This analysis is from the Oct. 10, 2025 newsletter.
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Nine generals subjected to ‘double expulsion’
Oct. 17
A spokesman for the PRC Ministry of National Defense announced that the Central Military Commission has launched formal investigations into nine generals. According to the findings, these nine individuals “seriously violated Party discipline,” are suspected of “serious duty-related crimes involving extraordinarily large sums,” and their actions were of an “extremely serious nature” and had an “exceptionally vile impact.” Therefore, Party Central has decided to expel all nine generals from the CCP and the military, and to transfer their cases to the military procuratorate for prosecution.
The spokesman added that the investigation of these nine generals once again demonstrates the firm resolve of Party Central and the CMC to carry out the anti-corruption campaign through to the end. He added that the probe was a “major achievement in the Party and the military’s anti-corruption struggle.”
The nine generals who were disciplined are:
- He Weidong, member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the CMC.
- Miao Hua, former CMC member and director of the CMC Political Work Department.
- He Hongjun, former executive deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department.
- Wang Xiubin, former executive deputy director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center.
- Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
- Qin Shutong, former political commissar of the PLA Ground Force.
- Yuan Huazhi, former political commissar of the PLA Navy.
- Wang Houbin, former commander of the PLA Rocket Force.
- Wang Chunning, former commander of the People’s Armed Police.
Oct. 18
PLA Daily published a front-page editorial on the expulsion of the nine generals titled, “Resolutely Carry the Anti-Corruption Struggle in the Military Through to the End” (堅定不移把軍隊反腐敗鬥爭進行到底). Major state media outlets like Xinhua, People’s Daily, and CCTV republished the PLA Daily’s editorial instead of issuing separate commentaries on the topic.
The editorial made several criticisms of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and the other purged generals:
- They “collapsed in faith and betrayed their loyalty” to the Party.
- They had “gravely betrayed the trust of Party Central and the CMC,” and “seriously undermined the principle of ‘the Party commands the gun’” (i.e. the Party‘s absolute control over the military) as well as the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
- Their actions had “severely damaged the political environment within the military,” shattered the “political and ideological foundation for the unity and progress of all military personnel,” and caused “extremely serious damage” to the Party’s cause, national defense and military construction, and the image of senior cadres.
The editorial said that “the military holds the gun; it is an armed group executing the Party’s political tasks, as well as a strong pillar for safeguarding the red regime and the nation’s dignity.” It added that the thorough investigation of the nine generals demonstrated that “no matter how high one’s rank or how great one’s power, everyone is equal before Party discipline and national law. Anyone engaging in corruption will not be tolerated — there are no exemptions, no ‘iron-cap princes,’ and no ‘red books and iron coupons.’”
The editorial then urged all levels of the military to unswervingly uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the military; “always remain loyal to the core, embrace the core, safeguard the core, and defend the core”; and resolutely align their thoughts and actions with the major decisions and deployments of Party Central and the CMC. The military must also “unite even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, deeply comprehend the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes, enhance the ‘Four Consciousnesses,’ firm up the ‘Four Confidences,’ achieve the ‘Two Safeguards,’ and implement the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
Backdrop
The Xi Jinping leadership stepped up efforts to “rectify” the People’s Liberation Army after the exposure of serious corruption in the PLARF and the military’s equipment development apparatus around mid-2023. In the following months and years, there have been media reports and online rumors claiming that several senior military officers had been investigated, including the nine generals that have been officially expelled from the Party and the military. A review of official announcements shows that more than three dozen military officials and defense industry executives and scientists have been probed or removed from their positions over the past two years.
Beijing’s latest military “rectification” efforts are clearly a response by the Xi leadership to the corruption exposures from two years back. However, proponents of the “Xi losing power” theory insist that the purge of senior military officers, many of whom are Xi allies or loyalists, is a sign that Xi is in trouble with “Party elders” and other “anti-Xi” elements in the regime. Some in the “Xi losing power” camp are even speculating that the removal of the nine generals indicates that Xi will be stripped of some or all of his power at the upcoming Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.
We believe that the “Xi losing power” theory does not hold water as it is based on numerous flawed assumptions about CCP elite politics and operations. Official CCP propaganda and documents also consistently reflect Xi’s status as paramount leader (see here, here, here, and here), including the Oct. 18 PLA Daily front-page editorial on the purge of the nine generals. In view of current dynamics in CCP elite politics, the “Xi losing power” camp’s argument that Xi faces removal or loss of authority because his “loyalists” have been purged is a non sequitur as the purge is Xi’s own doing, not done on the orders of Xi’s political “enemies.”
Our take
1. The official condemnation of the nine generals (“extremely serious nature” and “exceptionally vile impact” of their actions, etc.) suggests that the Xi leadership considers them to be a “political clique” or something akin to an “anti-Party group,” and is treating their purge as a very serious political incident.
From Beijing’s perspective, the nine generals appear to be part of a vast “interest network” that could endanger the political security of Party Central. In particular, Miao Hua, He Weidong, and He Hongjun controlled the military’s important political work system, which is responsible for vetting and promoting senior officers, as well as overseeing the indoctrination of the troops to be loyal to Xi Jinping and the CCP. This “anti-Party group” linked with Miao Hua and He Weidong also appears to have extended its tendrils outside the military’s political work apparatus to ensnare key commands (CMC Joint Operations Command Center, Eastern Theater Command, etc.) and service branches (PLARF, PLAN, PLAGF, PAP, etc.). Given the potentially serious threat posed by this “anti-Party group” to Party Central, the investigation of nine generals qualifies as a “major achievement in the Party and the military’s anti-corruption struggle.”
2. A review of the careers of the nine generals who were investigated suggests that they were all implicated in the investigation into former CMC Political Work Department chief Miao Hua:
- With the exception of People’s Armed Police commander Wang Chunning, the remaining seven generals had served with Miao Hua in some capacity. Those generals would later rise swiftly through the ranks following Miao’s own rapid promotion by Xi Jinping.
- Four of the generals — He Weidong, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang and Qin Shutong — previously served together with Miao Hua in the 31st Group Army before 2005. Miao was already a major general in 2001, while most of the five generals would only see more significant career advancement after Xi took office.
- He Hongjun, the former executive deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department, served under Miao Hua when the latter was director of the Lanzhou Military Region’s political work department and Lan Zhou Military Region political commissar. At the time, He was director of the Qinghai Military District’s political work department, and the Qinghai Military District was under the jurisdiction of the Lanzhou Military Region. In 2017, He Hongjun and Miao Hua were both transferred to the CMC Political Work Department at around the same time, with He serving as Miao’s deputy in various capacities (assistant director, deputy director, and executive deputy director).
- Yuan Huazhi (former political commissar of the PLAN) and Wang Houbin (former commander of the PLARF) likely established political ties with Miao Hua when the latter was transferred to the PLAN to serve as political commissar between 2014 and 2017. Miao then likely facilitated the promotions of Yuan and Wang later on. Yuan, who served as political commissar in the PLAN at various levels, would eventually take up Miao’s old position in 2022. Meanwhile, Wang was transferred to the PLARF and promoted to commander following the serious corruption scandal in 2023.
- Wang Chunning did not previously serve with Miao Hua. However, Wang could have been targeted because his transfer and promotions at the People’s Armed Police could have come at the recommendation of Miao, and Miao and Wang could have established close ties while serving in Beijing.
3. The CCP authorities have been particularly tight-lipped about personnel adjustments in the PLA since Xi Jinping’s second term in 2017. However, Beijing likely made public the investigation and expulsion of the nine generals at this time because it wants to make Central Committee member adjustments at the Fourth Plenum that is due to be convened imminently (Oct. 20 to Oct. 23) and needs to first expel the generals in the Central Committee from the Party and their office. The announcement also comes after Xi leadership having made preparatory efforts earlier in the year to ease the political “shock” of the move by issuing regulations to “reshape” the work of political cadres and “forge strong political loyalty” towards Xi and the CCP in the military (see here and here).
Those ultimately implicated in the Miao Hua case are unlikely to be limited to the nine purged generals. In a February 2024 newsletter, we covered the case of PLA Strategic Support Force commander Ju Qiansheng and the possibility that he received a “soft landing” after cooperating satisfactorily with the Xi leadership during interrogations, which led to a large-scale crackdown in the PLA. We also covered in an April 2025 newsletter a rumor that Miao Hua had implicated 1,300 individuals after he was arrested in November 2024. While it may never be publicly known exactly how many personnel were dealt with as part of the Xi leadership’s post-PLARF scandal anti-corruption effort, the simultaneous removal of the nine generals already hints that the current purge is much more intense than military purges in Xi’s first two terms.
4. Xi Jinping likely intends to strengthen his control over the PLA by purging the nine generals and others associated with them. However, removal of so many senior military officers at one go will come as a “political earthquake” of sorts to the PLA, and inevitably erode Xi’s “quan wei” and grip over the military in the short term as the remaining senior military officers ponder the implications of the purge and their own political safety.
Senior military officers will have noted that the nine purged generals were promoted to the rank of full general under Xi, and eight of them were appointed to the Central Committee after Xi personally reviewed their qualifications before the 20th Party Congress. Yet the nine were removed on corruption grounds a few short years into Xi’s third term despite Xi having allegedly vetted them himself for their loyalty and corruptability. This development suggests that either the nine generals were truly devious and highly deceptive in their corruption, or that Xi’s anti-corruption efforts were lacking and he exercised poor judgment in personnel selection. Either way, the purge of the nine generals and Beijing’s ongoing “rectification” of the PLA calls into question Xi’s infallibility and political credibility, which in turn weakens the trust between Xi and the military.
We previously assessed in analyzing the purge of former defense minister Li Shangfu that Xi’s factional rivals and other political enemies could have exploited Xi’s prioritization of national security matters to “manipulate” him into “taking out his own allies and ultimately undermining his own interests.” If our assessment is correct, then the “anti-Xi” elements continue to see success with their earlier actions, and could yet do more damage to the Xi leadership (or more accurately, get the Xi leadership to damage itself). It should be noted that while the removal of Xi’s allies in the military could have been the result of manipulation by “anti-Xi” elements, this does not mean that Xi “lost power” to his political enemies or that the military purge is a sign that Xi’s ouster is imminent as observers are speculating.
The Xi leadership has done damage control by spinning the purge of the nine generals as a “major achievement in the Party and the military’s anti-corruption struggle.” This effort to “spin tragedy into victory,” however, indirectly calls into question the actual success of the Xi leadership’s earlier anti-corruption efforts and declarations of “victory.”
5. Xi Jinping’s military personnel reshuffle plans and deployments are likely to be delayed by the ongoing PLA purge.
As indicated above, the Party is expected to revoke the Central Committee membership of eight of the nine generals at the upcoming Fourth Plenum. However, it is unclear whether Party Central will add new members to the CMC. For one, defense minister Dong Jun has not yet been appointed State Councilor or CMC member, and Xi has not promoted any senior military officers to the rank of full general so far in 2025. Should new members be added to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum, this would indicate that the phase of purging “big tigers” in the military is concluding and there would be a new round of full general promotions between December 2025 and January 2026.
Leadership instability at the top of the PLA means that it is not ready to take Taiwan by 2027, the date that Xi has supposedly set for the military per U.S. intelligence assessments. So long as the military purge remains intense and key personnel promotions and reshuffles have to be delayed, the CCP will have to indefinitely push back its readiness date for the PLA to invade Taiwan. Note that the PLA’s lack of readiness does not mean that it is incapable of gray zone operations, bullying the PRC’s neighbors, and other smaller acts of aggression.
What’s next
Party Committees of various military units and service branches across the country will likely hold study sessions to emphasize the severity of the nine generals’ actions and get the troops to fully unite behind “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” Those Party Committees and senior military officers could then issue open pledges of loyalty to Xi and the CCP, similar to how various local Party secretaries pledged their support for the “Xi core” before the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee near the end of Xi’s first term. Those generals who are the first — and the most effusive — in expressing their allegiance to Xi and the CCP could later be promoted more rapidly.
