1 PRC spy balloon updates and theories
The Biden administration and media outlets revealed more information about the PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon that flew over the continental United States and sparked controversy last week.
Feb. 5
According to an ABC timeline, the PRC balloon entered U.S. airspace of the Aleutian Islands in Alaska on Jan. 28, entered Canadian airspace over the Northwest Territories on Jan. 30, and re-entered U.S. airspace over northern Idaho on Jan. 31.
Feb. 6
1. U.S. Air Force General Glen VanHerck, the commander for North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, told reporters that the balloon was up to 200 feet tall and “probably weighed in excess of a couple thousand pounds.”
2. Unnamed Biden administration officials told The Wall Street Journal that the PRC previously sent high-altitude surveillance balloons over the U.S. that were not detected until they exited American airspace. Three of these prior intrusions reportedly occurred during the Trump administration and once previously under President Joe Biden.
The officials said that the earlier balloon flights were undetected at the time, likely because they were “much shorter in duration.” An official said, “This information was discovered after the prior administration left,” adding that intelligence agencies are preparing to brief key figures from the Trump administration.
3. The Drive reported that the U.S. Air Force had dispatched at least two U-2S Dragon Lady spy planes to track the PRC balloon while it was over the U.S. Midwest.
4. Fox News’s Tucker Carlson reported that the PRC balloon left China on Jan. 21, 2023 before entering U.S. airspace on Jan. 28.
Feb. 7
1. President Joe Biden alluded to the PRC balloon incident in his State of the Union address, saying, “I’m committed to work with China where we can advance American interests and benefit the world. But make no mistake: as we made clear last week, if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country.”
Biden added, “And let’s be clear: winning the competition with China should unite all of us. We face serious challenges across the world.”
2. Pentagon spokesman Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder said that the PRC defense minister refused a request by U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin to speak with him immediately after the balloon was shot down.
3. The Washington Post reported that the PRC balloon is part of a vast aerial surveillance program run by the People’s Liberation Army, citing unnamed U.S. officials. The balloons are operated from Hainan Province and have “collected information on military assets in countries and areas of emerging strategic interest to China including Japan, India, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines” over several years. The officials say that the balloons have been spotted over five continents.
An unnamed senior administration official told the Post that Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman briefed 150 people from 40 embassies on Feb. 6 about the balloon incident. The State Department also sent “detailed information” on espionage to every U.S. Embassy that can be shared with U.S. allies and partners. U.S. Officials also started sharing specific information with officials in countries targeted by Beijing, such as Japan.
More theories
More theories about why the PRC sent a surveillance balloon over the continental U.S. at this time have been floated since the incident broke out:
- Gordon Chang, author of ‘The Coming Collapse of China,” said, “China is preparing for war. It’s engaged in extremely provocative and dangerous activities around its periphery, and war could come at any time and at any place.”
- ZeroHedge, a libertarian financial blog and news aggregator, hypothesized among other possibilities that the incident could have arisen from “a series of unfortunate events without any malice on either side.”
- Intelligence officials and analysts told The Washington Post that they are unsure about why the PRC launched the balloon on the eve of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing, but offered some possible explanations. An “obvious possibility” was that the PRC was looking to “assert their power and panache at a moment when things haven’t been going well for Beijing … an opportunity to ‘poke a stick in the eye’ of the United States is always attractive for the bellicose regime of President Xi Jinping, especially now.” They also guessed that “Chinese military or hard-line elements within the leadership deliberately sought to sabotage the Blinken visit, the chief goal of which was to explore strategic stability measures and other guardrails that could limit the likelihood of unintended escalation over Taiwan or other issues of potential conflict.” Finally, officials believe that the incident was “simply a mistaken chain of error — something that’s possible in any intelligence or military operation. ‘Sometimes the left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing,’ noted the Pentagon official.”
Our take
As we previously analyzed, the PRC balloon incident looks like a case of the Biden administration taking advantage of an intelligence gathering operation by the CCP regime to embarrass and pressure Beijing during a crucial period for both the administration and the Xi leadership. Xi Jinping is presently struggling with severe internal and external crises, while the Biden administration itself is beset by various domestic troubles and has to ensure that the Russia-Ukraine conflict goes the way of the U.S. and its allies.
From our assessment of publicly available information about the balloon incident, including the PRC’s response and current interests (see item two of the newsletter), we believe that the more extreme theories about the incident can be safely ruled out. While the PRC is certainly building up its military and is prone to bellicose rhetoric, it is not yet ready for war and is not in a position to wage war at this juncture. That being said, it is unlikely that the balloon appearing over continental U.S. was merely a “series of unfortunate events”; the PRC does have the incentive to gather intelligence about the U.S., its longtime rival, through as many means possible. Using a balloon makes sense from the PRC’s perspective considering that the regime had successfully carried out such operations in recent years either without being detected (as Biden administration officials allege) or otherwise stirring up a public diplomatic incident.
The idea of the balloon as an effort by Beijing to “assert power” and “poke a stick in the eye” of the U.S. because things are not going well in China also does not hold water. While the CCP does pretend to be strong when it is weak (and vice versa), it is not so irrational as to deliberately and brazenly challenge the global hegemon through an “aggressive” intelligence/quasi-military operation and court greater crisis for itself when regime survival is already on the line. The PRC’s reaction to the incident (analyzed in item 2 of this newsletter) also shows that it is not looking for trouble at this time.
While it might be the case that there are PRC military or hardline elements in the Xi leadership who were looking to sabotage Blinken’s trip to Beijing, it does not seem likely that one of their plots was sending the balloon to the United States. For one, those elements would need to time the balloon to arrive in the U.S. precisely when it did, something virtually impossible to control. However, it cannot be ruled out that “anti-Xi” elements in the PRC with knowledge of the balloon confirmed exactly what it was to the Biden administration when it was spotted in U.S. airspace early on, giving the administration time to formulate a response and create a diplomatic incident.
It is possible that the incident was “simply a mistaken chain of error.” The Pentagon official’s observation of The Washington Post that the left hand sometimes does not know what the right hand is doing is a common occurrence in the CCP regime. That being said, this does not absolve the PRC from its illegal and sovereignty-breaching surveillance activities in the United States.
2 Analyzing the CCP’s response to the spy balloon incident
The CCP authorities issued terse statements in response to the U.S. shooting down the PRC surveillance balloon in U.S. airspace.
On Feb. 5, PRC defense ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei accused the U.S. of “obvious overreaction” by attacking a “civilian unmanned airship from China.” He said, “We reserve the right to take necessary measures to handle similar situations.”
On Feb. 6, PRC foreign vice minister Xie Feng “lodged solemn representations with the U.S. embassy in China” over the incident. Xie said that the U.S. downing the balloon was “an apparent act of overreaction and a serious violation of the spirit of international law and international practice.” He further accused the U.S. of “severely impacting and undermining the efforts and progress” that the two sides have made in stabilizing bilateral relations since the meeting between Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden at the G20 meeting in Bali.
Xie added that the PRC government is closely tracking developments, “will resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese company concerned and firmly defend China’s interests and dignity,” and “reserves the right to make further responses if necessary.”
Propaganda
On Feb. 6, several internet portals in mainland China republished an article by “Zheng Jie Ju” (正解局), a “patriotic” self-media personality, titled “The Chinese Balloon that the US Spent 9.55 Million Yuan to Destroy Can Be Bought on Taobao for 350 Yuan?” (美國花955萬元打掉的中國氣球, 淘寶350元就能買到?)
The article mocked the U.S. for deploying F-22 fighter jets to fire expensive air-to-air missiles to take out a high-altitude balloon (capable of heights of 30,000 meters) that can be “bought on Taobao for only 350 yuan.” The article then basically repackaged the PRC’s propaganda on the balloon, including how balloons like the one that was shot down were widely used in scientific research; most of these balloons have poor maneuverability “and rely mainly on floating”; balloons are easily sent off course by the weather; the balloon that entered U.S. airspace was “affected by the Westerlies.”
Meanwhile, Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published several articles under the “Zhong Sheng” (鐘聲) pen name (used to convey important views on international affairs that reflect the PRC leadership’s thinking) that both criticize U.S. hegemony while calling for Sino-U.S. cooperation:
- Feb. 1: “China and the US Must Find the Right Way to Get Along” (中美必須找到正確相處之道)
- Feb. 2: “‘Decoupling and Breaking Supply Chains’ Will Not Work, Deepening Cooperation is the Way Forward” (“脫鉤斷鍊”行不通，深化合作是出路)
- Feb. 3: “There is No Future in Camp Confrontation, the People Want Mutual Benefits and Win-win [Situations]” (陣營對抗沒有前途，互利共贏人心所向)
- Feb. 4: “The US Should Abandon ‘Long-arm Jurisdiction’ As Soon As Possible” (美國應儘早摒棄“長臂管轄”)
Our take
1. The CCP authorities have basically censored the PRC balloon incident by ensuring that it went mostly unreported in mainland media. The only news about the incident that was accessible on the mainland came from the various official statements and the “patriotic” self-media article accusing and poking fun at the U.S. for making a mountain out of a molehill by deploying a fighter jet to shoot down a “weather” balloon.
Beijing likely assessed that calling attention to the balloon incident would erode the political legitimacy and “quan wei” (authority and prestige) of the Party and Xi Jinping. This is because the optics of the incident has the PRC being bullied and embarrassed by the U.S., yet Beijing is unable to mount its usual bellicose response for fear of agitating the latter and further escalating the situation. Thus, the CCP authorities have resorted to damage control by limiting information on the incident that is being circulated on the mainland.
2. The PRC’s “solemn representations” to the U.S. and the People’s Daily’s recent commentaries on Sino-U.S. relations indicate that the CCP authorities are primarily looking to save face and move on from the balloon incident. This is in line with our assessment in early October that the Xi leadership will dial down its “wolf warrior” approach after the 20th Party Congress and make other “surprising” moves to ensure that he and the Party survive their “current crises and rework pathways to dominate in the future.”
Crises for Xi and the CCP have only worsened in recent times. As we have pointed out on a number of occasions, the Xi leadership needs to turn around a rapidly deteriorating economy, fix a demographic crisis that has become impossible to hide, manage the post-“zero-COVID” health and death crisis, lower increasing social tensions, and deal with mounting anti-regime sentiment. On top of that, Beijing has to contend with an international community that is becoming increasingly aware of and willing to confront the CCP threat. The internal and external crises plaguing the CCP regime are in turn compounding Xi’s personal political risks.
Therefore, it is not in Xi and the CCP’s interest to further strain ties with the U.S. over the balloon incident. This is reflected in CCP propaganda and official statements about the subject. However, this may not be obvious to those unfamiliar with Party jargon and operations, leaving room for even more miscommunication between both sides and misinterpretations by observers.
What’s next
The Xi leadership could make some concessions in a careful manner on key issues of U.S. concern to repair frayed bilateral relations. Yet Washington may not de-escalate tensions if it deems the CCP’s concessions to be inadequate, and could instead continue to up the pressure on Beijing.
3 Crisis-plagued Xi promotes ‘Chinese-style modernization’
On Feb. 7, new members and alternate members of the 20th Central Committee, as well as leading officials at the provincial and ministerial level, attended a study session on Xi Jinping’s political theory and “learning the spirit of the 20th Party Congress” at the Central Party School in Beijing.
Xi delivered a speech on “Chinese-style modernization theory” during the opening of the study session. Noteworthy points in Xi’s speech include:
- “Chinese modernization” is a “major theoretical innovation of the 20th Party Congress” and the “latest major achievement in scientific socialism.” Xi urged senior cadres to “correctly understand” and “vigorously promote” the theory.
- Xi said history has placed the “responsibility of exploring China’s path to modernization” on the CCP.
- Xi claimed that he had been “successfully promoting and expanding Chinese-style modernization” since taking office.
- Xi said that “only by unswervingly adhering to the Party’s leadership can Chinese-style modernization have a bright future and bring prosperity.” Otherwise, “Chinese-style modernization” will “deviate from the course, lose its soul, and even lead to subversive mistakes.”
- Xi said that “Chinese-style modernization has the common characteristics of the modernizations of all countries” and also the “distinctive characteristics based on China’s own national conditions.”
- Xi said that “Chinese-style modernization” is a “brand-new form of human civilization” that dispels the myth that “modernization is equal to Westernization.” It also “sets a model” and “provides a new choice” for developing countries.
- Xi stressed that the promotion of “Chinese-style modernization” is a “systematic project” and an “exploratory undertaking” that requires the balancing of several issues, including the correct handling of “top-level design and practical exploration,” as well as “self-reliance and self-improvement versus opening up [to the outside world].” (Explainer: “Top-level design” is a CCP concept. On paper, it means that the central leadership is responsible for coming up with an overall plan for regime reform to ensure better resource allocation, greater efficiency, and the realization of goals. For instance, Xi overseeing and setting guidelines governing personnel selection and reshuffles for the 20th Party Congress is “top-level design” in action at the leadership level)
- Xi said that the promotion of “Chinese-style modernization” will “inevitably encounter all kinds of risks, challenges, difficulties and even dangerous storms, some of which we can foresee and others we cannot.” Therefore, cadres must “dare to struggle and be good at struggling.” Xi instructed the senior cadres to focus on inspecting and identifying cadres during the “severe and complex struggles,” support and encourage cadres who are “good at struggling,” “dare to take responsibility,” and are “not afraid to offend people,” and “boldly use” cadres who fit the criteria.
Li Qiang, the second-rank Politburo Standing Committee member who presided over the opening of the study session, strongly praised Xi’s speech and urged officials to “study and understand it carefully,” as well as “unify [their] thoughts and actions with the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech.”
Background
Study sessions for provincial and ministerial-level leading cadres are the highest-level seminars taught at the Central Party School. Such seminars have typically been held in the first two months of each year since 1999, with a few exceptions (2001, 2009, and 2020).
The content of those seminars reflects the political priorities and directions, including the most urgent political risks of the day, of the top leadership in office.
Big picture
Xi and the CCP regime are currently facing internal and external crises and pressures, including a gloomy economic outlook and unprecedented geopolitical tensions. Both Xi and the CCP’s “quan wei” are also being steadily eroded by policy setbacks and failures.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping’s so-called “Chinese-style modernization” or “Chinese modernization” is old wine in new bottles. Like the CCP’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “democracy with Chinese characteristics,” Xi’s latest political theory serves to repackage the CCP’s brand of Marxism-Leninism into something that the Party believes that the Chinese people and the international community will find more acceptable, cover up governance failures by throwing out a distracting “shiny new object,” and safeguard the CCP dictatorship.
For example, the claim that “Chinese-style modernization has the common characteristics of the modernizations of all countries” is meant to signal to other countries that the PRC is “just like them,” rather than a Marxist-Leninist regime bent on political struggle and domination. By pretending that China is a “normal” country, the CCP is also laying the groundwork for the PRC hegemony to be accepted globally. The CCP would be hoping to continue deceiving the international community about the true nature of its regime and court foreign investments to preserve and strengthen itself.
Concurrently, the CCP is looking to differentiate itself from the West by claiming that “modernization is [not] equal to Westernization” and offering up “Chinese-style modernization” as another model for developing countries to follow. This represents a subtle attempt by the CCP to export its ideology and system abroad while rejecting the Western rules-based international order.
The CCP is clearly trying to have its cake and eat it with regard to the international aspect of “Chinese-style modernization.” This is unlikely to sway the international community, particularly countries that are increasingly recognizing and working to counter the CCP threat. The U.S. and its allies could later cite the CCP’s claim that “modernization is [not] equal to Westernization” as further evidence that the PRC is unwilling to align itself with the rules-based international order and as a result become more determined to step up pressure against Beijing.
2. On the domestic front, Xi was likely looking to reassure the senior leadership and strengthen their confidence in safeguarding the CCP regime with the promotion of “Chinese-style modernization,” another “feel-good,” “pie-in-the-sky” concept that cadres would have no trouble coming to a consensus over.
Xi also took the opportunity to emphasize the importance of his remaining in charge despite recent setbacks. This was done through Xi’s claim that he had been “successfully promoting and expanding Chinese-style modernization” since taking office, and that “only by unswervingly adhering to the Party’s leadership [i.e. by rallying around “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core”] can Chinese-style modernization have a bright future and bring prosperity.” Xi further made his case that the Party should stick with him lest “Chinese-style modernization” later “deviate from the course, lose its soul, and even lead to subversive mistakes.”
Further, Xi is seeking to “legitimize” his norm-breaking personnel reshuffles at the 20th Party Congress. This is evident from his call to “correctly handle top-level design,” which in the case of personnel reshuffles would mean that senior cadres should accept Xi’s involvement and new criteria governing the selection of personnel for various posts. Xi even instructed senior cadres to “boldly use” personnel who are aligned with the Xi leadership’s interests and gave them a rationale to purge Xi’s factional enemies or those who are not on board with Beijing’s agenda (i.e. those who “don’t dare to struggle and are bad at struggling,” do not take responsibility, etc.).
Finally, Xi is signaling to senior cadres that the CCP regime is currently in grave danger. This is seen from his claim that “Chinese-style modernization” will “inevitably encounter all kinds of risks, challenges, difficulties and even dangerous storms, some of which we can foresee and others we cannot.”
While Xi’s warning about risks and “dangerous storms” is almost certainly meant to rally officials and persuade them to give their all in safeguarding regime security, international observers could potentially interpret it as a sign that Xi is preparing to escalate PRC aggression, and perhaps imminently, with Taiwan or China’s neighbors. Ironically, the Xi leadership may be providing the international community the rope with which the CCP regime will be hung.
