoid responsibility; any initiative that carries even a hint of political risk will simply not be attempted.
As dissent within the Party becomes muted and Xi only receives “good news,” his leadership will find it harder to have a grasp of the actual situation on the ground in China. This could lead to poor decision-making and policies, which in turn would lead to greater dissatisfaction towards the Xi leadership as resentment simmers.
