◎ Xi faces very high levels of political risk in the next 90 days.
◎ We identify three broad strategic lines which the CCP is pursuing to hijack the discourse on Chinese influence.
◎ The CCP’s claim that migrants workers are returning home to partake in “entrepreneurship” is likely an attempt to put a positive spin on rising unemployment.
◎ Using the Red Matrix aggressively is a double-edged sword for the CCP when the U.S. is on high-alert for CCP influence and interference operations.
◎ Xi Jinping and Donald Trump likely find it to be in their interest to hold a summit at the G20 meeting in Buenos Aires.
◎ The midterm results should have little effect on influencing the Sino-U.S. trade war.
◎ Xi may be planning to make concessions on trade, but the CCP system may not let him give up too much.
◎ We believe that the expulsion of Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang from the CCP is connected with the recent purge of Interpol chief Meng Hongwei.
◎ There are hints that the Meng Hongwei case is connected with a “soft coup” against the Xi leadership.
◎ “Strategic competition” between America and the PRC has stepped up several notches.
◎ We believe that Trump and his administration have identified a very real threat to the upcoming U.S. midterm elections.
◎ The CCP is carrying out a controlled “blow up” of local government debts and transferring the risks to the private sector.
◎ In hijacking the new Cold War narrative, the CCP has resorted to old tropes and mixed in new disinformation
◎ The U.S. recognizes that the China threat is everywhere and existential, and has made addressing the issue the top priority.